French involvement and solidarity in South West France with the Spanish Republic in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) by Astington, Oliver
Astington, Oliver (2010) French involvement and 
solidarity in South West France with the Spanish 
Republic in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). MA(Res) 
thesis, University of Nottingham. 
Access from the University of Nottingham repository: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/12212/1/French_Involvement_and_Solidarity_in_South_West
_France_with_the_Spanish_Republic_in_the_Spanish_Civil_War.pdf
Copyright and reuse: 
The Nottingham ePrints service makes this work by researchers of the University of 
Nottingham available open access under the following conditions.
· Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to 
the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.
· To the extent reasonable and practicable the material made available in Nottingham 
ePrints has been checked for eligibility before being made available.
· Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-
for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge provided that the authors, title 
and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the 
original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way.
· Quotations or similar reproductions must be sufficiently acknowledged.
Please see our full end user licence at: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of 
record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please 
see the repository url above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription.
For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk
1 
 
French Involvement and Solidarity in 
South West France with the Spanish 
Republic in the Spanish Civil War 
(1936-1939) 
 
Oliver Astington, BA (Hons)  
  
 
Thesis submitted to the University of 
Nottingham for the degree of Master of the 
Arts in Modern Language Studies 
 
 
December 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
Although the research for this thesis has been based on individual research, I would like to 
thank all those who have in many ways funded, facilitated and enabled this research project 
to be successful. I am grateful for the kind support of the University of Nottingham School of 
Modern Languages and Cultures for part funding my research and providing me with 
excellent support from the staff at the Postgraduate office to the academics of the 
Departments of French and Francophone studies and Spanish, Portuguese and Latin 
American Studies. It has been a pleasure to have discussed and presented my research, as 
well as learnt from the experience of academics and peers alike within these departments. 
Special thanks must go to Dr Gareth Stockey who encouraged me throughout the project and 
allowed it to develop so successfully, having benefitted from two of his courses on the 
Spanish Civil War as an undergraduate from 2008-2009. I would also like to thank Professor 
Nick Hewitt for his advice on the Front Populaire in France and whose course on the Front 
Populaire and Culture from 2008-09 provided me with the foundations for many aspects of 
the French side of this study. I must also thank the staff at numerous departmental archives 
across the South West of France, whose time and advice was greatly valued in finding so 
many intriguing documents for my viewing.  
In Pau I would like to thank Mme. Sophie Lengagne and M .Marco Lengagne for their kind 
hospitality when I began this project in August 2009. I would also like to thank Mme. 
Yolande Paturon, M. Guy Paturon and Mme.Gisèle Saint-Germain in Tarbes, who went out 
of their way to supply me with many of the French works and maps relating to the South 
West in the Spanish Civil War which feature in this thesis.  
3 
 
For their support throughout the project, and especially with regards to my research trips to 
France, I would like to thank my parents Caroline and David Astington. My BA and MA 
trajectory would not have been possible without their constant support.  
Finally I would like to thank Zoé Laveda, who has been a source of inspiration and support 
throughout my postgraduate studies and has provided me with useful advice when I needed it 
most. 
All the persons above have contributed to this research and I would like to recognise their 
role in facilitating my studies and general well-being throughout. Nevertheless any errors 
relating to the contents of this thesis are mine alone and full responsibility lies with me.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
List of Abbreviations 
ADA  Archives Départmentales GHO¶$XGH'HSDUWPHQWDO$UFKLYHVRIWKH$XGH 
ADHG Archives Départmentales de la Haute-Garonne (Departmental Archives of the Haute-
Garonne) 
ADHP Archives Départmentales des Hautes-Pyrénées (Departmental Archives of the Hautes-
Pyrénées) 
ADPA Archives Départmentales des Pyrénées-Atlantiques (Departmental Archives of the 
Pyrénées-Atlantiques, a department before 10 October 1969 known as the Basses-Pyrénées)  
ADPO Archives Départmentales des Pyrénées-Orientales (Departmental Archives of the 
Pyrénées Orientales 
ADG Arxiu  de Girona (Archives of Girona province, Catalonia)  
ADL Arxiu de Lleida (Archives of Lleida province, Catalonia) 
ANC Arxiu Nacional de Catalunya (National Archives of Catalonia)  
CEDA  Confederación Española de Derechas Autonomas (Spanish Confederation of                   
Autonomous right-wing groups  
CDRE Comité de la Défense de la Révolution Espagnole (Defense Committee of the Spanish 
Revolution-based in Perpignan in the context of this study)   
CGT  Confédération Générale du Travail (National Confederation of Labour-French)  
CNT-FAI Confederación Nacional del Trabajo- Federación Anarquista Ibérico ( National 
Confederation of Labour- Iberian Anarchist Federation)  
FR Faucons Rouges (Socialist, SFIO linked youth group for 6-18 year olds)  
GMR Garde Mobile de Reserve (Riot police until 1945)  
GR Gauche Révolutionnaire (Revolutionary Left-Socialist faction within the SFIO)  
JC Jeunesses Communiste (Communist Youth) 
JS Jeunesses Socialistes (Socialist Youth) 
LDH /LJXHGHV'URLWVGHO¶+RPPH/HDJXHRI+XPDQ5LJKWV 
MOI 0DLQG¶°XYUH,PPLJUpH,PPLJUDQWZRUNHUVXQLRQOLQNHGWRWKH3&) 
PCF Parti Communiste Français (French Communist Party) 
PCE Partido Comunista Español (Spanish Communist Party)  
5 
 
PPF Parti Populaire Français (French Popular Party- Far-right) 
PSF Parti Social Français (French Social Party, prior to June 1936 known as the Croix de Feu 
league-Far-right)  
PSUC Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (United Socialist Party of Catalonia-combined 
party of the Catalan Socialist and Communist parties)  
6),26HFWLRQ)UDQoDLVGHO¶,QWHUQDWLRQDOH2XYULqUH)UHQFK6HFWLRQRIWKH:RUNHUV
International- Socialist)  
SP Secours Populaire (Popular Aid) 
SR Secours Rouge (Red Aid-Communist)  
SS Secours Socialist (Socialist Aid) 
UA Union Anarchiste (Anarchist Union)  
 
Maps 
Map 1: The South West..........................................................................................................p.8. 
Map 2: The Côte Basque........................................................................................................p.9.  
Map 3: Pau and Oloron-Sainte-Marie..................................................................................p.10.  
Map 4: Tarbes and Bagnères-de-Bigorre.............................................................................p.11.  
Map 5: Bourg-Madame and Puigcerdà................................................................................p.34.   
Map 6: Mauléon and Sainte-Engrâce...................................................................................p.80. 
Map 7: Cerbère and Port-Bou..............................................................................................p.81.  
Map 8 *DYDUQLH««««««««««««««««««««««««««««S 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 My postgraduate research project since August 2009 has focused on the ways in which 
solidarity and support were created and developed between people in the South West of 
France and the Second Republic in Spain.  The first chapter of my thesis looks at how support 
for leftist politics and Republicanism in Spain was developed in the South West, a border 
region with close social, economic and political connections to Spain, especially following 
the establishment of the Second Spanish Republic in April 1931. The second chapter 
investigates how community groups, local French Front Populaire committees, Trade Unions  
and left-wing political parties worked to establish solidarity with the Spanish Republicans, 
within their local communities, ranging from the large cities such as Toulouse and Perpignan, 
down to localized actions in smaller sous-préfectures and communes. This chapter aims to 
demonstrate that support for the Republic took root across the South West and was developed 
due to the strong links to her Iberian neighbour discussed in chapter one. Chapter three  
examines how smaller government connected of regional functionaries falling under the aegis 
of pro-Republicans in the French government circumvented Non-Intervention laws and 
supported the Republic via partisan acts of assistance in crucial border posts and aerodromes  
in the South West. This chapter aims to demonstrate that despite the traditional narrative of 
the Spanish Civil WDU ZKLFK HPSKDVLVHV )UDQFH¶V DGKHUHQFH to the Non-Intervention 
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agreement from August 1936, on a local level a plethora of actions in favour of the Republic 
were carried out. This research constitutes a significant step towards understanding 
international solidarity during the conflict beyond the major players such as the USSR and 
Mexico, countries which flouted the Non-Intervention agreement in favour of the Republic 
without any qualms.  Finally chapter four looks at the volunteers from the South West to fight 
alongside the Republicans against the Spanish Nationalists backed by Hitler and Mussolini. 
The chapter will also illuminate the complex network of support services provided in the 
region to those wishing to enlist in the Republican army, underlining the important social 
contribution provided by pro-Republican elements within border communities in the South 
West.  
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French involvement and solidarity in South West France with the Spanish 
Republic in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) 
 
Introduction: Beyond Paris and the Non-Intervention agreement. 
 
On 8  August 1936 the French government ratified the Non-Intervention agreement which 
confirmed that France would not supply or permit the supply of any war material to the 
Spanish Republican government or the Spanish Nationalist rebels.1 
This event more than any other has served to obscure more accurate accounts of French 
involvement in the Spanish Civil War, relying on the official version of events to marginalise 
all other forms of intervention in France in favour of the Spanish Republic. Historiography 
UHODWLQJ WR )UDQFH¶V UROH LQ WKH FRQIOLFW KDV mostly pigeon-KROHG µLQWHUYHQWLRQ¶ DV DFWV
undertaken by partisan individuals such as Pierre Cot and Jean Moulin in late July-early 
August 1936, which stopped once Non-Intervention was agreed upon, and only ever 
FRQVWLWXWHGµTXHOTXHVJRXWWHVG¶HDXGDQV O¶RFpDQ¶ 2 Whilst there has been research beyond 
the Parisian initiatives of Spanish Republicans and leftist French politicians, events occurring 
in the South West are usually portrayed as minor staging-posts; the cities of the Midi being 
useful in the frenetic days of early August 1936, but neglected thereafter.3 Even those who 
reveal the existence of clandestine support networks in the South West have a tendency to see 
such local participants in the latter as peripheral characters who acted without wider support 
in the community and whose links to the upper echelons of unofficial government 
partisanship were tenuous at best. 4  
                                                          
1
 G. Howson, Arms for Spain (New York, 1998) p.55.  
2
 J. Serres., Été 1936 /D*XHUUHG¶(VSDJQHGHSDUWHWG¶DXWUHGHOD%LGDVVRD (Biarritz, 2006) p.323.  
C. Gindin., Le Front Populaire: La France de 1934 à 1939 (Paris, 1972) p.155. 
3
 Howson., Arms for Spain pp.49- 57.  
4
  J-A. Rapin., Tant Pis si la lutte est cruelle : Volontaires Internationaux contre Franco (Paris, 2008) p.104. 
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 The other central role played by the south western départements, yet neglected by scholars, 
is the part played by communities, groups and individuals in supporting the Spanish 
5HSXEOLF¶V FLYLOLDQ DQG PLOLWDU\ VHFWRUV IURP -1939.  Frequently, in recent years, a 
plethora of necessary, yet narrowly focused, academic research, journalism and educational 
projects have focused on the Retirada of January-March 1939.5 Such commemorative pieces, 
directed at the squalor and neglect suffered by Spanish Republicans in the mainly coastal 
internment camps, have eclipsed the enduring, substantial and widespread actions of 
solidarity carried out by regional Spanish Republican sympathizers across the region 
throughout the conflict.   
 Research into solidarity with the Spanish Republic in the South Western départements on the 
outbreak of the Civil War in Spain has been a relatively new introduction to French 
historiography. The works of Jean Serres and José Cubero are rare and salient examples of 
how local historians have begun to look at the war and its effects on French solidarity in a 
regional context. 6 :LWK WKH H[FHSWLRQ RI 6HUUH¶V ZRUN WKH SURYRFDWLRQV DQG KRVWLOH DFWV
undertaken by Spanish Nationalists (often in collaboration with French Fascists) against 
French and Spanish Republican interests in the South West have seldom been touched upon 
as motives for increased sympathy across the population. Such Republican sympathies were 
manifested in numerous ways: from coalescing in the transport of military materiel into 
Republican territory, to involvement in solidarity and outright partisan acts in favour of the 
Spanish Republic, based largely, but not uniquely, upon shared leftist political ideology in 
addition to republican values.  
                                                          
5
  See La Dépêche de Dimanche 18/10/09, Hommage aux Réfugiés Espagnols de 1939-1940 (Conseil Général de 
O¶$XGHDQGLes Républicains Espagnols dans les Hautes-Pyrénées GHO¶H[LOj/¶LQWpJUDWLRQ(Conseil 
Général des Hautes-Pyrénées, 2003).  
6
 Cubero, Les Républicains espagnols (Pau, 2003)  
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 Finally, we might observe that scholars have largely overlooked the impact of Spanish 
immigrants present in the South West throughout the early twentieth century, and their effect 
on mobilising their French neighbours in favour of the Spanish Republic, in establishing why 
French populations supported Spain from 1936-1939. Whilst Skoutelsky has dealt with the 
connections between Republican Spaniards and French volunteers for the International 
Brigades, research on the combined efforts of French and Spanish leftist solidarity groups in 
the South West is thin on the ground, revealing little about the true extent of international 
collaboration.7 The same is equally true in the case of historians who have examined the role 
of specific political movements during the Spanish Civil War. David Berry, for example, in 
his work on the French anarchists, devotes significant analysis to anarchist volunteers, yet 
scarcely a paragraph is directed to the wider anarchist movement in the South West that 
sustained those front-line volunteers.8 The readdressing of the balance between the better- 
known combatant aspect of the Civil War and the barren historiographical terrain of 
solidarity thus clearly requires reappraisal.  
 Perhaps the most significant role of this thesis is in its regional focus, which offers a distinct 
insight and reassessment of the South West as a key area within the context of the Spanish 
Civil War and international solidarity with the Republic. Whilst national studies of French 
solidarity from 1936-1939 present the Front PopulaiUH JRYHUQPHQW¶V SHUVSHFWLYH RQ
intervention in favour of the Spanish Republic, this thesis deals with local people and 
communities ignored by most historians. Whilst this form of historiography is useful for 
contextual information on a national level it avoids analysing local communities as political 
players, equally as important as politicians in far-off Paris. Local people, especially in border 
départements, often had traditional links with Spain and Republicanism that meant they had a 
                                                          
7
 Rémi Skoutelsky., /¶(VSRLUJXLGDLWOHXUVSDV/HV9RORQWDLUHVIUDQoDLVGDQVOHV%ULJDGHV,QWHUQDWLRQDOHV
1936-1939 (Paris, 1998) pp.189-191.  
8
 D. Berry., Tant pis si la lutte est cruelle. (Les Anarchistes français volontaires en Espagne) (Paris, 2008) 
pp.231-232.  
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vested interest in supporting the Spanish Republic, regardless of national policies. 
Furthermore, many communities in the South West, particularly in the Basque Country and 
Catalonia, had trans-frontier identities, cultures, languages and religions that provided clear 
solidarity motives for local people. In this light the thesis aims to illuminate the political, 
social and cultural agency that regional communities had during the Spanish conflict and 
reappraise the role of communities in relation to the national and international context. 
 This thesis therefore seeks to go beyond traditional frameworks of Non-Intervention and 
national policy which have all too frequently ignored regional political and social agency in 
the events of the Spanish Civil War. Indeed, it will demonstrate the extent to which, for the 
duration of the civil war, local people and DXWKRULWLHVDFURVVWKH6RXWK:HVW¶VOHIWLVWDQGDQWL-
fascist spectrum mobilised to support the Spanish Republic. Whereas previous historical 
research has largely been reliant on memoirs and the centralised archives of Paris and 
Moscow, this thesis has examined in depth the neglected yet essential material in the 
departmental archives across the South West of France and Catalonia. Furthermore, the 
research has benefitted greatly from the recent declassification of departmental archives 
relating to the period 1936-1939. Therefore the source material discussed in this thesis can 
substantially further historical debate on the theme of France and her role in the Spanish Civil 
War.  
 The multitude of diplomatic, intelligence, administrative and police reports, portraying a 
climate of solidarity across the region, are clearly at odds with traditional interpretations of 
French assistance to the Spanish Republic. Combined they not only call into question how 
limited French civilian assistance supposedly was from 1936-39, but also the hitherto 
underestimated extent to which government functionaries and the local administration 
implicated itself in military assistance to the Spanish Republic. Coinciding with the 
beginning of this research, the digitalisation, since 2009, of Spanish regional and provincial 
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archives, containing government and local press resources has also facilitated the clarification 
of the extent to which French solidarity in the South West had a positive impact on how 
Spanish Republicans perceived their struggle, and how the solidarity of their northern 
neighbours provided substantial moral strength even in the most difficult times. Republican 
diplomatic correspondence has in addition demonstrated the extent to which, from 1936, links 
with Spanish immigrants to France were strengthened and collaboration with French leftist 
communities actively promoted, enhancing the solidarity movements and giving them vital 
official sanctioning needed to provide effective support to the Spanish Republic. 
 Finally this thesis has undoubtedly benefited from the changing current of French 
historiography which has begun to shift from focus on the exile of the Spanish Republicans 
and towards the efforts made by French communities to support the Republic, during the 
conflict itself.9 
 Chapter one will demonstrate the varying situations and motivations of local populations 
across the south-western départements. It will illuminate how diverse political tendencies 
were brought together through political meetings and pro-Republican events which then 
fostered a climate of sympathy towards )UDQFH¶V5HSXEOLFDQQHLJKERXUV7KLVFKDSWHUDLPVWR
establish the foundations for solidarity that existed in the 1930s in the region and could thus 
be developed by the end of 1936 by pro-Republican supporters. 
 &KDSWHU WZR ZLOO VKRZ KRZ ORFDO SHRSOH¶V DZDUHQHVV RIWHQ KHLJKWHQHG E\ VXFK HYHQWV, 
simultaneously facilitated the active involvement of communities, political groups and 
professionals in solidarity initiatives such as transporting of supplies to Spain, enabling a 
                                                          
9
 See  Cubero, Les Républicains espagnols & Serres., Été 1936   
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visible impact to be made by people from the South West in assisting their Spanish 
neighbours. 
 Having established the impact made by civilians in re-enforcing material solidarity to 
civilians, chapter three will demonstrate how, from July 1936, French government 
Republican sympathisers, working in covert and partisan solidarity operations, succeeded, in 
collaboration with local pro-Republicans, in supplying the Spanish Republic with war 
materiel. Such endeavours clearly carried a high political risk, with far-right groups in France 
and Spain prepared to go to extreme lengths to expose such undertakings. 
  Finally, in chapter four, having seen how solidarity activities by French officials 
increasingly blurred the boundaries of tacit support and active participation, we will see how 
individuals from the South West, influenced strongly by the plethora of solidarity activities 
and meetings in their local communities, decided to travel to Spain to participate in the 
struggle against the Nationalists and their allies. This will underline how volunteering for the 
Republic was seen as part of a wider tradition of partisan involvement in favour of the 
Spanish Republic, which was accompanied by parallel ventures in the region to clandestinely 
supply the Republic. The chapter also aims to emphasise how volunteers were supported in 
numerous ways by covert support activities which enabled volunteers to be guided into Spain 
following the introduction of Non-Intervention laws that made volunteering illegal.  
  Having highlighted the lengths that pro-Republican government-connected and civilian 
elements in the region went to, in order to provide solidarity and partisan support to the 
Spanish Republic from 1936, the thesis thus aims to demonstrate that Republican 
sympathisers across the South West were not peripheral characters, overshadowed by the 
extensive manoeuvres of Paris, Mexico and Moscow, in their bids to aid the Spanish 
Republic. The swift and multi-faceted nature of south west solidarity will elucidate how 
14 
 
solidarity activities, political meetings, deliveries of supplies to the Republican zone often 
combined the skills and expertise of a wide range of ideological tendencies and professions 
ranging from workers to functionaries, diplomats to doctors. This work will prove that such 
regional actors played a crucial role in solidarity with the Republic, providing a potent 
reminder that such assistance was neither fleeting nor dependent on financial recompense. It 
will ascertain that through the solid roots established prior to 1936, south western support for 
the Spanish Second Republic remained unswerving until the fall of the Republic in March 
1939. 
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Map 1 Above: Aquitaine and the Basque coast. Below: The Languedoc and Mediterranean coast: 
Pneu Michelin Services de Tourisme, France:Grandes Routes (Paris, 1954)   
1cm to 10km 
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Map 2 The Côte Basque (Basque coast) and Franco-Spanish border crossing at Hendaye-Irún 
(Basses-Pyrénées)  
Pneu Michelin Services de Tourisme, Carte Biarritz-Luchon 85 (Paris,1963)   
 
1cm to 2km 
Map 2 
Map 3 
Map 4 
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Map 3  Pau and Oloron-Sainte-Marie (Basses-Pyrénées)  
Pneu Michelin Services de Tourisme, Carte Biarritz-Luchon 85 (Paris,1963)  
 
1cm to 2km 
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Map 4  Tarbes and Bagnères-de-Bigorre (Hautes-Pyrénées)  
Pneu Michelin Services de Tourisme, Carte Biarritz-Luchon 85 (Paris,1963)  
1cm to 2km 
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Chapter One: From Sympathies to Solidarity 
In order to understand and position solidarity in the South West of France within its context 
in the 1930s this chapter will demonstrate that strong cross-border links existed prior to July 
1936 which then encouraged local people to get involved in solidarity initiatives. The chapter 
will show how political contexts on both sides of the border facilitated inclusion of all 
elements of the regional Left. Having provided the contextual analysis of solidarity in the 
region the chapter will then underline how political meetings succeeded in fostering an 
inclusive atmosphere conducive to the development of support initiatives. This will then 
allow us to see how initial pro-Republican demonstrations and meetings were developed into 
humanitarian relief initiatives, which will be analysed in chapter two. 
If the events triggered by the military uprising of the 17-18 July 1936 constituted the 
beginning of a long process of wartime solidarity and support for the Spanish Republic in 
France, it is undeniable that such widespread assistance did not arise amongst all sectors of 
the left in the South West by chance. Indeed it would be correct to say that the roots of the 
solidarity that would manifest itself during the conflict were already deeply entwined in 
UHJLRQDO FRQVFLRXVQHVV 7KDW VXFK V\PSDWK\ WR WKH UHJLRQ¶V WUDQV-Pyrenean neighbours 
already existed was in no small measure due to the development of extensive contacts with 
the northern border regions of Guipúzcoa, Navarra, Aragón and Cataluña in the years before 
the Civil war. It has been argued by José Cubero that whilst towns such as Oloron-Sainte-
Marie remained French in sovereignty, the local inhabitants remained economically tied to 
their southern neighbours.1 Moreover, centuries of cross-border cultural ties between Basques 
                                                          
1
 J.Cubero., Les Républicains espagnols, (Pau, 2003) pp.38-39.  
How closely Spaniards in the border regions identified economically and politically with their French 
neighbours can be seen when the population of Irún sang the Himno de Riego and the Marseillaise on the 
declaration of the Second Spanish Republic. See J.Serres., Été 1936.p.14.   
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and Catalans with their shared languages and cultures played significant roles in establishing 
solidarity, meetings often being held, particularly in Perpignan, in the regional language.2  
 Above all, immigration throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century undoubtedly 
bound trans-Pyrenean populations closer together. This is not to say that immigration to 
France was never a cause for consternation amongst elements of the Spanish Left, who 
lamented the drain of emigration to France. To give just one example the Confederación 
Nacional del Trabajo (CNT) in particular deplored that: 
En el quinquenio 1921-1925 huyeron a la vecina República 129,000 agricultores españoles.  
Por Hendaya, Marignac, Saint-%HDW3HUSLxDQVDOHQXHVWUDVDQJUHTXHHVFDSD« 
dejando nuestras tierras sin cultivar.3 
 
 
However, such interpretations of the harmful effects of emigration clearly underestimate the  
extent to which Spanish immigrants to France developed strong peacetime links with their 
northern neighbours, and how subsequent political events would draw the two populations 
together based on shared leftist and republican values. In this vein, François Mazou, an 
Oloronnais International Brigade volunteer responded on being interviewed about whether he 
had pre- 1936 connections to Spain and the Spanish people: 
Oui. Situation géographique. Contact avec des amis espagnols. Une partie de la population 
DYDLW VXLYLH O¶DUULYpH GH OD MHXQH 5pSXEOLTXH HVSDJQROH Et quand la République était 
proclamée, tout Oloron était en fête. Et puis je commençais à parler espagnol avec les 
EspDJQROVG¶2ORURQ4 
 
 
 It is also clear that whilst such values could produce moral support for the Republican cause, 
the Bienio Negro and the Asturias uprising demonstrated that trans-Pyrenean links were not 
only strong in times of celebration, but equally in times of crisis.5 Thus André Moine, the 
                                                          
2
 Commissaire Spécial de Perpignan to Préfet des Pyrénées-Orientales, 13.09.36. 1M769 ADPO  
3
 Gerona CNT , 19/6/37, ADG  
4
 R. Skoutelsky., /¶(VSRLUJXLGDLWOHXUVSDV, (Paris, 1998) p.190. 
5
 The Bienio Negro came following the triumph of the Right in the legislative elections for the Cortés in 
November 1933. This led to a period of social and political turmoil with the Right attempting to reverse the 
reforms made by the leftist Republicans of 1931-1933. In response to the naming of right-wing ministers of the 
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head of the Regional Communist Party, when asked about why the local Communist party 
responded to the Nationalist rebellion with solidarity for the Republicans in July 1936, 
answered: 
Déjà suite à la féroce répression anti-ouvrière de 1934 dans les Asturies, des dizaines de 
refugiés espagnols avaient été hébergés à Boucau et à Tarnos....en juillet 1936 O¶agression 
franquiste contre la République espagnole, le réflexe de solidarité républicaine de nos 
populations est déjà une ancienne tradition. 6  
  
Evidently the events in Spain were particularly resonant in much of the South West especially 
in host areas of Spanish economic immigration. As can be seen in 0RLQH DQG 0D]RX¶V
response above, solidarity was not just based on class, but also on republican values on both 
sides of the Pyrenees. However, if solidarity before 1936 was appreciated by Republican 
Spaniards, such assistance to a fellow neighbour was certainly not one sided. At a meeting in 
Tarbes to celebrate the anniversary of the Spanish Republic on the 14 April 1937 an orator, 
M. Mamonet, of the Secours Rouge (SR), reminded the audience of the contribution of Spain 
to the Paris Commune of 1871 and the 39,000 Spanish volunteers to the French army in the 
First World War.7 
 Such evocations and mutual support make it obvious that by the outbreak of the Civil War, 
both populations already had large leftist and republican sectors that embraced similar 
political aspirations and were prepared to reinforce words with acts of solidarity in support of 
their neighbours.   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
CEDA in the government, in October 1934 miners in the Asturias region led an uprising. After initial success 
the workers were repressed by the army commanded by General Francisco Franco, leading to hundreds of 
summary executions and torture as well as thousands of imprisonments. For further information on the Bienio 
Negro and the Asturias uprising of 1934 see R. Carr., The Spanish Tragedy (London, 1977) pp.45-46.  
6
 Serres., Été 1936, p.295. 
7
 Commissaire Spécial to Préfet des Hautes-Pyrénées.  14.04.37. 4M238 ADHP 
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 If the events of the early 1930s highlighted the capacities of the South West for solidarity 
with their southern neighbours, the advent of the Spanish Civil War would prove a true test 
for French populations across the region. Whilst previous solidarity efforts aimed at assisting 
the refugees of the Asturias uprising had been relatively small scale, the events of Civil War 
demonstrated that such pre-July 1936 solidarity had not been a momentary phenomenon and 
indeed can be seen as the beginning of a trajectory that would last until 1939 and beyond.8  
  
 Of course the 1930s had not just witnessed the development of close relationships between 
French Republican sympathisers and the Spanish Left, but also the establishment of many 
Spanish rightist groups whose political agenda was aimed at undermining the Spanish 
Republic from abroad. Following the establishment of the Second Republic in April 1931, 
Monarchists, Carlists and personalities of the Spanish far-right, visiting and residing on the 
Basque Riviera, were involved in various intrigues against the fledgling Republic of Spain. 
As early as August 1931 Manuel Azaña, the first Prime Minister of the Second Republic 
declared in a VSHHFKGLUHFWHGDWWKHUHJLPH¶VHQHPLHV 
La República tiene sus enemigos...los que intentan perturbar la obra de la República, en 
Biarritz y dentro de España...9 
 
Thus from the outset of the Republic, the French Basque coast enclaves of Biarritz, Saint-
Jean-de-Luz and Ciboure acquired contemptible status to the Spanish Left, becoming 
synonyms for the foci of anti-Republican conspiracy abroad.10  
 Numerous Nationalist personalities who could hardly have endeared themselves to the Left 
continued to arrive in Biarritz up until July 1936 and after. The South West was therefore the 
home not only to French pro-Republicans such as the supporters of the Comité Bilbao and the 
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 Serres., Été 1936, p.295. ,QUHIXJHHVZHUHKRXVHGE\WKH³&RPLWp%LOEDR´LQ%RXFDX 
9 See Diario de Gerona, 14/09/31, ADG 
10 These towns had become fashionable with the Spanish Aristocracy since their foundation as playgrounds for 
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Sebastián.   
23 
 
Parti Communiste Français (PCF), but also a substantial layer of the ancien regime and 
domestic personae non gratae of the Bienio Negro era political class, epitomised by the 
presence before and after July 1936 of José Maria Gil Robles, head of the Confederación 
Española de Derechas Autónomas (CEDA). The tone for confrontation between the 
5HSXEOLF¶VORFDO)UHQFKV\PSDWKLVHUVDQG6SDQLVKULJKWLVWUHIXJHHVZDVXQGHUOLQHGRQWKH
July 1936, when A.B.C Madrid UHSRUWHGWKH)UHQFK%DVTXH3&)¶VGHQXQFLDWLRQRIWKHIRUPHU
CEDA leader:  
La célula comunista...pide al gobierno nacido del Frente Popular la adopción de medidas 
inmediatas para que el jefe fascista Gil Robles y su estado mayor sean imposibilitados de 
dirigir desde Biarritz la subversión criminal contra el pueblo español...El ex-ministro de 
Guerra jesuita no es un veraneante cualquiera, enamorado de la hermosa Francia. Es un 
FRQVSLUDGRUHVXQEHOLJHUDQWHFRQWUDODOHJDOLGDG«11  
 
 
In this context of rising political tension, on 24 August 1936 Gil Robles was invited by the 
local authorities to vacate the region, with the ex-CEDA chief subsequently making his way 
to a house in the Landes, 100 kilometres from the border.12 
 The activities of the refugee right that had previously appeared benign, thus in July 1936 
acquired a very different significance. Local leftists were spurred into action in many areas of 
the South West, including on the Basque and Mediterranean coastlines, as the ideology of 
many Nationalist refugees and their local far-right supporters lay in clear opposition to the 
unity of the Front Populaire. For pro-Republicans in the South West it was unnecessary to 
travel south of the Bidassoa to comprehend the anti-Republican machinations of Nationalists 
in the region and obvious that solidarity and anti-fascism was as relevant in local 
communities as in the Spanish Republic itself. This recognition thus enabled a regional unity 
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to arise based on Republican émigré and French local opposition to Nationalist activities 
which will be demonstrated later in the chapter.  
 
 In assessing the effectiveness of solidarity actions in the South West later on in the war it is 
necessary to examine the trajectory of support for the Spanish Republic in the early months 
of the war. Amongst many aspects that will be analysed in this vein will be the spread of 
meetings and solidarity events in the regions. This will demonstrate that subsequent solidarity 
came as a result of an established programme of events that fostered a climate of sympathy  
for Republican factions as well as resistance to Nationalist and Fascist elements, in the South 
West and in Spain.  
 
The first months-The awakening of consciousness and the development of solidarity 
movements across the South West 
 
 
If the fallout of the Bienio Negro had limited effect on wider leftist solidarity across the 
region, the main committees being run by the regional PCF at the outbreak of the Civil war in 
Spain brought together the diverse components of the French Front Populaire in the South 
West in unprecedented displays of unity. 13 Within days after the outbreak of the Nationalist 
rebellion against the Spanish Republic, meetings had been organised across the region. 
Accompanying such manifestations of Front Populaire unity, committees and solidarity 
groups developed as it became obvious that the uprising would not be contained and that the 
danger posed to the Second Republic was increasingly serious.  
At the same time it is evident that, whilst the rebellion in Spain was important on the agenda 
of the regional Left, it did not initially take precedence over national and local issues from the 
outset. Indeed, it was only clear after the general¶V DWWHPSWHGFRXSG¶pWDW GHYHORSHG LQWR D
civil war, that the issue would develop its own prominence over local political affairs.  
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Thus at a Front Populaire meeting held in St Cyprien, in the Pyrénées-Orientales , on the 26th 
July, the Ordre du jour voted on by the assembled leaders and supporters of the local Section 
Française de /¶LQWHUQDWLRQDOH2XYULqUH6),2- Socialist), the PCF and their youth wings was 
as followed:       
1. Un ordre du jRXUGHPDQGDQWTX¶XQHHQTXrWHVRLWIDLWVXUOHVSURYRFDWLRQVIDVFLVWHVGX
-XLOOHWj6W&\SULHQ« 
2. Une adresse de sympathie au Front Populaire espagnol. 14 
The Head of the Comité local du Front Populaire, also declared on closing the meeting:  
-¶HVSqUH TXH OD PDQLIHVWDWLRQ G¶DXMRXUG¶KXL VHUYLUD GH leçon aux fascistes de St 
Cyprien. 6¶LOVUHFRPPHQFHQWOHXUVSURYRFDWLRQV nous reviendrons plus nombreux.15 
 
 
It is obvious from the meeting that, whilst the nascent Spanish conflict was a noteworthy 
WRSLFLWZDVLQLWLDOO\VHHQWKURXJKWKHSULVPRIORFDOµ)DVFLVW¶HYHQWVIHDWXULQJDVDQDVLGHWR
local politics. From the perspective of the speaker it is clear that the strength of local feeling 
and an ideological ally south of the border were combined factors of support for the Left. 
Furthermore, it is understandable in the climate of 1936 and the elections of the Front 
Populaire that national and regional issues were still at the forefront of leftist feeling, unlikely 
to be superseded immediately by Spanish events, especially when the outcome of the initial 
rebellion was still uncertain. However, it is clear that in Front Populaire meetings after July 
1936 the Spanish Civil War gained a political significance of its own as a rallying point for 
the regional Left, and would subsequently come to dominate the political agenda across the 
entire political spectrum. The magnitude of the Spanish cause would lead to an expansion of 
events and meetings and increasing public sympathy, if not yet committed solidarity. 
                                                          
14
 Commissaire Spécial de Perpignan to Préfet des Pyrénées-Orientales, 27.07.36 1M769 ADPO 
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  The contrast between the meetings of July and the subsequent meetings from August 1936 is 
notable. Whilst the meeting in St Cyprien, a small coastal town, attracted 400 local leftists 
outside the Café Pontis, the meetings in August became altogether different affairs.16  
 Police in Perpignan reported : 
«la soirée sportive organisée par le &RPLWpG¶(QWU¶DLGHDX[$QWL-fascistes espagnols, sous le 
SDWURQDJHGX)URQW3RSXODLUHV¶HVWGpURXOpHKLHUVRLUDX9pORGURPHPXQLFLSDOHQSUpVHQFH
de  4 à 5.000 personnes.17 
 
 
The upgrading of the conflict to a major regional political event can thus be evidenced in this 
meeting with the use of an important community sporting venue, in the Prefecture town of 
Perpignan, with an enlarged audience and with aims that were clearly directed at assisting the 
Spanish Republic. The police Inspecteur continued:  
TOURNE, Secrétaire adjoint du dit comité, prononce une allocution concernant les affaires 
G¶(VSDJQH ; fait un appel à la solidarité des anti-fascistes et termine en demandant que M. le 
Préfet des Pyrénées Orientales  fasse évacuer du département les fascistes espagnols. M. 
BRUTUS donne l¶DGKpVLRQ GH OD PXQLFLSDOLWp j OD lutte contre le fascisme. Et enfin M. 
%2855$7«DQQRQFHTXHGHVGpOpJXpVVHUHQGURQWj%DUFHORQHGLPDQFKHDRWDSSRUWHU
O¶DLGHPRUDOHWPDWpULHOOHGHV&DWDODQVIUDQoDLVDOHXUVIUqUHVHVSagnols. 18  
 
 
What is striking is how Spanish events overtook local political events to such an extent that 
the meeting was directed entirely at supporting the Spanish Republic and expressly intended 
to give not just moral support to the Republic, but also to show that the organisers intended to 
travel to Barcelona to support their neighbours. Cultural ties between French and Spanish 
Catalans were repeatedly emphasised to demonstrate the unity of the struggle on both sides of 
the Pyrenees. The use of sport and cycling in particular as a vehicle for raising funds shows 
not only clear adhesion to the ideals of the Front Populaire, but also a diversification of 
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political methods to appeal to an even wider Leftist audience. Terms such as anti-fascist and 
frères are evoked with the obvious aim of appealing to as wide a spectrum of support as 
possible on the Left as well as appealing to the traditional cross-border relationship between 
French and Spanish Catalans. 
 By September 1936, the unity of this spectrum was obvious to all elements of the local 
community, with a procession through the town centre comprising 2000 Republican 
sympathizers led by the assembled local leaders of the SFIO, the PCF, the SR, Faucons 
Rouges (FR), the Ligue des DrRLWV GH /¶+RPPH /'+ WKe Confédération Générale des 
Travailleurs (CGT), the Jeunesses Socialistes (JS) and Communistes (JC) and the Amis de 
O¶8566 1XPHURXV RWKHU SHUVRQDOLWLHV LQFOXGLQJ WKH GHSXW\-mayor of Perpignan, M. 
Bonnery, and a delegation from the Conseil Municipal also marched accompanied by the 
Socialist deputy for Prades , M. Rous and the Conseiller Général M. Abbadie and various 
other leftist local representatives19. &KDQWV RI µDHV DYLRQV HW GHV FDQRQV SRXU O¶(VSDJQH¶ 
accompanied the procession with the commissaire finishing his report noting that: 
 ,OQ¶\DSDVHXGHFULVFRQWUHOHJRXYHUQHPHQWRXVHVUHSUpVHQWDQWV 20  
This was hardly surprising given that every political grouping, as well as their supporters 
present at the event, were in 1936 part of, or supporting, the Popular Front with most of the 
OHIWXQZLOOLQJ WRGRDQ\WKLQJ WKDWPLJKWEHSHUFHLYHGDVGDPDJLQJ WR WKH)URQW3RSXODLUH¶V
image of unity.  
  As noted above, unity was clearly the key feature of such meetings and demonstrations, with 
no reference to differing national political agendas. The appeal of supporting the Spanish 
Republic was consequently far greater by September as the major political organisms had 
widened the net of participation to target the whole of the leftist and democratic spectrum.  
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 Finally the meetings emphasise how the local anti-fascist spotlight was redirected from local 
political feuds with the right and towards local Spanish rightist elements, which were 
indisputably present on French territory, in the Pyrénées-Orientales.21  
 Whilst such meetings displayed a certain mobilisation of leftist public opinion in favour of 
the Spanish Republic there were clear reasons why such solidarity events could be organised 
in the community. In Perpignan notably the establishment of a united front of left-wing 
political groups in the municipal buildings of the town provided a centre in the region for 
solidarity initiatives. By August 1936 they would house the offices of the PCF, the SFIO, the 
Groupe Anarchiste and the Secours Populaire de France (SP), with all the aforementioned 
political groups constituting the united Comité de la Défence de la Révolution Espagnole 
(CDRE) focusing on different aspects of solidarity.22 In this way local Republican 
sympathisers had a clear point of reference in establishing solidarity with the Spanish 
Republic at the centre of the local community. In addition the spacious interior of the Ancien 
hôpital militaire, the seat of the committee, provided an obvious setting for the plethora of 
political meetings and the storage of supplies, before transportation over the Pyrenees.23 
 As we have seen active public sympathy in the Pyrénées-Orientales could be mustered from 
the outset of the conflict as there was the political will across the left to develop the means 
necessary to support the Spanish Republic. Significantly, meetings could be held with little 
interference from the local authorities, who clearly welcomed the discretion of the local leIW¶V
initiatives, the commissaire reporting: 
Au lendemain du commencement des hostilités entre les gouvernementaux et le Général 
FRANCO, il y eut quelque agitation dans les milieux politiques de Perpignan. De nombreux 
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 For an example of an encounter with Nationalist émigrés to the Côte Vermeille in July 1936 see F.Pitcairn., 
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PHHWLQJV IXUHQW WHQXV GDQV OH EXW GH FUpHU GHV FRPLWpV G¶HQWU¶DLGH DX EpQpILFH GX )URQW
Populaire espagnol. 'qVTXHOHVFRPLWpVIXUHQWFUppV«O¶DJLWDWLRQFHVVD24   
 
  
Such reports indicate that, whilst initial events gave the Police room for concern, the creation 
of official committees had a moderating effect on the various elements of the local left. The 
commissaire¶VIRFXVRQDJLWDWLRQDOVRLPSOLHVWKDWVROLGDULW\DFWLYLWLHVZKDWHYHUWKHLUSULYDWH
objectives, would be tolerated, and thus could continue, as long as public order was not 
threatened.  
 Whilst the case of Perpignan remains a key example of how local leftists did organise 
themselves, it would be insufficient to assert that this town represents a uniform experience 
for solidarity across the South West, a region comprising nineteen départements, five of 
which border Spain. Nonetheless, the basic characteristics of political and social organisation 
in the South West favourable to the Spanish Republicans can all be seen in Perpignan. First, 
the emphasis on unity from the outset, and the collaboration of hitherto disparate political 
factions. Second, the organisation of political meetings based on multi-polar political stances 
as well as the formation of a committee containing all leftist political groups. As will be seen, 
this was demonstrated in numerous other départements. This will establish that whilst 
Perpignan remains a good example of solidarity from July 1936, the same emphasis on unity 
remained widespread across the South West.  
 Manifestations of solidarity for the Republic sprang up spontaneously across the region in 
small towns as much as in the large préfectures. In St-Gaudens (Haute-Garonne) for example, 
Police reports highlighted how local initiatives often came without formal organisation and 
were the result of local Front Populaire committee and Trade Union initiatives: 25 
Référence à vos leWWUHV GX  $RXW HW  6HSWHPEUH«DXFXQ © &RPLWp G¶DLGH DX SHXSOH
espagnol ªQ¶DpWpFUpHGDQVPDFLUFRQVFULSWLRQ 
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Néanmoins une collecte en faveur des Républicains espagnols en lutte a été ouverte au cours 
de la réunion organisée dans notre ville par le Front Populaire le 20 Août écoulé.26  
 
Such reports highlight how the Front Populaire managed to mobilise leftist public opinion in 
favour of the Spanish Republic with little national or even regional direction. In this case 
formal structures of organisation, namely the Comités G¶DLGH DX SHXSOH HVSDJQRO or the 
Comités d¶HQWU¶DLGH  were eschewed in favour of  local fundraising, smaller in scale, but still 
orientated towards meetings in which orators could inform and educate their audiences about 
the plight of the Spanish Republic. Undoubtedly solidarity, as in the Pyrénées-Orientales, 
retained regional tinges to alert local populations to the danger of the rebellion in Spain, but 
also to reinforce the idea of unity. One poster, displayed in Tarbes, announcing a meeting in 
WKH6DOOHGHO¶2O\PSLDLQ%D\RQQHFOHDUO\H[DOWLQJUHJLRQDOXnity:  
µAmis de la paix et de la liberté ¶ 
'H %D\RQQH GH %RXFDX GH %LDUULW] GH WRXWH QRWUH UpJLRQ LPLWH] O¶H[HPSOH GX 3HXSOH
Espagnol  qui a réalisé la plus large unité, des Républicains aux Communistes et aux 
Anarchistes, des Catholiques aux Laïques.27 
 
 
Whilst the appeal of uniting geographically, socially and politically the entire region 
obviously had appeal to local supporters of the Front Populaire, reinforcing the idea that the 
entire left could be united in support of the Spanish Republic, the success of solidarity 
initiatives in the South West lay as much in their inclusion of their Spanish neighbours and 
national personalities as in the focus on regional issues. Such political actors could bring their 
knowledge of the conflict to the local areas, but with international perspectives. Thus the 
above meeting in Bayonne included such speakers as André Marty of the PCF, Paillé of the 
CGT and Carcarrier of the LDH, the clear message being that if unity could be achieved at a 
national level then it coXOGFHUWDLQO\EHµLPLWDWHG¶DWDORFDOOHYHO28 The success of engaging 
with local Republican sympathisers also lay in the ability of national personalities to relate to 
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their regional audiences and build a rapport with them, demonstrating that they remained in 
touch with local concerns and political developments that affected them. The educational 
element was also built upon to encourage a greater understanding of the significance of the 
Civil War to an audience unaccustomed to the detail of Spanish politics. In this way at 
meetings in Pierrefitte, Lourdes and Maubourguet, in the Hautes-Pyrénées in September 
1936: 
/¶2UDWHXU 0 9D]HLOOHV GpSXWp GH OD &RUUq]H à traité le sujet suivant: « 3RXU /¶Espagne 
Républicaine, pour la paix et la sécurité de la France.» 29 
 
The fact that the meetings were held in smaller towns in the departément, over several days 
and with national politicians relating the significance of the conflict for France, illustrates 
how solidarity meetings not only brought Spanish issues to a local level but also developed 
themes recognisable to all: peace, security and Republicanism. The policy of bringing  
national personalities to the South West was consciously developed throughout the conflict, 
illuminating how the local rapport remaiQHGDNH\WRROIRUµRXWVLGHUV¶WRHQJDJHZLWKSHRSOH
in the region. Thus in 1938 a police report on a meeting revealed:  
Une conférence  a été donné à la  Bourse du Travail par Mr BERNET architecte à Paris, 
originaire de Séméac (H.P) délégué permanent du Front Populaire, sur la Guerre 
G¶(VSDJQHVDSRVLWLRQGHJXHUUHHWVXUFHTX¶LODFRQVWDWpHWDSSULVHQ(VSDJQHSHQGDQWVRQ
YR\DJHGHUDSRUWDJHVLFGDQVFHWWHQDWLRQ«%(51(76RFLDOLVWH 6),2«PDQLIHVWHVDMRLH
GHUHWURXYHUDSUqVDQVG¶DEVHQFHDXSUqVGHVHVYLHX[FDPDUDGHVSROLWLTXHVQRWDPPHQW
0UOH'RFWHXU'DVTXHDYHFOHTXHOLOV¶pWDLWWURXYHQVLFVLVRXYHQWjOD%RXUVHGX7UDYDLOHW
GDQVOHVUpXQLRQVSROLWLTXHVGHO¶pSRTXH30 
 
There is particular significance in that the orator, a Parisian delegate of the Front Populaire, 
Bernet, expressly referred to his local origins before presenting his experiences in Spain 
showing great tact in enabling the audience to relate to an otherwise distant figure in a 
comprehensive way. The use of a reference to a local Radical, Dr Dasque, again served to 
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reinforce the idea of old ties to the area but renewed unity in the changing circumstances of 
solidarity with Spain. 
 As we have seen the key to solidarity in the early months of the war, and indeed beyond, was 
the ability of even small Front Populaire committees to mobilise local leftist opinion in 
favour of the Spanish Republic, together with a blend of local displays of unity, combined 
with national and international themes that transcended regional boundaries and reinforced 
the idea of the need for universal unity and solidarity. Local communities were then able, 
having been provided the necessary historical and political contextual information, to engage 
effectively with their Spanish neighbours. In the early stages of the conflict this would come 
in the form of moral support from within such local areas, accompanied soon after by 
material support that will be discussed below. The declarations of local political organisations 
in particular show how this engagement linked and committed the South West to the Spanish 
Republic. One report on a telegram sent to the President of the Spanish Republic, after a 
workers¶ meeting in Tarbes, read:  
Au Président AZANA (sic) 
« Dix Mille Tarbais réunis, saluent en vous le glorieux people espagnol et le gouvernement 
Républicain que vous présidez, ils emploieront tous leurs efforts pour vous aider dans cette 
KpURwTXHOXWWHTXHYRXVPHQH]«SRXUODOLbeUWpGHO¶RUGUHHWGHODSDL[» 31  
 
 
The telegram is indicative of the local support that was found in many of the south-western 
départements. However, rather than simply offering a display of admiration and moral 
support for the Spanish Republic, the text clearly states a desire of a significant part of the 
FRPPXQLW\ WRDFWLYHO\SDUWLFLSDWH LQDFWLRQV LQ IDYRXURI WKH5HSXEOLFHPSOR\LQJ µDOO WKHLU
HIIRUWV¶32 
  6XFK µHIIRUWV¶ KRZHYHU ZHUH QRW VROHO\ RULHQWDWHG WRZDUGV SXEOLF PHHWLQJV DQG YRFDO
displays of allegiance to the Republican cause. Indeed, the success of the solidarity 
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committees in the South West lay in their ability not only to raise public awareness, but also 
to raise funds to support the Republic. In the spirit of the Front Populaire, participation in 
social and sporting events was used as a means of mobilising all sectors of the leftist 
population in the region. This was vital as it meant that sympathy to the Republic could 
spread throughout the community, to sectors that political meetings could have limited 
impact on. As we have seen, in Perpignan, the Vélodrome was used for cycling events to 
raise funds for the Spanish Republic, but sports were only one area that was employed to this 
end. 
 In November 1936 for example, in Tarbes a SP poster displayed in the town offered a Soirée 
Dansante ZLWKDQHQWUDQFHIHHRIµCavalières 1fr  Cavaliers 2fr.¶An additional incentive lay 
in the tombola where the purchase of a ticket for 1fr offered a chance to win µ8Qe poste de 
76)XQYpORXQDSSDUHLOSKRWRJUDSKLTXHHWF¶33 
In a final thought the poster urged young women to participate in solidarity with the 
Republic:  
    µP.S. Camarades femmes, tricotez des lainages, brodez-y votre prénom. Envoyez des 
YrWHPHQWVXVDJpV¶34  
 
 
Such an event obviously offered an exciting evening for the participants conveying through 
targeted messages the true meaning of the evening, as a fund raising exercise. The 
propaganda was not devoid of a political explanation, an accompanying address reading:  
 
Camarade Jeune, 
/H&RPLWp1DWLRQDOG¶$LGHDX3HXSOH(VSDJQROHDGpFLGpG¶HQYR\HUDX[«5pSXEOLFains de 
Bilbao  un bateau chargé GHWRQQHVGHYLYUHVHWGHYrWHPHQWVFKDXGV«F¶HVWDX[FRPLWpV
GpSDUWHPHQWDX[GX)URQW3RSXODLUHGHWRXWOH6XG2XHVW«GHUHFXHLOOLUOHVIRQGVQpFHVVDLUHV
SRXUUpDOLVHUFHFKDUJHPHQW«35  
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In this case support for the Spanish Republic was clearly aimed at a particular area of 
solidarity, the Basque Country, and directly targeted the South West for raising the funds for 
a shipment of supplies to Bilbao. Consequently the reader is included as a vital component to 
achieve this. The writer may also have been aware that to make the event a success it would 
be necessary to mobilise Spanish émigrés and local French support with reference to regional 
geography and politics included as well: 
Toi qui souhaite si ardemment de revoir Irun au pouvoir des JRXYHUQHPHQWDX[«as-tu 
terminé ton devoir ? Non 7RXWHOD%LVFD\HUHFRQTXLVHDLQVLTX¶XQHSDUWLHGHOD*XLS~]FRD
W¶LPSRVH OH GHYRLU DEVROX G¶HQYR\HU Oj-bas à WHV IUqUHV %DVTXHV O¶DVVXUDQFH GH WRQ« 
sympathie, en même temps que ton implacable volonté de leur voir chasser, des rives de la 
%LGDVVRDOHV&DUOLVWHVHQQHPLVGHOD5pSXEOLTXH«36    
 
 
Such slogans deliberately play on regional sympathies as well as pPLJUp¶V NQRZOHGJH RI
Spain, with pointed references relating to the proximity of Carlists to France and the threat 
represented by such a political group to the Republic. The idea that the reader has a duty to 
DVVLVW WKHLU %DVTXH µQHLJKERXUV¶ LV LQWHUHVWLQJO\ GLUHFWHG DW D département with no direct 
geographical link to the French or Spanish Basque country, which indicates that the events of 
Irún were perceived as being sufficient to trigger sympathies across the region.  
 The reason for the Spanish references become clear on reading the Compte Rendu of the 
dance evening referring to: µ250 jeunes gens, et 80 jeunes filles environ, en majorité 
pWUDQJHUV¶37 The attendance at such an event mainly of µIRUHLJQHUV¶LVKDUGO\VXUSULVLQJJLYHQ
the statistics for Spanish immigrants living in the département of the Hautes±Pyrénées (3785 
in 1934).38 Whilst lower levels of local French participation might seem to indicate less 
support for the Spanish Republic, the participation of local people in a multitude of other 
solidarity activities organised during the Civil War counters this suggestion.39  
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  Across the South West the use of sport and culture enhanced the efforts of the solidarity 
committees in building a relationship between local communities sympathetic to the Republic 
and their Spanish neighbours. Cinema and theatre in particular were used to educate and 
entertain supporters across the region. Much like the dances held in Tarbes, they demonstrate 
the multi-faceted nature of support for the Republic, relying on social events to reinforce the 
political agendas that were set by leftist political parties. In this way, in Perpignan a Soirée de 
Gala was organised by the local S.F.I.O and the Secours Socialiste (SS) in April 1937 under 
the slogan µ7286$87+eÆ75(081,&,3$/¶  and using references to  the support of the 
municipality of Perpignan and the participation of: Artistes Professionnels, Perpignanais et 
Régionaux.40 
Such events underline how in towns such as Perpignan, municipal facilities and support could 
be provided and large sectors of the left mobilised beyond party boundaries. However, it 
would be false to suggest that all solidarity initiatives attracted similar support. Often smaller 
political groups, particularly the Anarchists, prepared solidarity events on a far smaller scale, 
but with equal educational significance for their supporters. Indeed the Union Anarchiste 
(UA) in Tarbes held its meetings in October 1936 at the Hôtel des Pyrénées and the Café de 
la Martinique, small venues, but with speakers who had returned from Spain presenting their 
experiences.41 The UA also held a soirée cinématographique a few months later with a 
programme of: 1)Actualités espagnoles 2) Actualités russes 42 
 
Whilst evidently the Café venue for meetings might not indicate a large turnout for events, 
the use of documentaries to heighten awareness of the situation in Spain indicates that even 
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minority political groups organised events that promoted solidarity with the Spanish Republic 
amongst their supporters. This permeation of Spanish issues, into even minority political 
groups, in turn allowed for a broad spectrum of support for the Republic to arise 
encompassing the entire regional Left. 
 Whereas the above example of the UA in Tarbes might seem to suggest that this 
RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V DFWLYLWLHV ZHUH DLPHG DW FRQYHUWHG $QDUFKLVWV PHHWLQJV HOVHZKHUH LQ WKH
region held by this movement demonstrate that this was rarely the case. Whilst the latter 
RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VPHHWLQJV LQFOXGHGDVPDOOFRUHDXGLHQFHRI3HUSLJQDQ¶V$QDUFKLVWPRYHPHQW
(20 strong in early 1937 according to the local police) the themes introduced at such meetings 
were largely designed to transcend the individual political boundaries and enhance solidarity 
amongst the wider leftist community. 43 In this respect an Anarchist meeting at the Ancien 
hôpital militaire illuminates the inclusive aspect of such meetings, the local police writing 
that on the 15 March 1937:  
Le meeting organisé le 14 Mars...par le comité Anarchiste de Perpignan...V¶HVW GpURXOp«j
O¶DQFLHQ K{SLWDO PLOLWDLUH«HQ SUpVHQFH GH  j  DXGLWHXUV«*8(55$ GH OD &17
V¶H[SULPDQWHQIUDQoDLVDGpYHORSSpOHV RULJLQHVGHODJXHUUHFLYLOHHWDGpILQLO¶DWWLWXGHGHV
autres pays vis-à-YLVO¶(VSDJQHUpSXEOLFDLQH,ODIDLWOHSURFqVGXIDVFLVPHHQSUpFLVDQWTXH
la lutte actuelle était la guerre du fascisme internationale contre le prolétariat.44 
 
 
It was obvious from the outset of the meeting that whilst the speakers belonged to the 
Anarchist organizations their presentations were not restricted to Anarchist themes. Indeed, 
the areas developed aimed at informing a local audience about the background to the war and 
the stance of international actors in the Civil War and were clearly topics that encompassed 
the FRQFHUQV DQG HGXFDWLRQ RI DOO OHIWLVW OLVWHQHUV 7KH HPSKDVLV RQ D ZDU µDJDLQVW WKH
SUROHWDULDW¶DVDZKROHFRQILUPVIURPWKHRSHQLQJPRPHQWVRI the meeting that the Civil war 
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in Spain is of concern to all workers and thus all political inclinations. As noted above, 
education remained well into 1937 a crucial concern for orators, French and Spanish alike. 
 Further impetus was given to such instructive endeavours when by 1937, local communities,  
for example the Anarchists in Tarbes, began to receive eye-witnesses and participants from 
the Spanish Republic who could confirm and elaborate upon the anti-fascist discourse of the 
early months of the war. This undoubtedly reinforced the reality of the situation to leftists, as 
well as the danger posed by the Nationalist uprising. 
In this vein a Perpignan commissaire reported: 
PEREZ MANUEL, emprisonné pendant 4 mois par les fascistHV j 0DMRUTXH«LQGLTXH OHV
UDLVRQV SRXU OHVTXHOOHV LO HVW YRXp j OD FDXVH GX SUROpWDULDW ,O D FRPPHQWp«OHV DWURFLWpV
fascistes citant notablement le massacre de 5.000 ouvriers auxquels on avait au préalable 
arraché les yeux. Puis il a flétri les bombardements aériens sur les villes VDQVGpIHQVHHWV¶HVW
HQWHQGXVXUOHPDWpULHOIRXUQLSDUOHV$OOHPDQGVHWVXUWRXWOHV,WDOLHQV«45     
 
The impact on local leftist sympathies of such horrifying descriptions of the situation in Spain 
cannot be underestimated. They seemed to confirm previous rumours from Spain and show 
the sinister nature of Nationalist atrocities being committed. Furthermore, for sceptics there 
was always photographic proof displayed to demonstrate the veracity of the macabre atrocity 
stories being exposed:                                     
GUERRA...à cité certaines atrocités  notablement le jet par un avion fasciste, sur Madrid, 
 G¶XQHFDLVVHFRQWHQDQWXQFDGDYUHGpFRXSpHQPRUFHDX[/DSKRWRJUDSKLHHQDpWpSULVHHW 
elle HVWDIILFKpHGDQVODVDOOHRXV¶HVWWHQXHODUpXQLRQ46 
 
 
Clearly, as well as conveying a shocking message, the organisers of the meeting wished to 
avoid any scepticism on the part of more dubious listeners, perhaps more inclined to take 
such gruesome claims as exaggeration, used  for propaganda purposes.47 
 Such harrowing images undoubtedly also reinforced the gravity of the situation in Spain and 
directed uncommitted listeners towards further identification with the Republican cause. 
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Furthermore the emphasis on inhumane treatment being directed at ordinary civilians in 
Mallorca and Madrid is noteworthy in portraying how the solidarity movements aimed to 
mobilise the support of not just the working class but democrats in general. Fascist violence 
in Spain was portrayed not simply as a threat to the proletariat but the entire Republican and 
Democratic spectrum. 
 Clearly in the above case, whilst the meeting was held under the auspices of an Anarchist 
committee, the themes exposed spanned the left-wing spectrum, enabling wider identification 
with the orators and the events of Spanish Civil War. One example of many demonstrating 
this transcending political approach can be seen at an Anarchist meeting held in Perpignan in 
March 1937 in which a SFIO orator was described by Police as: 
 «Un socialiste venu affirmer que les socialistes français sont avec le C.N.T et la F.A.I pour 
abattre le fascisme mondial. Celui- ci a précisé que déjà la France et notamment le C.G.T 
avaient fait beaucoup pour le peuple espagnol et a préconisé une solidarité plus étroite avec 
ceux qui combattent pour leurs libertés«48 
 
Such declarations are remarkable given that collaboration between the SFIO and the 
Anarchists prior to July 1936 had been minimal. Therefore, the fact that by March 1937 local 
socialists were prepared to exalt the unity of the Socialists and the CGT with the Anarchist 
movements illustrates the impressive transition of the French regional left in the South West. 
From disparate factions vying for political influence, the aforementioned political groups 
clearly achieved a large degree of regional unity in the face of Nationalist aggression against 
a common Republican and leftist ally in Spain.49  
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 Another pertinent example that provided testimony of this political transformation is shown 
by the stance of the regional PCF- a party that was consistently at odds with the SFIO and 
Radicals over Non-Intervention which nonetheless made appeals calling for non-partisan 
participation.50 Thus on 19 August 1936, in front of an audience of 5-6000 listeners, Tourne 
of the Pyrénées-Orientales JC exalted such unity. Police reports recorded this new-found 
belief in cross-party unity:  
Le Président TERRATS donne la parole à TOURNE. Celui-FL«IDLW XQ Dppel à toute la 
MHXQHVVHVDQVH[FHSWLRQQLVDQVGLVWLQFWLRQGHFUR\DQFHRXG¶RSLQLRQSRXUDLGHUPRUDOHPHQW
et matériellement les anti-fascistes espagnols qui combattent pour que la liberté des peuples 
ne soit pas un vain mot.51    
 
As has been seen in the solidarity meetings across the region, where traditional political 
parties had often demonstrated contrasting stances, such overtures for unity enabled a wide 
coalition of the left to emerge which, far from concentrating on its traditional party 
supporters, opened up the floor to the whole left. Indeed, whilst nationally Communists and 
Socialists were divided over Non-Intervention, the urgent demands for solidarity with a close 
neighbour revealed that, ZKDWHYHU WKH µRIILFLDO¶ VLWXDWLRQHOVHZKHUH UHJLRQDOOy local parties 
took the initiative and acted in support of the Republic.   
 Despite the strictly regional and cross-frontier focus of this thesis, it would be erroneous to 
suggest that solidarity movements were galvanised into action and given the means to 
respond to the Civil War through regional bases alone. The region did not act in isolation and 
if solidarity succeeded it was partly due to external actors, who, when joining forces with 
local sympathizers, permitted the effective functioning of solidarity organizations. As will be 
seen these external characters could make or break solidarity within the early months of the 
war.  
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 Moreover the geographical nature of the South West presented a challenge for regional 
Republican sympathizers and the Spanish Republic which was hastening to promote a climate 
there ,QGHHG ZKLOVW WKH 5HSXEOLF¶V V\PSDWKLVHUV XQLWHG VR GLG KHU 1DWLRQDOLVW UHIXJHH 
opponents across the region whose activities sought to undermine the Republic from the 
rearguard. Such Spanish Nationalists served as a reminder to local leftists that there was a far-
right enemy present not only south of the Pyrenees, but also within local communities. This 
subsequently led to a greater consciousness of the threat the Republic faced internationally, as 
well as from within the Iberian Peninsula.  
 &KDSWHU WZR ZLOO H[DPLQH KRZ WKH 6SDQLVK 5HSXEOLF¶V VRXWK-western sympathisers, 
increasingly implicated in solidarity through meetings and shared ideals, transformed words 
into actions in favour of the Republic; going beyond displays of unity and organizing material 
aid to the government zone. 
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Map 5  Above: The Ariège and Pyrénées-Orientales départements (France)  
Pneu Michelin Services de Tourisme, France:Grandes Routes (Paris, 1954)  Below: Bourg-Madame 
(Cerdagne region, Pyrénées-Orientales, France) and Puigcerdá (Girona province, 
Catalonia, Spain) <www.geoportail.fr> µ*pRSRUWDLO/HSRUWDLOGHVWHUULWRLUHVHWGHVFLWR\HQV¶ (Géoportail 
2007-2010®) [accessed on 23 July 2010] 
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Chapter two: Communities Unite- The Spanish Civil War Demonstrates the 
Loyalties of the Regional Left 
 
Whilst chapter one has demonstrated the roots of solidarity and how it developed from July 
1936 chapter two is concerned with how political organisers built upon the initial displays of 
sympathy with the Spanish Republic and developed the support base in the local 
communities. In addition we will see how traditional supporters of the Spanish Republic were 
DLGHG LQ WKHLU HIIRUWV E\ WKH LQYROYHPHQW RI DFWRUV RXWVLGH WKH W\SLFDO µOHIWLVW¶ SROLWLFDO
spectrum, enabling a diverse support base to arise in the region from 1936-1939. The chapter 
will then IRFXVRQKRZµKHDUWVDQGPLQGV¶ZHUHPRELOLVHGIRUWKH6SDQLVK5HSXEOLFDQFDXVH
and the variety of techniques employed by pro-Republicans to ensure that sympathisers 
transformed words into solidarity actions. Finally, through an analysis of the diversity of 
solidarity actions in the South West, we will see how campaigns in favour of the Republic 
were multi-faceted and inclusive of all elements of the local community. This will 
demonstrate how initial sympathies discussed in chapter one were harnessed to the 
5HSXEOLF¶VDGYDQWDJH, as rhetoric was converted into support actions.  
From the outset of the Spanish Civil War there was clearly widespread sympathy for the 
Spanish Republic amongst the majority of the regional Left in the South West. However, it 
would be inaccurate to suggest that active engagement with the Spanish cause came solely 
through the pro-Republican meetings held across the départements from July 1936. As noted 
above, the Republic could rely on the core support of hundreds of Front Populaire 
committees. In this chapter it will be seen how members of such committees were prepared to 
not just to raise awareness of the Spanish cause but as also endeavoured to ensure the 
provision of supplies that the Republic lacked. Such aid efforts were carried out in an attempt 
to rebalance the shortages of basic foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing created by the 
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isolation of many of the Republican regions, for example, the Spanish Basque country in 
August 1936.   
 The first concerted solidarity efforts organised in the South West were aimed at assisting 
Irún and Barcelona in late July and early August 1936. The activities organised to assist the 
former will firstly be examined to establish the extent to which such humanitarian aid 
initiatives created an atmosphere of support amongst the regional left and the wider 
community.  
  As has already been alluded to, the political situation by July 1936 in the southern 
départements of Aquitaine was already overwhelmingly favourable towards nascent 
solidarity efforts. Indeed in the legislative elections of April and May 1936 the Landes had 
voted 65.97% for candidates of the Front Populaire with three radicals elected as deputies. In 
the Basses-Pyrénées, seven deputies were elected including four Front Populaire candidates, 
the remainder being stalwarts of the far-right, Ybarnégaray in Mauléon, De Coral in Saint-
Jean-de-Luz and Tixier Vignancourt in Orthez.1 
 Meanwhile the Municipal elections of May 1935 had resulted in widespread gains for the 
Left, with Tarnos, Capbreton, Bayonne and Boucau voting overwhelmingly for PCF or SFIO 
candidates.2 In the climate of solidarity that would emerge in July 1936 from the events of the 
Spanish Civil War it is thus of crucial significance to the infant solidarity committees and the 
PRUH HVWDEOLVKHG FRPPLWWHHV VXFK DV WKH µ&RPLWp %LOEDR¶ that the leaders of such efforts 
already had the firm foundations of political support, favourable to their efforts, implanted in 
the region. However, it must be noted that this climate of solidarity was tempered by the 
elements of the regional right, whose interests remained juxtaposed to those of their local 
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leftist representatives and more regularly in  alignment with Nationalist elements of the 
Spanish émigré right, discussed above, in chapter one.  
 Undoubtedly the support arising in the Landes and along the Côte Basque came as a result of 
the particularly determined and well organised assistance of the left, beginning with the trade 
unions. On 1 $XJXVW  WKH 8QLRQ GHV 6\QGLFDWV &RQIpGpUpV GH O¶$GRXU FDOOHG IRU WKH
mobilising of all people of bonnes volontés to help assist the population of Irún.3  Meanwhile 
the established Comité Bilbao demonstrated its long running support for the Spanish Republic 
with a three pronged approach to the war: assisting the refugees and wounded, raising 
volunteers for the Republican struggle and supplying arms to the combatants of Guipúzcoa.4 
The first aid effort by this committee raised 2376 francs for the defenders of the frontier 
WRZQZKLOVW WKHJURXS¶VILUVWFRQYR\RISKDUPDFHXWLFal supplies reached Irún on 1 August, 
demonstrating remarkable organisational capacities. Furthermore, reports in the local 
Communist press collated by the local authorities confirm that such aid was not temporary 
and showed no signs of having petered out after the initial drive. Throughout the fighting 
across the Bidassoa the local aid committees established relentless deliveries of supplies to 
the Republican defenders which could not have been possible without widespread community 
support. The sparse formalities required for export of such supplies were revealingly 
LOOXPLQDWHGLQRQHVXFKFRPPLWWHH¶VIRUWQLJKWO\EXOOHWLQ 
...Nous allons pénétrer sur le territoire des opérations, Nous allons voir. Frontière. Pont 
,QWHUQDWLRQDODYHFVHVEDUULqUHVG¶XQSDUWHWGHO¶DXWUH/DYLVLWHGHOD'RXDQHHVWVLPSOLILpH
au minimum. Bulletin de sortie à signer, examen sommaire du contenu de la matière et la 
EDUULqUHVHOqYHVRXVO¶°LOV\PSDWKLTXHGHVGRXDQLHUVHWGHVJDUGHVPRELOHV&¶HVWDYHFXQH
émotion contenue que nous franchissons la seconde barrière et que bientôt nous filons à la 
PDLULHG¶,UXQWUDQVIRUPpHQTXDUWLHUJpQpUDO. 5   
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Such articles highlight the complicit nature of the local authorities in such initiatives. Whilst 
hardly participating, the lack of impediment to such efforts can be seen as largely indicative 
of wider government policy. As long as order was not threatened, the committees were free to 
operate. The achievements of the Front Populaire organisations, right up to the fall of Irún in 
early September, were substantial with the local PCF press able to claim by the end of August 
that: 
Le Comité ORFDOGH)URQW3RSXODLUH«DpWpHQWHQGXSDU OHVKDELWDQWVGHQRWUHUpJLRQ«,OD
été effectué un total de recettes de 12.535 francs, dont 8.500 francs par le Comité de Front 
Populaire de Bordeaux et 4.000 francs de quêtes diverses. Il a été dépensé 6.700 
fraQFV«SRXU HQYRLV GH IDULQH«GH EpTXLOOHV«G¶DSSDUHLOV FKLUXUJLFDX[ «GH SURGXLWV
SKDUPDFHXWLTXHV«LOUHVWHGRQF IUDQFV«TXLVHURQWHPSOR\pVHQUL]SRPPHVGH WHUUH
HWF«6   
 
The multi-faceted nature of the supplies to Irún and the close collaboration with committees 
across the region demonstrates how solidarity arose. However, as Jean Serres indicates from 
interviews with local politicians at the time, if solidarity efforts were successful they came in 
part as a result of surprising appeals to quarters which had not previously been 
accommodating towards the left, but which overcame their ideological differences to assist 
the humanitarian cause. Thus Jean Abbadie, a member of the Jeunesses Républicaines and 
future mayor of Boucau claimed that: 
6¶il est vrai qX¶LO\DYDLWj Boucau un fossé à cette époque entre ceux qui croyaient au ciel et 
FHX[TXLQ¶\FUR\DLHQWSDV MHWLHQVjSUpFLVHUTXHORUVGHVFROOHFWHVDXSRUWHjSRUWHQRXV
étions reçus dans les foyers catholiques que dans les autres, et cela était une expérience 
réconfortante pour nous. 7   
 
From such declarations it is clear that despite their political differences the Front Populaire 
organisations managed to transcend religious and ideological boundaries and incorporate the 
support of the important local Catholic sector. In this respect the seemingly far-fetched 
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exhortations on the posters for the meeting at the Salle Olympia, urging a unity j O¶ 
espagnole with Secularists joining forces with Catholics seemed rather less incongruous than 
might previously have been expected. Indeed if Catholics were far removed from the 
clandestine ventures of many Front Populaire committee members, they were wholeheartedly 
involved in aid efforts for the Spanish Republicans pouring onto the Côte Basque from 
August 1936.  
 Demonstrative of the links forged between religious associations and Basque republicans 
was the &RPLWp1DWLRQDO&DWKROLTXHG¶$LGHDX[UpIXJLpVG¶(VSDJQH, established by the local 
Catholic diocese in October 1936 in collaboration with José Antonio AguLUUH¶V %DVTXH
government, to rehouse hundreds of Basque children8. In this respect solidarity efforts in the 
French Basque provinces can be seen as being effective as Catholics were able put aside their 
political differences with the Spanish Republicans due to their Catholicism, which ran as 
deep amongst Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) supporters in the Spanish Basque provinces 
as in French Catholic sectors north of the Bidassoa.     
 Whilst the encompassing of all areas of the local political spectrum in pro-Republican 
solidarity and humanitarian relief efforts was undoubtedly crucial to developing solidarity in 
the region perhaps the most important way in which local communities supported the 
Republic was through the ability of local sympathisers to adapt their foci to the shifting 
priorities of the Republic. Invariably in areas closer to the border, such groups could become 
genuine assets to local communities in northern Spain, providing them with a life-line to the 
outside world, by providing equipment and materials in short supply in Spain. Importantly 
the campaigns in the South West were also joined directly to military events in Spain, 
adapting to the urgency of different regions and their fighting. Consequentially we will 
                                                          
8
 Serres., Été 1936, p.297.  
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examine several campaign examples to demonstrate the effectiveness of local community 
organisation in the South West and the vital role it played in sustaining the Republic.   
 As highlighted in chapter one, the involvement of the regional left in support initiatives with 
the Republic arose from July 1936, with delegates from Perpignan travelling to Barcelona on 
16 August 1936, to bring their frères Catalans µPRUDODQGPDWHULDODLG¶9 Such manifestations 
of support seem to have been the result of spontaneous leftist response to the military 
uprising in Spain, but subsequent campaigns were carefully planned and organised to target 
specific Republican military and civilian campaigns. Examples of this can be seen across the 
South West, notably in towns which had close contact through emigration to the region and 
thus close ties to the situation in Spain. In June 1937, for example, several meetings were 
organised to raise supplies and funds for the Basque defenders of Bilbao. Curiously a town 
where this campaign was particularly effective was Narbonne, in the Aude département, an 
area on the periphery of the South West, therefore bringing into question the purely 
geographical factor in Republican sympathisers supporting the Spanish Republic. Clearly the 
effectiveness of such events lay in the participation of local Spanish immigrants who raised 
awareness in the local area of the plight of their Iberian compatriots. A meeting held in 
1DUERQQH¶VSalle des Fêtes, on the 3 June 1937, was notably inclusive of both French and 
Spanish elements of the community as well as an important gender balance, re-enforcing the 
idea that the success of the support movements in the South West lay in their ability to 
FDSWXUH WKH µ+HDUWV DQG 0LQGV¶ RI WKH HQWLUH OHIWLVW SRSXODWLRQ 7KH 3ROLFH REVHUYHU RI WKH
meeting wrote that the meeting was held in: 
«un petit auditoire des deux sexes, composé de deux cents personnes environ, dont une 
bonne moitié appartient à O¶pOpPHQWHVSDJQROGHQRWUHYLOOH«10  
                                                          
9
 Inspecteur Principal de Police Spéciale de Perpignan to the  Commissaire spécial de Perpignan, 14.08.36 1M 
769 ADPO 
10
 Commissaire Central de Narbonne to Sous-préfet de Narbonne, 7.06.37, 1M480 ADA 
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The organisers of the meeting regretted that the audience was smaller than previously 
anticipated but this does not suggest that the meeting was not conducive to an atmosphere of 
support for the Republic. The opening speaker, Montane, speaking in Spanish, then French, 
allowed for the understanding of the entire audience. Whilst the outcome of the collection of 
GRQDWLRQVZDVODEHOOHGµIDLEOH¶ by the officer attending the meeting, it would seem that such 
localised campaigns were productive. Montane claimed, for example, WKDWWKHµ&RPLWp/RFDO
G¶(QWU¶DLGHDX3HXSOH%DVTXH¶Kad supplied the workers of the Basque Country with : 
µIUVGHGHQUpHVGHPHGLFDPHQWVHWDXWUHVSURGXLWVSRXUVRXWHQLUODOXWWH¶11 
,Q H[DPLQLQJ VXFK FOHDUO\ GLIIHULQJ YHUVLRQV RI HYHQWV WKH RIILFHU¶V UHSRUW PXVW EH WUHDWHG
with suspicion, as the local authorities contained many elements hostile to intervention in 
Spanish affairs, and thus may have played down the significance of pro-Republican 
initiatives.12 The figures of funds raised for such campaigns, lauded by local organisers, may 
also be treated with caution, as evidently the objective of such support meetings was to 
portray an inclusive climate of solidarity throughout the community. Despite this tendency to 
downplay or exaggerate levels of support what is clear is that the emotive and political 
content of such meetings, when animated by talented orators, was sufficient to win over even 
the police observer in this case. Indeed, the  powerful and educational explanations of the 
significance of the struggle outlined by one orator, who had travelled from Catalonia, 
representing the Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (PSUC), impressed the commissaire 
ZKRZURWHWKDWGHVSLWHWKHVSHDNHU¶VVHOI-GHFODUHGµEDG)UHQFK¶WKHODWWHUH[SUHVVHGKLPVHOI
with:  
                                                          
11
  Commissaire Central de Narbonne to Sous-préfet de Narbonne, 7.06.37, 1M480 ADA 
12
  See G.Howson, Arms for Spain, (New York, 1998) p.50. For more information on the hostility of  the 
Toulouse Police towards pro-Republican arms smugglers.  
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« une finesse remarquable...il fait un KLVWRULTXHGHO¶(VSDJQHGHSXLVLOGLWTXH%LOEDR
QHFUDLQWSDVOHVFRXSVGH)UDQFRPDLVTX¶HOOHUHGRXWHOHVDWWDTXHV$OOHPDQGVHW,WDOLHQV. 13  
 
The importance of the contextual information given early on in the speech, accompanied by 
its relevance to the current struggle and the Basque campaign, can be seen as even more 
effective in that the audience was further reminded that their support was vital, especially in 
the face of the horrors that the Nationalists were subjecting the Republicans to. Ruiz Iza used 
the previously mentioned tactic of citing public opinion influencing recent events to bring the 
reality of the situation home. In this case the orator reminded the listeners of the: 
Agonie de Guernica, la ville héroïque et martyre ...il rappelle les crimes sans nom commis 
contre la population civile ...avec son arbre millénaire au milieu de la place, qui inspirait la 
SRpVLHHW OHWUDYDLO0DOJUpWRXVFHVFULPHVOHSHRSOH%DVTXHUpVLVWHHW IDLW O¶DGPLUDWLRQGX
monde; il vaincra le fascisme. Ruiz Iza relate les incidents du Deuchland (sic), les 
représailles contre Almeria où 36 femmes ont trouvé la mort...la responsabilité de GIL 
ROBLES, HITLER, MUSSOLINI ...aidés par le sinistre MARCHS (sic).14  
 
Such explanations of the situation, including criticisms of not only Fascism but also 
FDSLWDOLVP UHSUHVHQWHG E\ WKH VSHFWUH RI -XDQ 0DUFK¶V IXQGLQJ RI WKH 1DWLRQDOLVWV ZHUH
clearly intended to shock local people into action regardless of nationality, gender or political 
inclinations. The references to poetry and labour clearly fulfilled the objective of appealing to 
intellectuals and the middle-classes as much as the working class. The use of references to 
Almería and Guernica was no coincidence either. Narbonne, a Mediterranean town, would 
have been an easy comparison to Almería to highlight the risk of atrocities in France, if 
people did not act, whilst the bombing of Guernica was also able to evoke local parallels. In 
this vein one orator, Vidal, of the local anti-fascist committee, related to listeners a recent 
                                                          
13
 Commissaire Central de Narbonne to  Sous-Préfet de Narbonne, 7.06.37, 1M480 ADA 
14Commissaire Central de Narbonne to  Sous-Préfet de Narbonne, 7.06.37, 1M480 ADA 
 The orator was of course reminding the audience of the recent bombing of Guernica on the 26 April 1937, See 
A. Beevor., The Battle for Spain 1936-39, (New York, 2006) pp.231-232 & G.L Steer., The Tree of Gernika, 
(London, 1938) The second reference in the quotation refers to the Naval bombardment of Almería on the 30 
May 1937 when, following the aerial bombing of the German Battleship Deutschland on the 29 May 1937, 
Hitler ordered a reprisal attack on a Republican coastal town.  
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interview with Cluzel, the Mayor of the French frontier town of Cerbère, who had denounced 
the strafing of this locality by Italian aircraft.15 
 Such meetings were able to provoke action as they clearly related how the rise of Fascism 
was not exclusively a Spanish problem, but a universal problem, with repercussions in France 
as likely as in Spain.  
 The material results of such meetings were substantial not just in economic terms but also in 
the level of support they received from local communities. During the fight of the 43rd 
'LYLVLRQLQWKH%LHOVDµSRFNHW¶RI1RUWKHUQ$UDJyQLQ0DUFKWKH6SDQLVKSUHVVSUDLVHG
the workers of the Hautes-Pyrénées who twinned themselves with the aforementioned 
formation, and constructed a path through snowdrifts to the border from Aragnouet. La 
Vanguardia subsequently reported that: 
«Los camaradas de Tarbes se han prestado a hacerlo practicable. Mientras ellos clavaban 
a pico, los observadores de No Intervención enderezaban su tedio en campos de tenis«16  
 
7KH6SDQLVKSUHVV¶V UHFRJQLWLRQRI the efforts of French Republican sympathisers stretched 
EH\RQGDSSUHFLDWLRQRI)UDQFH¶VUROHLQDVVLVWLQJZLWKHPEOHPDWLFFDPSDLJQVVXFKDVWKDWRI
Bielsa and Bilbao. Local communities in the South West made contributions that belied their 
small populations, in often remote areas. Thus the anti-fascist committee in Lavelanet 
(Ariège) would be lauded by La Vanguardia which praised the community: 
«demostrando desde...que se inició la Guerra Civil...una solidaridad con nuestro 
movimiento que merece el más ferviente reconocimiento«17  
                                                          
15
 Commissaire Central de Narbonne to Sous-préfet de Narbonne, 7.06.37,1M480 ADA. The incursion of 
Nationalist aircraft into French airspace, following raids on the marshalling yards of Portbou, in Spain, less than 
2 miles away, became a source of outrage across the political spectrum. In October 1937 Cluzel would telegraph 
the Interior Ministry demanding re-enforced Anti-Aircraft defences in Cerbère after a bomber strafed Cerbère 
and Banyuls-sur-Mer, provoking widespread panic amongst the populace. 6HH&OX]HOWR0LQLVWUHGH/¶,QWpULHXU
27.10.37. 4M414 ADPO   
16
 La Vanguardia, 20/05/38 
17
 La Vanguardia, 22/05/37. It is important to note that many locations across the South West made 
contributions to pro-Republican campaigns that appear out of proportion to their populations. For example in 
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The village in question had, according to the publication, supplied the anti-fascist militias 
with 4,000 kilograms of potatoes, 615 kilograms of pasta for soup, as well as sugar, cod, 
crates of jam, sacks of chickpeas and lentils. These were then delivered to the Hospital 
Clínico in Barcelona.18 Such support from villages such as Lavelanet was notable, as it 
indicated substantial support for the Republic, beyond even small provincial centres of 
political organisation. Other examples of solidarity arose following the bombing of Spanish 
border towns in the Pyrenees. After one such bombing of Puigcerdà in the Cerdanya region, 
WKHWRZQ¶V)UHQFKQHLJKERXUVLQ%RXUJ0DGDPHDQG/D7RXUGH&DUROSOD\HGDYLWDOUROHLQ
assisting the wounded, one publication wrote: 
El veínat francés deis pobles limítrofes s'ha mostrat molt sollícit amb els habitants 
de Puigcerda, acellint en les seves cases dones i infants i auxiliant els ferits. Els metges de la 
Tour de Carol s'han traslladat a Püigcerdá per a auxiliar curs col.legues espanyols en 
nombre i la farcàcia de Bourg-Madame ha facilitat material ganitari. Una parts deis ferits 
han estat hospitalitzats al Sanaori francés de Font Romeu i en diverses clíniques de 
Perpinyá.19 
 
 
The role of local men in helping the wounded and the opening of the local pharmacy and 
medical centres to their injured neighbours cannot be underestimated in fostering an 
atmosphere of solidarity with the Republic. It comes as slightly ironic, however, that 
/¶$XWRQRPLVWD, a newspaper  whose title indicates its Catalan regionalism, accompanied by a 
declared position as a 'LDULG¶(VTXHUUD(Leftist newspaper) should inadvertently praise the 
assistance of the Bourg Madame pharmacy, whose owner as well as village mayor, Thomas 
Casals, was a member of the far-right Parti Social Français (PSF).20 Therefore in this case 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
'HFHPEHUWKH2ORURQ$LG&RPPLWWHHGRQDWHGIUDQFVWRWKH³Año Nuevo del Niño´FKLOGUHQV
campaign. In the same campaign, the city of Lyon, one of the largest in France donated 3,000 francs and the 
Spanish Legation in Bucharest 600 francs. See La Vanguardia, 28/12/38 Likewise the Aude and Hérault 
µ:RPHQV&RPPLWWHH¶VXSSOLHGORUU\ORDGVRIVXSSOLHVWRWKHAyuda Infantíl de Retaguardia campaign in 
March 1938 sending 5 crates of food, 1 of clothing, 1 sack of sweets, 1 of school equipment and clothes and 87 
of bread. See La Vanguardia, 16/03/38, p.5.  
18
 La Vanguardia, 22/05/37 
19
 /¶$XWRQRPLVWD, 24.01.38, ADG 
20See G.Bonet, /¶,QGpSHQGDQWGHV3\UpQpHV2ULHQWDOHV- 8Q6LqFOHG¶KLVWRLUHG¶XQTXRWLGLHQ-
1950,(Perpignan, 2004) p.248.  
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solidarity was not necessarily forged by political sympathy, but rather by the consideration 
towards neighbours in time of distress. Arguably however such a case exemplifies why the 
South West and in particular the border region was so effective in supporting the Spanish 
Republic. Whilst the politicians of the PSF at national level wholeheartedly engaged in 
assisting the Nationalists and demeaning the Spanish Republic, such a stance at a local level 
was clearly incompatible with community life.21As previously mentioned, with the stance of 
the Catholic Church towards assisting Basque refugees after the fall of Irún, the geographical 
proximity and long term cross-border links made animosity towards neighbouring political 
adversaries not only inadvisable, but indeed practically impossible, in both examples, 
economically and religiously.22  
 Despite common border connections playing such roles, outside the realms of political 
motivation, ideological sympathies towards the Republic clearly played a decisive role in 
establishing regional support for the Republicans. Indeed the majority of support actions were 
carried out under a political etiquette. In November 1938 for example the Dirreció de 
O¶+RVSLWDO GH OHV &RPDUTXHV *LURQLQHV thanked the Port-Vendres Socors socialista a 
O¶(VSDQ\D republicana for supplying medical provisions and foodstuffs to Gerona province 
hospitals.23Similarly in March 1938, La Vanguardia  thanked Dr J. Ducuing of Toulouse, for 
supplying therapeutic products to the Hospital General de Cataluña, working in collaboration 
with the Comité des Médecins et Pharmaciens and &RPLWp GHV $PLHV GH O¶(VSDJQH
Républicaine.24 Evidently the success of such support initiatives lay in their encompassing of 
not only professional groups such as doctors and pharmacists, Spanish immigrants and 
5HSXEOLFDQV\PSDWKLVHUVEXWDOVR WKHLURUJDQLVDWLRQRIDLGFRPPLWWHHV LQ VSHFLILFZRPHQ¶V
                                                                                                                                                                                    
21
 
For  PSF details, R.Soucy, French Fascism: The Second Wave, 1933-1939(New Haven, 1995) pp.115-203. & 
J. Wardhaugh, In Pursuit of The People: Political Culture in France, 1934-39 (Basingstoke, 2009) pp.122-150.  
 
22
 Serres., Été 1936, p.297.  
23
 Front, 19/11/38, p.5.  
24
 La Vanguardia,22/03/38,p.3.   
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JURXSVDQGSURIHVVLRQDOVRFLHWLHV7KHUROHRIZRPHQLQFKLOGUHQ¶VFDPSDLJQVHVSHFLDOO\KDV
already been noted, but a broad spectrum of professions was also encompassed in the support 
movements.25 In this manner the Republic would receive support from, for example, the Pau 
and Oloron Construction and Public Works confederation, the Basses-Pyrénées Republican 
Reserve Officers Federation, workers trade unions of the Basses-Pyrénées and the Hautes-
Pyrénées and others.26  
 Importantly the solidarity actions of these groups¶ were assisted by the local Spanish consul, 
ZKRZDVDEOHWRUHOD\VROLGDULW\JURXS¶VPHVVDJHVRIVXSSRUWDQGDLGWRWKH5HSXEOLF27 It will 
also be seen in chapter three how French state functionaries were also provided support 
services to the Republic.  
 In this climate of diverse solidarity initiatives, it is evident that pro-Republican solidarity, 
across the South West, was successful for several reasons. First, the South West already had 
solid bedrocks of leftist, republican and democratic political support across the region, 
demonstrated by the prevalence of elected leftist representatives, following the May 1935 
Municipal elections and the April/May 1936 Legislative elections. This meant that pro-
Republicans were, from July 1936, surrounded by fellow sympathisers, with large networks 
of contacts and organisational know-how.  
 Second, the work of local organisers to establish campaigns that targeted different aspects of 
the Republican struggle also allowed for focused and productive aid to be delivered to the 
Republican Zone. Such local leaders clearly harnessed, as seen in chapter one and in the 
meeting in Narbonne, the value of atrocity stories to shock local people into action. They also 
                                                          
25
 For the role of Women in the Spanish aid committees see La Vanguardia, 16/03/38, p.5. 
26
  See in order La Vanguardia, 21/02/37,La Vanguardia, 2/04/37, Commissaire Spécial de Tarbes to Préfet des 
Hautes-Pyrénées,6.08.36 4M238 ADHP & Sous-Préfet de Bayonne to M. Préfet des Basses-Pyrénées,24.09.36 , 
1M 260 ADPA. A Reservist officer from Hendaye, Jean-Baptiste Casalonga was responsible for  establishing 
one of the departmental committees for the reception of refugees from Irún, in September 1936.See Serres.,Été 
36, pp.294-296 & pp.295-299 for more information.  
27
 See La Vanguardia, 21/02/37,ibid, 2/04/37 
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brought home a reality that could seem distant and reminded listeners of their duty to support 
the Republic. 
 Third, the geographical nature of solidarity must also be acknowledged as a vital factor in 
forging pro-Republican solidarity. Traditional border relationships, relying on shared 
economic, social, and religious, if not political, connections and beliefs proved resilient to the 
political upheaval surrounding them and enabled local people, even  those not adhering to the 
5HSXEOLFDQLGHDOWRDVVLVWWKHLUQHLJKERXUVIRUWKHµFRPPRQ-JRRG¶ 
 Finally it must be stressed that the solidarity movements largely succeeded in encompassing 
a large part of the working class, as well as white collar profeVVLRQV DQG ZRPHQ¶VJURXSV
The permeation of Republican sympathies into groups as diverse as builders, doctors, 
douaniers, army reservists and trade unions illustrates to a large extent why Republican 
support in the South West succeeded in assisting the Republic. With the rallying of political 
tendencies ranging from Communists to Anarchists, Socialists to Radicals, and Republicans 
WR'HPRFUDWV WKH6SDQLVK5HSXEOLFFOHDUO\FDSWXUHG WKHµ+HDUWVDQG0LQGV¶RI WKH OHIW$V
shown through examination of local events and connections to Spain, Republican themes 
remained dominant in local politics and society, infiltrating into sympathisers¶ daily lives in 
the work place, the political sphere and even in sporting events and cultural life, ensuring 
that, even if the events of the Spanish Civil War seemed physically distant, they remained 
mentally omnipresent.   
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Map 6  Above : Toulouse and the Haute-Garonne département  
Below : Toulouse Montaudran airfield  
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Chapter three: Allies in the Shadows: The French South West as an example of 
µ1RQ- ,QWHUYHQWLRQUHOkFKpH¶ 
 
Whilst in chapter two the impact of support from local civilian committees has been 
examined, with the impact of actions that supplied and assisted the Republican Home Front 
amply analysed, it is vital in the context of French solidarity actions in the South West to 
stress the importance of French government-led initiatives, carried out in the strictest secrecy.  
As discussed above, the Front Populaire of Léon Blum contained many elements, including 
Blum himself, who were favourable towards assisting the Spanish Republic, but were forced, 
DW OHDVW RIILFLDOO\ WR DFW XQGHU WKH FRQVWUDLQWV RI WKH µ1RQ-,QWHUYHQWLRQ¶ DJUHHPHQW $Q\
action taken in favour of the Spanish Republic thus had to occur via a covert arrangement 
NQRZQ DV µ1RQ-,QWHUYHQWLRQ UHOkFKpH¶ ,W LV LPSRUWDQt to underline that, whilst several 
historians have acknowledged the existence of secret pro-Republican logistical operations, 
few studies have revealed the regional complexities implied by the Parisian-directed 
ventures.1 Although Howson unravels the key characters in the saga of French aid, tracing the 
organisation of such operations back to the cabinet of the Air Minister, Pierre Cot and his 
able Chef du Cabinet, Jean Moulin, few historians have developed their studies into the South 
West; fewer still beyond the summer of 1936.2    
 Recently French historians including Jean Serres and Ami-Jacques Rapin have delved deeper 
into the regional intricacies of French government intervention in favour of the Republic.3 
However, as will be seen, even such studies have definitively failed to connect central 
                                                          
1
 R.Skoutelsky.,/¶(VSRLUJXLGDLWOHXUVSDV, (Paris, 1998) pp.109-140. C.Gindin, Le Front Populaire ( la France 
de 1934 à 1939) p.155. E.Weber., The Hollow Years: France in the 1930s, (New York, 1994)pp.167-169.   
2
 G.Howson,Arms for Spain, pp.40-+RZVRQ¶VGHWDLOHGVWXG\UHYHDOVWKHNH\SOD\HUVLQWKH)UHQFKNon-
Intervention relâchée  sphere, yet does not go beyond August 1936 in relation to secret operations.      
3
 J.Serres., Été 1936., & A-J. Rapin.,Tant pis si la lutte est cruelle (Les réseaux clandestins de fourniture en 
armes de la République espagnole) (Paris, 2008) pp.101-132 
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government actions with the covert activities of small groups in the South West, detailed in 
this chapter.  
 In examining government-led secret activities in favour of the Spanish Republic at both 
regional and national level it is important to consider the defects of traditional historiography 
and the complex political atmosphere of 1936-1939. Whilst the far-left, particularly the 
Communists, took the Non-Intervention agreement literally and saw it as the ultimate 
H[SUHVVLRQ RI WKH )UHQFK JRYHUQPHQW¶V EHWUD\DO RI WKH 6SDQLVK 5HSXEOLF WKH far-right, 
conversely, ZDV DV :HEHU DUJXHV µQHYHU FRQYLQFHG¶ DQG ZHQW WR Jreat lengths to expose 
regional and national personalities secretly supplying the Republic.4 The protests of the latter 
were perhaps tinged with a certain cynical irony, given the ardent support of such elements 
collaborating with Spanish Nationalists.5 This aspect will be briefly examined later in the 
chapter, in relation to the efforts of far-right sympathisers, who attempted to sabotage 
Republican operations through pro-Nationalist collaboration and the far-right press. 
 Before we look at the regional situation it is important to highlight that the chapter will be 
examining the actions of covert government connected elements operating in the South West. 
By government connected elements the thesis will be referring to the cabinet offices of 
ministers in the Front Populaire government who supported an unofficial pro-Republican 
interventionalist stance. During the course of the chapter the cabinet ministers and aides 
involved in pro-Republican activities will be briefly explored in relation to their regional 
VXERUGLQDWHV¶DFWLYLWLHV 
  This study acknowledges that private individuals, motivated by financial recompense 
(sufficiently dealt with by Howson) often combined with leftist sympathies, also became 
                                                          
4
 Weber., The Hollow Years, p.169. 
5
 On 24 November 1937 Interior Minister Marx Dormoy, announced that the Sûreté Nationale had dismantled a 
far-ULJKWWHUURULVWRUJDQLVDWLRQNQRZQDVWKHµ&DJRXOH¶ZKLFKZDVDUPHGE\0XVVROLQLDQG)UDQFRSee J-M. 
Berlière, 3ROLFLHUVIUDQoDLVVRXVO¶2FFXSDWLRQ, (Paris, 2001) pp.99-101.  
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involved in clandestine ventures, which helped supply the Spanish Republic. However, our 
focus here will be the unofficial actions of local functionaries, as such officials had a capacity 
to carry out effective actions in favour of the Republic that individual enterprise did not. This 
can be explained largely by the fact that government-connected elements, often working 
alongside like-minded Republican sympathisers, benefitted from the complicity and 
connections necessary to conceal and co-ordinate their proscribed activities, as well as the 
protection of political heavyweights. These included Front Populaire personalities including 
the customs union leader, Gaston Cusin, the Air Minister, Pierre Cot and his chef de cabinet, 
Jean Moulin, who were extremely adept at organising compromising political operations.6  
 In contrast, as demonstrated in numerous police and press reports, dedicated yet amateur 
individuals, particularly Anarchists and Communists, were kept under constant police 
surveillance and subjected to the routine threat of arrest and imprisonment for activities 
contrary to the Non-Intervention agreement, limiting their effectiveness as political allies.7  
 As will become clear, this chapter will thus focus on several case studies which illuminate 
the nature of secret initiatives in the region, tacitly agreed upon and facilitated by select pro-
Republican ministers in the Front Populaire government. We will also see the key 
components of Non-Intervention relâchée on a local level, as well as the relation of such 
elements to the wider national context of tacit government approval, described above. The 
chapter will additionally encompass the challenges faced by such local elements, playing a 
double-game with local authorities enforcing Non-Intervention, as well as examining the 
implications of functionary- OHGDFWLRQVIRUWKH6SDQLVK5HSXEOLF¶VZDUHIIRUWUltimately, the 
available evidence will show the connections that such hitherto overlooked local actors had 
                                                          
6
 For more on the role of Gaston Cusin see M.Poggioli., &DKLHUVGHO¶LQVWLWXWH&*7GHO¶KLVWRLUHVRFLDOH : 
&*7HWOD*XHUUHG¶(VSDJQH no.62 (June 1997) <http://www.ihs.cgt.fr/IMG/pdf_DOSSIER.pdf> [accessed 11 
march 2010]   Weber.,The Hollow Years, p.168. & Skoutelsky., /¶(VSRLU*XLGDLWOHXUVSDVp.  .   
7
 See Le Temps, 2/09/36  µ6DLVLHSUqVGH$[-les-7KHUPHVXQFDPLRQFKDUJpG¶DUPHVDGHVWLQDWLRQG¶(VSDJQH¶ 
See also 1MD480 & 1 MD481 ADA for the activities of Anarchists in this département in supplying weapons to 
Spanish Anarchists and transporting volunteers to Spain 
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with upper government echelons, demonstrating the effectiveness of south-western elements 
as part of the wider policy of relaxed Non-Intervention.  
 From the outset of the Spanish conflict, French government elements who favoured 
supplying Republican Spain with aircraft and arms did not underestimate the importance of 
the South West in their operations. Indeed, Howson details the convenience of the private 
aerodrome of Montaudran, near Toulouse, and owned by the Latécoère aircraft company, as 
the ideal substitute for the military airfield of Francazal. The latter was avoided after initial 
setbacks, including the opposition of the Sûreté Nationale and the opposition of the far-right 
/¶([SUHVVGX0LGL.8 Both official and press intrusions on such politically sensitive operations 
OHGWR0RQWDXGUDQ¶VHVWDEOLVKPent as the centre of aircraft transfer operations in the summer 
of 1936 and this period requires no further exploration. However, the activities in favour of 
the Spanish Republic continued far beyond 1936 and indeed show a clear trajectory of 
support for the Republicans until 1938.  
 Police and prefectoral reports show that, whilst all aircraft except for commercial liners were 
supposed to be prohibited from taking off from French airfields destined for Spain, by a law 
coming into force on 18 February 1937, this was not the case for Montaudran. Additionally, 
under the annexes of the 18 February law, designated border-zone aerodromes were 
established for correspondence with Spain, these being Marseille-Marignane, Perpignan-
Habanère, Biarritz-Anglet and Toulouse-Francazal. Montaudran was thus, in the eyes of the 
Non-Intervention leaning French Foreign Ministry, international Non-Intervention observers 
and the local authorities, an airfield out-of-bounds to aircraft leaving for and arriving from 
Spain.9    
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 See Howson.,Arms for Spain, p.50.  
9
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 At the centre of the activities to supply the Spanish Republic with military and aviation 
equipment, was a certain Jean Blanc, former Air France FKHI G¶DWpOLHU and chef radio-
télégraphist at the airfield.10 The exact role of Blanc becomes clear through numerous police 
reports into his mysterious activities, both at the aerodrome and in the city of Toulouse. From 
March 1937, for example, a steady series of reports by officers monitoring activities at the 
airfield, by now subject to official surveillance (probably triggered by the events of August 
1936), began implicating the former Air France employee with numerous activities, legal and 
illegal, in favour of Republican Spain.11 However, far from portraying Blanc as a lone 
RSHUDWRU WKH LQYHVWLJDWLRQ LQWR %ODQF¶V DFWLYLWLHV GHPRQVWUDWHV D QHWZRUN RI VXSSRUW DQG
complicities within the local community and from central government collaborators, which 
reinforces the image of local leftist support for such initiatives.12  
 7KHLQLWLDOLPSUHVVLRQRI%ODQF¶VDFWLYLWLHVDULVHVIURPHYHQWVRFFXUULQJRQWKHPRUQLQJRI
March 1937. A report from the commissaire divisionnaire to the préfet of the Haute-Garonne 
commenced: ... XQIDLWTXHOTXHSHXVLQJXOLHUTXLV¶HVWSURGXLWFHPDWLQVXUO¶DpURGURPHGH
Toulouse-Montaudran «13 This suggested that an unusual state of affairs had arisen at the 
airfield, beyond its intended  usage. 7KH µVLQJXODU¶ HYHQW LQ TXHVWLRQ FDPH ZLWK WKH *DUGH
                                                                                                                                                                                    
For more on the February 18 1937 Non-Intervention laws see R.Haigh, D.S. Morris & A.R. Peters, The 
Guardian book of the Spanish Civil War (Aldershot:1987) pp.81-82.  
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 See Préfet de la Haute-Garonne to 0LQLVWUHGHO¶,QWpULHXU'LUHFWLRQ*pQpUDOHGHOD Sûreté Nationale, 3.09.37 
& Commissaire de Police Mobile to Commissaire Divisionnaire, 17.03.37 1960 W9 ADHG Archive and series 
number the same until specified by author.  
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 Howson notes how in August 1936 Montaudran airfield, as private property of Air France, was off-limits to 
ERWKµSROLFHDQGVQRRSHUV¶E\-XQHKRZHYHUDQGSHUKDSVDVDUHVXOWRIFHUWDLQLQGLVFUHWLRQVE\%ODQFZH
see in Préfet de la Haute-Garonne to  MinistrHGHO¶,QWHULHXUD report that detailed µOHWHUUDLQGH
Montaudran est soumis à une surveillance constante de jour et de nuit...3 Gardes Mobiles détachés du peloton 
GH)5$1&$=$/TXLHIIHFWXHQWOHXUVXUYHLOODQFHVRXVOHFRQWU{OHGHO¶,QVSHFWHXUGH3ROLFH6SpFLDOHFKDUJpGHV
VHUYLFHGHO¶$pURSRUW¶Clearly by the spring of 1937 there was thus considerable risk in carrying out activities 
proscribed by the 18 February 1937 laws. In Howson., Arms for Spain, p.50. 
12
 Whilst police reports are generally valuable in showing an accurate picture of events, despite ideological 
stances that can influence their usefulness, caution must be exercised when reading the local right-wing press, 
which relished portraying Blanc as a renegade Marxist, acting alone without any external support in the 
community. Such reports are characteristic of the regional rightist press which loathed the Frente Popular and 
the Front Populaire in equal measure and did all it could to portray Republican sympathisers as outsiders. This 
picture of events runs contrary to all the evidence in this study and others, but remains useful as a reminder of 
the attitudes of the French Right towards the Left during the Spanish Civil War. See Le Jourµ«Un 
KRPPHXQKRPPHVHXOHVWO¶kPHGXWUDILFDpULHQHQWUHO¶(VSDJQH5RXJHHWOD)UDQFH¶ 
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Mobile detachment at Montaudran being instructed by telephone, by the police commander at 
Francazal airfield, to authorise the departure of an aircraft, destined for Perpignan. At the 
same time a group of airfield workers began to unload crates from the aforementioned plane, 
crates which were: 
 ...portées par quatre hommes ce qui représente un poids de 80 à 100 kilogrammes et une 
autre suffisamment longue pour supposer TX¶HOOHFRQWHQDLWGHVDUPHV«14  
 
During the unloading of the crates the commissaire wrote that a man (Blanc) came out to the 
aircraft and ordered the employees to reload the crates, saying he would telephone Paris. 
During this time the enterprise of Blanc, overseeing the loading of the aircraft, was 
interrupted by the suspicions of the Garde Mobile on the scene who ...en présence de cette 
merchandise qui [me] paraissait douteuse... refused Blanc embarkation of the containers.15 
These were subsequently transferred to a hangar nearby, whilst the Garde Mobile commander 
went to interview the airfield director of Air France, a M. Gonnin. On returning to the hangar 
following their questioning of Gonnin, the officers discovered that they had been foiled in 
their attempt to confiscate the suspicious containers, the crates having disappeared. The 
Gardes supposed that the hangars had been returned to Toulouse by taxi, having arrived in 
WKLVIDVKLRQHDUOLHULQWKHPRUQLQJ$QRWKHUKLQWDWWKHWUXHQDWXUHRIWKHPRUQLQJ¶VRSHUDWLRQV
at the aerodrome comes from the Garde Mobile report on the subsequent destination of the 
aircraft, which mentions that:  
/¶DYLRQWUDQVSRUWHXUW\SH/DWpFRpUH (sic), piloté par ANE, Robert «HVWSDUWLFHPDWLQHQ
GHVWLQDWLRQGH3HUSLJQDQPDLVLOQ¶DSDVDWWHUUL&HWDYLRQDSSDUWHQDLWELHQjODFRPSDJQLH
Air ±)UDQFHPDLVLODIDLWO¶REMHWG¶XQHPXWDWLRQ«LO\DXQPRLVHt demi.16  
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The deviation of the aircraft from its authorised destination of Perpignan can only indicate 
that the pilot flew to Spain, thus, under Non-Intervention laws, committing an offence against 
aviation regulations concerning the Spanish Civil War. 
 The irregularity of such operations was not overlooked by the punctilious authorities in 
Toulouse, the commissaire finishing the first of several reports on the incident writing:   
«-¶HVWLPHTX¶Hn raison du caractère singulier et mystérieux qui entoure cette affaire...une 
enquête... pourrait être ouverte par la Brigade de Police Mobile...17 
 
Whilst the police clearly recognised that there was something afoot at the aerodrome and that 
IXUWKHULQYHVWLJDWLRQZDVUHTXLUHGWRORRNLQWRWKHµP\VWHULRXV¶JRLQJV-on at Montaudran, the 
report from the commissaire¶V VXSHULRU WKH SUpIHW RI WKH +DXWH-Garonne, to the Interior 
0LQLVWHUSURYLGHVDPSOHHYLGHQFHWKDWWKHDLUILHOG¶VVKDGRZ\UROHLQUHODWLRQWRWKHHYHQWVLQ
Spain, was known. The report divulged that initial police surveillance of Montaudran had 
arisen from «les conditions trop souvent irregulières du traffic aérien de ce terrain«18 In 
DGGLWLRQWRQRWLQJWKHSDWWHUQRIµLUUHJXODU¶happenings at Montaudran the préfet noted that, 
besides the flight of pilot Robert Ane, various other pilots were implicated in strange 
activities at the Air-France airfield with: 
...ce départ >$QH¶V@ pour le moins aussi suspect que les voyages des aviateurs CORNEZ et 
DELABRE...19  
)ROORZLQJ WKH SUpIHW¶V RUGHULQJ RI D SROLFH investigation into the incident of 13 March,  
commissaire Ludevic Lautier wrote on the 17 March 1937 to the commissaire divisionnaire, 
detailing the findings of his enquiry. According to Lautier, on the 13 March the Latécoère 28 
aircraft, registration AJHS had been loaded on the orders of Jean Blanc, who in his procès 
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verbal (judicial statement) claimed that he had received the crates from a delivery driver he 
could not remember the name of, executing written orders from a M. Edouard Serre, resident 
in Paris. He also claimed that the crates were of un volume normal. Blanc then apparently had 
the containers returned to the sender, denying all knowledge of the contents.20  
Blanc had also used an authorised letter from his employer M. Serre to justify his activities: 
Mon Cher Blanc |  vous allez recevoir trois caisses. Vous les chargerez sur le Laté 
[Latécoère] 28 N° 902. En cas de difficulté de chargement vous me les retournerez par la 
route en les remettant au porteur de la présente | Vous êtes autorisé à vous servir de la 
présente lettre à toutes fins utiles. Bien amicalement à vous| signé: Ed. Serre 21     
 
Ami-Jacques Rapin, who has examined arms trafficking by French Republican sympathisers 
in Toulouse, KDV EHHQ LQFRQFOXVLYH LQ HVWDEOLVKLQJ WKH QDWXUH RI -HDQ %ODQF¶V UHODWLRQVKLS
with wider smuggling movements. Indeed, whilst Rapin argues that Blanc was connected to 
persons in the Air Ministry, he provides no further details. He also alludes to Blanc playing a 
UROH LQ WKH WUDQVIHU RI DLUFUDIW WR WKH 5HSXEOLF µcela ODLVVH HQWHQGUH TX¶LO SDUWLFLSe au 
transit...22 However, such statements remain open to doubt and require substantiated 
illumination in the context of this chapter.  
 The evidence available points strongly towards Blanc being a major regional organiser, 
categorically affiliated with government Republican sympathisers, namely Cot and Moulin. 
The connection arises through Edouard Serre.23 That this Air France director should be linked 
to Blanc provides the evidence connecting South West aircraft and arms smuggling 
RSHUDWLRQV WR WKH $LU 0LQLVWU\ ,QGHHG LQ +RZVRQ¶V H[DPLQDWLRQ RI 0RXOLQ¶V SULQFLSDO
collaborators in Non-,QWHUYHQWLRQ UpODFKpH 6HUUH¶V UROH IHDWXUHV SURPLQHQWly. A pioneering 
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 Commissaire de Police Mobile to Commissaire Divisionnaire à Toulouse,17.03.37 & Procès- Verbal no.3 
µ'pFODUDWLRQGXQRPPp -HDQ%ODQF¶  
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64 
 
SLORW DQG UDGLR HQJLQHHU ZLWK $pURSRVWDOH LQ WKH V KROGLQJ µVWURQJ OHIW-ZLQJ YLHZV¶
Serre had been transferred to Air France in 1933 after the collapse of Aéropostale, his rise to 
technical director being overseen through the patronage of fellow leftist, Pierre Cot.24  Thus 
as a radio engineer it is obvious that Serre would have close pre-Spanish Civil War contact 
with regional heads of radio communications in Air France, such as Jean Blanc, enabling  
him to have regional contacts available on the outbreak of war in Spain. Indeed, this seems to 
have been  precisely the case. A police report from July 1937 records that...Au début de la 
guerre civile espagnole, il [Blanc] à demandé et obtenu sa mise en disponibilité«25 Clearly, 
with Air France, the state airline, under the aegis of Pierre Cot in 1936, and with confidents 
such as Serre in the shadows of covert aircraft transfers, Blanc was in an ideal position to 
facilitate such activities, and thus obtained temporary leave from his regular Air France 
responsibilities. His relinquishing of routine responsibilities and his detachment on special 
duties within the company, however, did not seem to have hindered his contacts within the 
company, or his use of company property and motor pool, as will be seen below. The dual 
positions of Blanc in a state owned company, accompanied by additional approved 
responsibilities, no doubt allowed for this unusual arrangement.  
 It is noteworthy, in assessing the attitudes of the local authorities towards covert pro-
5HSXEOLFDQ YHQWXUHV WR DQDO\VH SROLFH UHSRUWV IURP  UHJDUGLQJ %ODQF¶V UROH DW
Montaudran 6XFK LQWHOOLJHQFH ILQGLQJV DOOXGH WR SRVVLEOH ILQDQFLDO PRWLYDWLRQV LQ %ODQF¶V
disposition towards pro-Republican activities, an officer writiQJ WKDW %ODQF¶V pas très 
avantageuse financial situation had since the start of the Civil War become brillante.26 
However, it is contestable for various reasons that money played the predominant role in 
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Blanc organising activities in Toulouse for the Republic.27 First, it is known that Blanc was in 
contact with Serre, an uncompromising leftist, in collaboration with the most well-known 
Spanish Republican sympathisers in the Front Populaire. Second, a police report specifies 
that in May 1937 Blanc joined the mouvement Pivertiste faction of the SFIO. This Socialist 
sub-section known as the Gauche Révolutionnaire was led by Marcel Pivert, who, whilst 
politically a pacifist, was also tacitly in support of intervention in Spain, also justified by this 
belief.28 )XUWKHU SURRI RI %ODQF¶V LQYROYHPHQW LQ WKLV 6RFLDOLVW IDFWLRQ ZDV GHPRQVWUDWHG
ZKHQ LQYHVWLJDWRUV KLJKOLJKWHG KLP DV EHLQJ D VLJQDWRU\ RQ WKH PRYHPHQW¶V QDWLRQDO
manifesto in May 1937.29 Police reports on Blanc at various stages in the investigation into 
his activities portray him alternately as motivated by financial gain or extremist politics. Both 
stances reveal the conservative tendencies of the Toulouse police department, which, as has 
been seen above, was against any form of Pro-Republican intervention. 
  It is of great significance when examining UHJLRQDODFWLYLWLHVVXFKDV%ODQF¶VDWMontaudran, 
to establish the longevity of such acts of support for the Spanish Republic and their exact 
motivations and influences. In the case of Blanc it seems that the incident at the aerodrome in 
March 1937 came amidst a variety of other activities which suggest a role far more important 
than that of a reliable political intermediary.  
 An examination of French civil aviation records from 1936-1939 reveals that the Latécoère 
28, registered under the civil aviation code F-AJHS, at the centre of the March incident, was 
based in Toulouse and had belonged in succession to Aéropostale and Air France and was 
registered from March 1937 to the Fédération Populaire des Sports Aeronautiques (FPSA).30 
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The latter organisation had been set up by the Front Populaire in 1936 to train young pilots 
from the proletariat and in 1937 also was under the joint aegis of the undersecretary of state 
for Sport and Leisure, Léo Lagrange, a staunch pro-Republican sympathiser, and Pierre Cot.31 
That Blanc was able to procure an aircraft registered under the FPSA for pro-Republican 
activities is unsurprising. His government connected protectors no doubt authorised such an 
action. Blanc clearly had a role in the FPSA as  in May 1937 a far-right press report referred  
to Blanc as being a member of the Toulouse Aviation Populaire (another term for the FPSA) 
sitting on its comité des fêtes. More interestingly the report also highlighted that Blanc was a 
friend of Edouard Serre, a fellow Toulousain, confirming what has already been examined 
UHJDUGLQJ%ODQF¶V)URQW3RSXODLUHFRQWDFWV32        
 7KURXJKRXWWKHVFDOHRI%ODQF¶VLQYROYHPHQWLQ7RXORXVH-based operations in favour of 
the Spanish Republic can be seen in the attention he attracted from rightists, Non-Intervention 
observers and far-right press snoopers. 
 March 1937 was a frenetic month for Blanc, the latter primarily organising aircraft refuelling 
for Spanish Republican aircraft purchased in northern Europe, as well as other activities that 
caught the attention of /¶([SUHVV GX 0LGL and the Toulouse authorities. Evidence from 
/¶([SUHVV would often suggest a vastly exaggerated stance and hence unreliability in its 
MRXUQDOLVWV¶UHSRUWLQJRISUR-Republican activities. However, even the ideologically opposed 
rightist press offers a valuable insight into events at Montaudran. The unsurpassed snooping 
abilities of /¶([SUHVV¶V UHSRUWHUVRIIHUHGPDQ\ LOOXPLQDWLQJGHWDLOV- alongside the expected 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
this aircraft to the FPSA is also referred to in the report, Le Commissaire Divisionnaire to Le Préfet de la Haute-
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anti-Republican vitriol. For example, in an DUWLFOHHQWLWOHGFKDUDFWHULVWLFDOO\µLa Farce de la 
neutralité¶WKHQHZVSDSHUDVNHGLQDn exaggerated tone: 
 Les aérodromes français appartiennent-ils au Frente Popular?| Comment huit avions 
hollandais RQWSXJDJQHU/¶(VSDJQH5RXJHHQVHUDYLWDLOODQWj7RXORXVH.33 
 
What is interesting beside the inflated VXJJHVWLRQ WKDW WKH )UHQWH 3RSXODU µRZQHG¶ )UHQFK
airfields, tellingly reminding us of the ire of the Right towards any breaches of Non-
Intevention in favour of the Republic, is the commentary relating to  the transit and refuelling 
of Dutch-built aircraft at Montaudran. As has already seen above from the comparatively 
minor incident of the 13 March 1937, any unauthorized departures for Spain via Montaudran 
were prohibited by the 18 February law (as /¶([SUHVV reminded its concerned readers)The 
following makes interesting reading, indicating the level of organisational acumen that Blanc 
and his collaborators must have had: 
...le 9 mars...deux monoplaces Koolhoven PHAMP et PHAMR décollaieQWGHO¶DpURGURPHGH
Toulouse j PLGL WUHQWH«LOV pWDLHQW VXLYLV j  KHXUHV GHV GHX[ PRQRSODFHV 3+$06 HW
3+$07HWGXELSODFH3+$027RXVVHVDYLRQVV¶pWDLHQWSRVpVj0RQWDXGUDQOHHW0DUV
et ils avaient tranquillement IDLW OHXU SOHLQ G¶HVVHQFH ,OV Q¶pWDLHQW SDV DUPpV PDLV
possédaient des supports des mitrailleuses. Achetés par le gouvernement de Valence (sic) à la 
firme hollandaise Koolhoven, ils se rendaient en Espagne pour être incorporés dans les 
UDQJVGHO¶DYLDWLRQ URXJH3RXUrWUHFRPSOHWLOFRQYLHQWG¶DMRXWHUTXHODPrPHFRPpGLHV¶HVW
UpSpWpHDYHFODPRQRSODFHGHFKDVVH.RROKRYHQ3+$08TXLDSUqVDYRLUDWWHUULOH«PDUV
HWV¶rWUHUDYLWDLOOpHQHVVHQFHHVWWUDQTXLOOHPHQWUHSDUWLOHVDPHGL«34     
   
It is quite remarkable that such activities could take place given the level of rightist hostility 
in the region to the Popular Front and official surveillance measures in place. That a squadron 
of aircraft was able to land at Montaudran and refuel before taking-off, clearly illicitly, for 
the Spanish Republic, testifies that the pilots relaying the aircraft to Spain knew that they 
were assured in advance of full logistical support, when they arrived at the aerodrome, and 
                                                          
33
 /¶([SUHVVGX0LGL, 22/05/37 
34Ibid., 22/05/37  
68 
 
that they knew they could avoid complications. Furthermore as the reporter wrote, the 
Koolhovens were unambiguously military aircraft, and thus, even unarmed, were of 
substantial value to the Republic. That Blanc was in charge of operations is clear. The 
departmental préfet wrote in relation to an identical aircraft transfer in May 1937: 
...Comme par hazard, BLANC se trouvait sur le terrain de Montaudran, au moment précis ou 
OHVDYLRQVHVSDJQROVJRXYHUQHPHQWDX[\RQWDWWHUULOH0DL&¶HVWVRXVVDGLUHFWLRQ«TXL
IXWIDLWOHSOHLQG¶HVVHQFHGHVDSSDUHLOVSDUOHVSLORWHVGHO¶HVFDGULOOHDLGpVSDUOHSHUVRQQHO
de la compagnie Air-)UDQFHDXPR\HQGHVELGRQVGH OLWUHVSODFpVDYDQW O¶DWWHUULVVDJH
SDUJURXSHGH«35 
 
From the préfeW¶VPHVVDJHLWLVREYLRXVWKDW%ODQFZDVWDNLQJRUGHUVIURPWKRse responsible 
for assisting the Spanish Republic, and that he had the full collaboration of Air-France 
employees, despite having obtained leave from the company in July 1936. This demonstrates 
a significant level of co-ordination, beyond the remit of an ordinary employee.  Furthermore, 
from Dutch aviation records it is known that there was a sale of 10 FK-51 Koolhovens by NV 
Koolhoven Vliegtuigen, in March and April 1937. Records show that these fighter aircraft, 
built in 1937, were sold to France and then µprobably to Spain¶EHWZHHQ0DUFKDQG-XQH
1937, with the aircraft listed above shown as being sold nominally to France days before their 
refuelling at Montaudran, and subsequent departure south of the Pyrenees.36 As an epilogue 
to the Koolhoven episode, recent research on the Spanish Civil war in Cantabria reveals that 
WKH5HSXEOLF¶VDLUIRUFHLQWKLVUHJLRQZDVUHLQIRUFHGZKHQ... llegaron, a principios de 1937, 
10 Koolhoven FK-51...37  
 The actions of Blanc had thus played an important role in the enabling of these fighters to 
arrive on the Northern Front. Whilst such actions were important, it is useful, in order to 
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comprehend the implications of such covert support actions for the Spanish Republic, to gain 
an understanding of the network of complicities and co-operation that enabled such 
sympathies to be transformed into clear-cut solidarity actions. As has already been seen Blanc 
was not acting alone. It is therefore useful to comprehend the nature of solidarity for the 
Republic in Toulouse and the characters that fostered the atmosphere of support for the 
Spanish government.  
  In social and political terms Toulouse was a hotbed of support for the Republic. One 
commissaire quoted the Non-Intervention control officer for the region, Colonel Lunn, 
UHSRUWLQJWKDW WKH%DUGHO¶2SpUDUXQE\D0 Monso, an SFIO member, was a rendezvous 
for local Socialists. He added that the bar was also frequented by municipal functionaries, 
leftist students and agents of the Spanish Republic passing through Toulouse. Lunn noted that 
passionate discussions of leftist politics and especially the war in Spain often erupted in the 
bar. 38 In this light it seems that there was a clear venue for debate of Spanish issues in the 
city which was well-known to the authorities for its implication in hosting a wide range of 
potentially suspect characters, ranging from students to Spanish Republican functionaries. 
:KLOVWWKH%DUGHO¶2SpUDIHDWXUHVEULHIO\LQ/XQQ¶VUHSRUWWKHDXWKRULties seem to have been 
more concerned with the happenings at another local bar, the Bar Gambetta, run by a Mme. 
%RXJHUROOHV DOVR WKH PLVWUHVV RI -HDQ %ODQF %ODQF ZDV DOVR WKH EDU¶V ODQGORUG39 Reports 
from June-July 1937 reveal that the bar provided another focus of pro-Republican 
V\PSDWKLVHUV%\-XO\DQ\DPELJXLW\ VXUURXQGLQJ%ODQF¶V clandestine pro-Republican 
role seems to have evaporated in the eyes of the police and the rightist press. One article 
brazenly declared of Blanc¶VUHFHSWLRQRI5HSXEOLcan pilots at Montaudran, µIl commandait 
MXVTX¶DXFKHIG¶(VFDGULOOH¶and gave a pen-portrait of Blanc that read:  
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«il ne ressemble pas au héros du romanFDULOQ¶DTX¶XQWUDLQGHYLH«VLPSOHHWPqQHXQH
H[LVWHQFH GH ERXUJHRLV«0DLV LO sait  le prix de la discrétion, et je suis certain TX¶LO QH
PDQTXHSDVGHFRXUDJH« intelligent il est.40 
 
Curiously Blanc¶V OHIWLVP did not reduce the effect on the reporter, who seemed strangely 
overawed by the accomplishments of the Air France connected employee, tempering this 
ZLWKWKHDFFXVDWLRQWKDW%ODQFZDVWKHµUDYLWDLOOHXURIILFLDOGH%DUFHORQHHW9DOHQFH¶.41 This 
suggestion, however, appears reasonably accurate. Certainly, Blanc took orders from 
government connected Republican sympathisers such as Serre. Furthermore, reports into 
activities at the Bar Gambetta and other local facilities reinforce this.  In early July an officer 
wrote of Blanc that the latter was ...en relation étroite avec divers agents du gouvernement de 
VALENCE....and that public opinion suggested that on various occasions cars had been seen 
parked outside the bar, late at night, with the transfer of crates to them. However, the officer 
doubted that the cases contained matériel de guerre, rather aircraft spare-parts.42 It is 
worthwhile considering in such reports that Rightist public opinion, inflamed by the often 
drastically inaccurate reports of publications such as /¶([SUHVV GX 0LGL and Le Jour, was 
RIWHQSURQHWRGHQRXQFLQJDPXOWLWXGHRIOHIWLVWµFODQGHVWLQH¶KDSSHQLQJVZLWKRQO\WKHPRVW
tenuous evidence to support such accusations.43 Even the official reports of the Non-
Intervention observer Colonel Lunn were treated with scepticism by the officer in this case, 
who wrote that /XQQ¶V DFFXVDWLRQ RI %ODQF XVLQJ PXQLFLSDO YHKLFOHV WR WUDQVSRUW LOOHJDO 
equipment to the aerodrome was doubtful. The officer commented that it was more likely that 
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the vans belonged to Air-France, due to their model baring a remote resemblance to 
municipal vehicles.44  
 The case illustrates how the issue of the Spanish Civil War and Non-Intervention often 
provoked flights of the imagination as well as inaccuracy, even amongst officialdom charged 
ZLWK DFFXUDWHO\ GHWDLOLQJ µLQIUDFWLRQV¶ RI WKH ODZ :KLOVW RWKHU UHSRUWV E\ /XQQ RQ SUR-
Republican activities in Toulouse were negateG E\ WKH FLW\¶V SROLFH GHSDUWPHQW LW LV DOVR
arguable that such senior officers sought to avoid embarrassment and the wrath of their 
superiors for their own failure to reduce illegal activities, which they were supposed to be 
preventing.45 :KLOVWSROLFHUHSRUWVPXVWEHWUHDWHGZLWKFDXWLRQGXHWRRIILFHUV¶LGHRORJLFDO
opposition to clandestine pro-Republican activities, such sources can largely be treated as 
accurate. Police surveillance of airfields and railway stations was, as seen above, particularly 
intense; in contrast foreign Non-Intervention observers worked with smaller teams, with little 
local knowledge and fewer resources to dedicate to investigating Non-Intervention breaches.  
 As mentioned in reports above, it is clear that the Bar Gambetta was a hive of activity for 
persons ranging from Air-France employees and ex-colleagues of Blanc at Montaudran, to, 
according to officers, numerous other figures, who in the context of this case study seem to 
reveal substantial information about how Blanc was able to pursue his activities. An 
H[KDXVWLYH UHSRUW LQ -XO\  E\ WKH 7RXORXVH SROLFH FKLHI UHYHDOV WKDW %ODQF¶V EDU ZDV
frequented not only by Air-France workers, but also employees from the Latécoère aircraft 
IDFWRU\ DQG µWKH PDMRULW\¶ of Soviet agents passing through the town. The police also 
established that Blanc had friends in the Air Ministry, whom he would phone from the bar. 
The bar, the officer wrote, was a ....lieu de rendez-vous des intermédiaires de tout ordre en 
UHODWLRQG¶DIfaires avec les agents accrédités du gouvernement de Valence«DQGWKDWZKHQ
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Spanish Republican squadrons had landed at Montaudran«de nombreuses communications 
WpOpSKRQLTXHVRQWHXOLHXHQWUHOH%DU*DPEHWWDHWOH0LQLVWqUHGHO¶$LU«46  
Whilst such reports certainly suggest that Blanc was a government agent, his contacts with 
the Air France and Latécoère factory workers come as particularly interesting in the context 
RI%ODQF¶V OHVVHUNQRZQLQWHUHVWV LQ7RXORXVH$FFRUGLQJ WR WKHSROLFH%ODQFDOVR Uented a 
lock-up, containing spare-parts for planes, including seats and ailerons. We can deduce that 
VXFK SROLFH FODLPV PXVW RQO\ KDYH EHHQ PDGH DIWHU FRYHUW VXUYHLOODQFH RI %ODQF¶V VWRUDJH
area, as the locality was kept under lock and key by an employee oI%ODQF¶VZKRRQO\JDYH
DFFHVV WR %ODQF¶V FROODERUDWRUV47 Clearly obtaining parts such as ailerons required the 
assistance of persons in mechanical positions in the aviation industry, such as those 
mentioned above, reinforcing the probability that, whilst %ODQF¶V LQGLYLGXDO UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV
were valued by Spanish Republicans and the Air Ministry, such activities were made possible 
through a greater network of associates than the reports might like to indicate.  
 7KHLQIOXHQFHWKDW%ODQF¶VSRVLWLRQDW0RQWDXGUDQFDUULHGis hinted at when reading between 
the lines of a report from the préfet of the Haute-Garonne. The determination of some areas 
of the local authorities to bring Blanc to book for his activities was undoubtedly hindered by 
friends in influential places, the préfet noting in June 1937 that:   
OHSDUTXHWGH7RXORXVHQ¶DYDLWSDVKpVLWpjHQYR\HUXQHFRPPLVVLRQ«SRXUHQTXrter à son 
sujet mais je ne sais à la suite de quelles interventions le parquet a éWpDPHQpj µFODVVHU¶
O¶DIIDLUH«48     
 
 The fact that the préfet openly hinted that the Toulouse prosecutors were thwarted from 
investigating Blanc by the intervention of an unknown force, able to have archived a judicial 
investigation into  breaches of Non-Intervention, is tellingly indicative of the esteem in which 
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FHUWDLQSHUVRQVLQDXWKRULW\KHOG%ODQF¶VDFWLYLWLHV2IDGGLWLRQDOLQWHUHVWLQWKLV domain is a 
Gendarmerie report from 31 July 1937, in which the commander of Gendarmerie for the 
Toulouse region wrote to the prefect that his units had jamais FRQVWDWpXQWUDILFG¶DUPHVDX
bénéfice des belligerents espagnols.49 Given that the Gendarmerie also had responsibility for 
the Gardes Mobiles stationed at French aerodromes, including those on duty at Montaudran 
during the March 1937 events discussed above, it seems strange that the Gendarmerie should 
show a total ignorance of the extensive investigaWLRQVLQWR%ODQF¶VDFWLYLWLHVXQGHUZD\LQWKH
FLW\¶V SROLFH GHSDUWPHQW In this context it is worth referring to a piece published in the 
rightist daily, Le Jour, in May 1937, which had hinted at the authorities¶ complicity in secret 
operations at Montaudran, writing:  
..quiconque est un peu informé sur ce qui se passe HQ(VSDJQHVDLWTX¶LOVHMRXHLFLXQHSLqFH
de marionnettes, dont les fils sont tirés par ceux-là même qui devraient faire respecter la loi. 
/H*HQGDUPHGHYLHQWYROHXU&¶HVWWRXWjIDLWGXbon guignol.50 
 
In a similarly exaggerated fashion the Republican Servicio del Extranjero of the Ministerio 
del Estado, monitoring Nationalist press releases, noted that in November 1937 the latter 
continued to believe that the French government was involveG LQ WKH 5HSXEOLF¶V XVH RI
)UHQFKDLUILHOGVWKHUHSRUWKLJKOLJKWLQJWKDWµFranco acusa...a Francia, de poner sus aviones 
\VXVDHURSXHUWRVDODGLVSRVFLyQGHOD(VSDxD/HDO¶51   
 Scepticism is undoubtedly required for many such disproportionate accusations, clearly 
designed to misinform and discredit the Left in the eyes of public opinion. However, it is 
worth considering the pressure that certain personalities, such as Cot and Cusin, could exert 
on functionaries, as well as the willing complicity of many more public servants favourable 
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to the Spanish Republic.52 That the entire Toulouse Gendarmerie should be implicated in 
assisting in acts of illegality is questionable. However, the notion that certain elements would 
have participated in the clandestine operations that Blanc was running is realistic, given the 
network of useful sympathies that will be discussed below.  
 7KH*HQGDUPHULH¶VREOLYLRXVQHVVWRZDUGV%ODQF¶VSUR-Republican activities could equally be 
extended to a number of his other actions, which were arguably as LPSRUWDQW DV %ODQF¶V
aerodrome-based activities. In a 31 July report a police commissaire wrote that when a 
Spanish [Republican] aircraft crash-landed near Cadours (Haute-Garonne) Blanc telephoned 
a lawyer at the Toulouse bar to defend the pilot.53  -HDQ6HUUHVDOVRUHIHUVWRDFHUWDLQµ%ODQF¶
of Toulouse being the registered owner and regional representative of Air Pyrénées, a 
blockade-running airline created in early 1937 to transport Republican personalities from 
Biarritz to the encircled northern Zone of Bilbao and Santander.54 %ODQF¶VLQYROYHPHQWZLWK
Air Pyrénées is additionally confirmed by a July 1937 police report.55 The French aviation 
register also suggests that Blanc sold aircraft to the Republicans with a 1936 Caudron 600 
Aiglon F-$3&*EHLQJUHJLVWHUHGWRµ-0%ODQF¶LQ0DUFKOLVWHGDVµSRVVLEO\¶VROGWR
6SDQLVK5HSXEOLFDQVDQGUHFRUGHGDVµGHVWUR\HG¶LQ-XQH56 
 From what we have seen in the case of Jean Blanc and the Montaudran aerodrome affair it is 
necessary to draw some interim conclusions as to the nature of secret pro-Republican 
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operations in Toulouse. Blanc undoubtedly collaborated with the upper levels of government 
who supported the Spanish Republic. His connections with Serre are a case in point. Police 
DQGSUHVVUHSRUWVWKDWKDYHIRFXVHGODUJHO\RQ%ODQF¶VUROHLQWKHVXSSO\LQJRIHTXLSPHQWDQG
supplies to the Republicans have overlooked the vital, if not co-ordinating, roles played by a 
plethora of local collaborators who made BlDQF¶VYHQWXUHVSRVVLEOH$VKDVEHHQVHHQ%ODQF
worked alongside fellow sympathisers from his former company, Air France, had contact 
with aviation workers from Latécoère, connections through the Bar Gambetta to Soviet and 
Republican agents and staff who guarded his storage unit as well as a reliable lawyer from the 
Toulouse bar. Such connections demonstrate the far-reaching network of assistance that 
Republican sympathisers and the Spanish Republic received, reinforcing the central tenet of 
the present work and indicating a range of loyalties considerably more widespread than might 
have been assumed. Certainly we must be wary about the nature of the authorities¶ complicity 
in the events described. Indeed, as we have seen, the police department was extremely 
tenacious in its investigations into Blanc, going to great lengths to observe him, both at 
Montaudran and in his other commercial and private ventures. However, the ability of Blanc 
to have the support from government superiors LQGXELWDEO\ IDFLOLWDWHG WKH ODWWHU¶VDFWLYLWLHV
allowing him and his collaborators to continue their operations, with the knowledge that 
influential friends could permit them to evade potential sanctions.  
 The above case study has demonstrated the clear implications of the role played by aviation 
employees in connection with local Republican sympathisers, and whilst undoubtedly such 
personalities played a significant role in the supplying of specialist aviation material, the vast 
majority of smuggling of arms and equipment to Spain was overseen under the aegis of 
Gaston Cusin. Many studies, including those by Weber, Rapin, and Poggioli have covered the 
76 
 
role of Cusin in relation to his far-reaching contacts in state administration.57 However, the 
local implLFDWLRQVDQGFRPSRQHQWVRI&XVLQ¶VRSHUDWLRQVLQWKH6RXWK:HVWKDYHEHHQJLYHQ
little more than cursory attention by historians, with the exception of Ami-Jacques Rapin, 
who has focused mainly on the Pyrénées-Orientales.58 The latter has explained how CusiQ¶V
subordinates operated at regional level, but divulges little on the local aspects of Non-
Intervention relâchée.  
 (YLGHQWO\DVDFXVWRPVRIILFHUDQGGHSDUWPHQWDOXQLRQOHDGHU&XVLQ¶VPDLQFROODERUDWRUVLQ
smuggling supplies to the Republic were customs officials and revenue inspectors. Both 
groups also fell under the remit of the Ministry of Finance, in which Cusin was sous-chef de 
cabinet in 1936 and senior aide until April 193959. There was also collaboration from the 
railway workers, working closely with the aforementioned groups in the same border stations. 
The cheminots were additionally notable adherents to the PCF, as will be shown below. For 
the purposes of this case study, the broader implications of revenue and customs pro-
Republican activities on a national scale will be avoided, as the key focus of this regional 
study resides in the activities of customs and revenue functionaries in the border region, 
where such activities could influence pro-Republican supplying operations.  
 In order to demonstrate the motivations behind later pro-Republican actions a clear trajectory 
demonstrating the levels of involvement of customs and revenue staff in leftist political 
organisations in the South West in 1936, and political meetings, will be traced. This will then 
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form the basis for demonstrating why these functionaries by 1938 became fully implicated in 
partisan activities in favour of the Republic.  
 A study of departmental involvement in political organisation in the strategically vital 
Pyrénées-Orientales provides a thorough insight into levels of functionary engagement in 
leftist political leadership in the region. In 1936 the sous-préfet of the Prades sous-préfecture 
wrote to his superior, the préfet of the Pyrénées-Orientales, that the Communist party was 
making significant gains in local politics with 3,239 votes being cast for M. Terrats, the PCF 
candidate in the May 1936 elections in this sector.60 At a commune by commune level, in the 
border village of Le Boulou, the PCF was led by Joseph Salbat, an accountant at the railway 
company the P.O du Midi, the group comprising 150 members. In Port-Vendres a former 
customs official acted as PCF treasurer, and in Maureillas, near the border, the sous-préfet 
denounced the propaganda activities of PCF deputies¶ZLYHV0PHV0DUW\DQG3pULUHVLGLQJ
in the commune whilst their husbands carried out pro-Republican activities in Spain.61                                        
Meanwhile the SFIO in the area counted 5,000 members, it was led in the canton of Céret by 
Joseph Roigt and Gaston Cardonne, respectively retired and active senior tax officials for the 
region. Since the legislative elections of May 1936 the prefectoral functionary   noted that the 
µ*DXFKH 5pYROXWLRQQDLUH¶ IDFWLRQ RI WKe Socialist party had gained ground amongst local 
Socialists with the aforementioned revenue officials also leading this tendency.62  
 In the context of involvement of local functionaries, in leftist political leadership in the area 
it is unsurprising that enquiries by the préfet to his police observers regarding leftist political 
reunions in the region should similarly reveal the implication of these officials¶ colleagues in 
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such meetings. Thus an enquiry in 1937 by the Perpignan Sûrété into the organisation of the 
PCF in the region revealed that there was cause to note amongst other communist activities:  
O¶DFWLYLWp GHV FHOOXOHV GH %285*-0$'$0( HW G¶(19(,7* FRPSRVpHV HQ JUDQGH
majorité des fonctionnaires (douaniers) et employés du P.O. ±Midi, à la Gare Internationale 
de LA TOUR DE CAROL.63  
 
In addition to the widespread involvement of customs officers and railway workers at these 
strategically important border posts and international stations, the sous-préfet in Prades wrote 
in September 1936 of customs RIILFHUV¶ DWWHQGDQFHDW DPHHWLQJ LQ D FDIp LQQHDUE\0RQW-
Louis. At the reunion an exposé of events in Spain was given by a M. Raymond Zuckermann, 
of the Parisian Comité de vigilance des intellectuels antifascistes, with:  
...XQH YLQJWDLQH G¶DVVLVWDQWV SDUPL OHVTXHOV OHV GRXDQLHUV GH /D &DEDQDVVH IRUPDLHQW OD
majorité... 64 
 
From these reports we thus have evidence of state functionaries¶DFWLYHLQYROYHPHQWLQERWK
leftist political organisation in the region and attendance of pro-Republican reunions held in 
ERUGHU WRZQV ZKHUH VXFK RIILFLDO¶V SROLWLFDO LQFOLQDWLRQV ZRXOG DSSHDU WR EH LQ GLUHFW
contradiction to the Non-Intervention role that Howson has alleged they fulfilled.65  
 It is noteworthy that, GHVSLWHVXFKIXQFWLRQDULHV¶VWUDWHJLFUROHDW%RXUJ-Madame/La Tour de 
Carol and Cerbère, in 1936 at least, even Nationalist high command seems to have shown a 
remarkable ignorance of the military importance to the Republic of these border stations, 
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indeed General Mola commented on the 8 September 1936, to journalists in Vera de Bidasoa,  
after the capture of Irún that: 
/D SULVH G¶,UXQ D SRXU QRXV XQH LPSRUWDQFH FRQVLGpUDEOH La liaison par terre entre les 
armées rouge de Catalogne et du Guipúzcoa est coupée. (sic) &¶HVWSDUOjTXH passaient le 
ravitaillement et les armes de provenances étrangères. 66     
 
In the context of this chapter it would seem that barring of supplies to the Spanish Republic 
from abroad was not the foregone conclusion that Mola, with perhaps excessive confidence 
following the fall of Irún, would have liked to have been the case. It is worth noting that the 
1DWLRQDOLVW¶V 1D]L DOOLHV ZHUH XQGHU QR VXFK LOOXVLRQV 7KH *HUPDQ $PEDssador in France 
wrote in August 1936 that:  
...on the occasion of a trip to the Catalonian Pyrenees, I had been able to convince myself at 
first hand of the extensive arms smuggling in favour of the Spanish Popular Front...67 
 
A brief examination of the Spanish rightist press from 1938 reveals that the Nationalists 
developed an obsession with the Catalan frontier crossings, including Bourg-Madame/ La 
Tour de Carol. In January 1938 ABC Seville wrote that:  
«En La Tour de Carol hay cinco trenes más de material de guerra con vagones de diez 
WRQHODGDVFDGDXQR«HQ$[-Les-7KHUPHV«\HQRWUDVHVWDFLRQHVIURQWHUL]DVHOWUiILFRKDFLD
la zona roja  UHYLVWH FDUDFWHUHV H[WUDRUGLQDULRV«+DVWD HO SUHIHFWR GH 3LULQHRV 2ULHntales 
realiza viajes exprofeso D /D 7RXU GH &DURO SDUD FRPXQLFDU D OD VHJXULGDG«ODV
LQVWUXFFLRQHVGHOPLQLVWHULRGHO,QWHULRU«68  
 
In this light it seems that the transit of supplies to the Republic via La Tour de Carol and 
FRQVHTXHQWO\WKHPDWHULDO¶VWUDQsfer into Republican hands by local authorities was perceived 
as a major headache by the Nationalists. On a cautionary note, the Spanish Right had a 
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FRQWLQXDOSURSHQVLW\WRHPLWH[DJJHUDWHGGHQXQFLDWLRQVRIWKH)UHQFK/HIW¶VDVVLVWDQFHWRWKH
Republic, and therefore we must be careful in assuming that such large quantities of supplies, 
as extensively listed by the Nationalists, were actually supplied. With reference to the 
involvement of the prefect of the Pyrénées-Orientales, it is important to underline that Rapin 
confirms that Raoul Didkowski, the préfet of the department during the Spanish Civil War, 
was in regular contact with Gaston Cusin.69 That he would have shown the indiscretion 
alleged in the ABC report is doubtful, due to the high political risk his position implied, and 
must be treated with suspicion. 
 In examining the levels of solidarity that existed with the Spanish Republic and the key 
personalities involved in secret supplying operations it is important to assess the exact role of 
departmental administration, to underline the nature of prefectoral and administrative 
involvement in activities that favoured the Spanish Republic. Whilst Raoul Didkowsky and 
préfets in other strategic departments, such as Maurice Bodenen in Bordeaux, were indeed 
involved in carrying out secret government orders from ministers such as Auriol and Cot, it 
would be erroneous to confuse heart-felt solidarity motivated by Republican and leftist 
politics with duty-bound professionalism.70 Indeed, Julian Jackson gives perhaps the most 
accurate description RIWKHSUpIHWV¶DWWLWXGHVLQWKHFRQWH[WRI the Nazi Occupation of France 
from 1940-44, writing that ...The majority [of prefects] merely carried out their duties in a 
spirit of professionalism rather than political zeal...in general French administrators 
executed orders with efficiency...71 This analysis of the préfets¶ attitude towards orders was 
clearly the same throughout the period of the Spanish conflict. Certainly in this chapter 
nuances of political opposition from certain state administrators can be seen, but these tended 
to surface when political superiors did not pose a risk to the careers of those voicing a greater 
                                                          
69
 Rapin.,Tant pis si la lutte est cruelle, pp.123-124.  
70
 Ibid.,p.124.  
71
 J.Jackson.,France: the Dark Years 1940-44, (New York, 2001) pp.264-266.  
81 
 
degree of criticism. In this case, such nuances are visible in certain prefectoral reports after 
the fall of the Front Populaire in November 1938. In the case of Raoul Didkowsky from 
1936--DFNVRQ¶VGHVFULSWLRQRI)UHQFKSUpIHWVZRXOGEHDSSOLFDEOH2UGHUV IURP3DULV
were undoubtedly followed, regardless of personal inclinations towards the opposed Spanish 
factions. Indeed, whilst Didkowsky did relay arms shipment orders he also followed orders 
WKDW LQ 1RYHPEHU  DURXVHG WKH KRVWLOLW\ RI WKH /HIW )ROORZLQJ 'DODGLHU¶V RUGHU WR
temporarily prohibit the re-entry into France of certain wounded former International 
Brigaders, /¶+XPDQLWp complained bitterly: 
...A la frontière un important déploiement de police, sous la direction de M. Didkowski,  
préfet des Pyrénées-2ULHQWDOHV LQWHUGLW O¶HQWUpH HQ France des vaillants défenseurs de la 
OLEHUWp«72   
   
+RZHYHU D JUHDW GHJUHH RI SURIHVVLRQDOLVP FDQ EH VHHQ LQ DOO 'LGNRZVN\¶V GHFLVLRQV, for 
example, on the return of International Brigaders via Perpignan, the préfet allowed the train 
transporting the volunteers to stop in Perpignan where they were subsequently loudly fêted 
by local leftists. Despite criticism from prominent local rightists, which caused Daladier to 
demand explanations from the préfet, the latter wrote that: 
...quelque important fut le serYLFHG¶RUGUHLOPHUpSXJQDLWSRXUGHVUDLVRQVTXHMHQ¶DLSDV
besoin de souligner de faire charger les Gardes Mobiles contre des Français qui revenaient 
G¶(VSDJQHHWTXLWRXVpWDLHQWLQWR[LTXpVSDUOHVSDUROHVOHVFKDQWV«|-¶DLFUXQpFHVVDLUH de 
SURSRVHU  DX FDELQHW GX 0LQLVWUH GH O¶,QWpULHXU XQH IRUPXOH TXL OLPLWHUDLW OHV GpJkWV«MH
JDUDQWLVVDLVTX¶LOQ\DHXDXFXQLQFLGHQW«73  
 
Instead of viewing such reactions as politically sympathetic to a particular cause, it is evident 
that Didkowsky acted in a spirit of on-the-spot pragmatism and political damage limitation, 
as was required by any administrator in such a situation. He reacted similarly in January 1938 
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following a Nationalist aerial incursion and bombing of French border villages in the 
Cerdagne, ABC Madrid reported:  
...El prefecto del departamento  de los Pirineos Orientales ha pedido al gobierno que adopte 
rápidamente las medidas necesarias para asegurar la protección del territorio y de los 
FLXGDGDQRVIUDQFHVHV«74 
 
From such reports as detailed above, it would be correct to underline that the préfet¶Vactions 
whether following Non-Intervention rélâchée related orders, carrying out instructions from 
the government that hindered the left, or calling for military protection from Nationalist aerial 
incursions, all represent prefectoral IXQFWLRQDULHV¶ professional efficiency and protection of 
state interests.75 In this light we must separate leftist initiatives from those carried out by 
administrators, who, whilst facilitating solidarity through their carrying out of covert orders, 
did not assume the same political solidarity role as that chosen by leftist douaniers and tax 
inspectors. The latter were evidently motivated by political sympathies and not by protecting 
the interests of the state.   
 Having examined different layers of involvement and solidarity with the Spanish Republic it 
is important to examine the context in which solidarity actions took place and the significance 
of the border positions in which customs Republican sympathisers operated.  
 Nationalist strategic objectives in the offensive against Catalonia, from 1938 specifically 
refer to the role of the Catalan border-posts, with /¶$XWRQRPLVWD citing the German High 
Command publication Deutsche Wehr, in which the author :  
«FRQIHVVD TXH OD QRVWUD UHVLVWqQFLD ³KD IUXVWUDW HOV SODQV GH )UDQFR´«DIHJHL[ TXH
O¶REMHFWLX GHOV UHEHOV FRQVLVWLD D ³VHSDUDU &DWDOXQ\D GH )UDQoD´DUULEDQW G¶XQD VROD
HPSHQWD«D3XLJFHUGjSHUWDOGHLPSHGLUO¶~VGHO¶HVWDFLyIURQWHUHUDGH%RXUJ-0DGDPH«76     
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This recognition of the importance of the frontier crossings of Catalonia with France becomes 
FUXFLDOWRWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHVLJQLILFDQFHRI)UHQFKIXQFWLRQDULHV¶DFWLYLWLHVsuch as in 
Bourg-Madame and La Tour de Carol, which are detailed in a report after the fall of 
Catalonia in February 1939. It is worth considering when viewing such official sources that, 
as has already been seen in previous reports from the local sous-préfet, this state 
representative retained a conservative tone that is reflected in his hostility throughout the 
report towards the functionaries detailed in it. However, despite the ideological contrasts 
between the sous-préfet and the subjects of his report, the contents can be treated as accurate 
as they originate from police officers, whose reports were required to be factually correct- 
even when their language contains nuances of their political opposition to the activities 
investigated.  
 The sous-préfet began his report- ironically to his pro-Republican activities implicated 
superior, Didkowski, - writing that:  
...de tous les fonctionnaires de douane| Trop de ces fonctionnaires se sont montrés depuis la 
révolution espagnole OHVDPLVRXOHVV\PSDWKLVDQWVUpVROXVGHVUpJLPHVGHWHUUHXUVLFTX¶D
GX VXELU«OD SRSXODWLRQ GH 3XLJFHUGD '¶DXWUH SDUW LOV RQW«DFFRUGp DX[ JHQV GH %RXUJ-
0DGDPH TXL WUDILTXDLHQW DYHF OHV«FRPLWpV HVSDJQROV TX¶LOV V¶HPSUHVVHQW ELHQ HQWHQGX GH
refuser à ceX[TXLIUDQFKLVVDQWPDLQWHQDQWODIURQWLqUHHWTXLQHVRQWSDVOHXUVDPLV«77  
 
 The sous-préfet also revealed that the customs officials subjected local Rightists such as the 
Mayor of Bourg-Madame to thorough searches every time they crossed the frontier, whilst 
themselves traversing the border throughout the conflict ...tout à leur aise avec tous les 
paquets TX¶LO leur plaisait de passer... whilst ensuring that their political adversaries were 
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submitted, following the Nationalist capture of the border, to : ... tant de soin partisan une 
véritable brimade...78   
2Q D ORFDO DQG HYHQ UHJLRQDO OHYHO WKLV LQWHOOLJHQFH VXJJHVWV WKDW GHVSLWH WKH RIILFLDO¶V
REYLRXV LGHRORJLFDO RSSRVLWLRQ WR WKH FXVWRPV RIILFHU¶V DFWLYLWLHV WKH ODWWHU HQVXUHG WKDW
supplies to political opponents were restricted, through ideologically motivated yet 
legitimately permitted searches, whilst the officers themselves contributed to supplying local 
Spanish Republicans. Such acts clearly contributed to maintaining Republican morale on a 
local scale, especially in 1938-39, a time of shortages on the Spanish side of the border.  
After recommending the transfer of the customs officers claiming, perhaps entirely correctly, 
that the latter would be unable to work with the new Spanish authorities the sous-préfet than 
gave an interesting in-depth report on the officers concerned and their exact activities, as 
reported by the commissaire spécial in Bourg-Madame.  Listing seven customs officials 
including the receveur, brigadier secretaire - one of whom was the secretary of Bourg-
0DGDPH¶V3&)FHOO - the prefectoral official stressed that, in contrast to their subordinates, 
the captain, lieutenant and brigadier of Bourg-Madame customs were blameless in all 
respects. This suggests that lower levels of officialdom were more widely involved in pro-
Republican activities than their perhaps more conservative and career-motivated superiors. 
The sous-préfet also turned his indignation on the contrôleur des contributions indirectes (tax 
inspector), M. Ribot, whom he accused of having ...trafiqué pendant plusieurs années avec 
les membres des comités de Puigcerda...79 It is evident from this statement and other 
information, that whilst many trans-frontier relationships were not tinged with political 
motivation, as examined above, the involvement of the customs and tax officials with Frente 
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Popular committee members clearly indicates that political sympathies developed crucial 
significance in cross-border solidarity during the Spanish Civil War. These sympathies in 
turn provided Spanish Republican allies with assistance, which might not otherwise have 
existed. Furthermore, as has already been seen, customs and tax officials, as state 
functionaries, could provide a range of covert services to their leftist colleagues in Spain 
which would have facilitated significantly local and national solidarity initiatives. As noted 
by the Sous-préfet, the conspiratorial interaction of the customs officers made it extremely 
difficult for hostile French administrators to impede such ventures as µOD GRXDQH O¶DXUD
VDQVDXFXQGRXWH IDFLOLWp¶80 That local authorities should declare their impotence towards 
the pro-Republican activities of state subordinates demonstrates the effectiveness of localised 
assistance to the Spanish Republic. As in the Blanc case, such officials relied undoubtedly on 
a network of contacts in the administration including Cusin, Didkowski and others, allowing 
their covert activities to be shrouded from the scrutiny of interfering political adversaries.81  
To finalise this case study, it is worth examining in this vein the problems faced by such 
Republican sympathisers, to demonstrate that solidarity initiatives with the Republic were 
often undertaken at considerable political and legal risk, making these sympathisers¶ 
activities even more significant in the context of Non-Intervention.  
 From the outset of the conflict administration sympathisers also had to contend with the 
continual risk posed by Nationalist espionage of operations supplying the Republic. In 
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November 1936, for example, the Gendarmerie of La Tour de Carol arrested a German spy 
named Schumann who was caught in the act of photographing the railway line and other 
strategic points near this important border station.82 Also dangerous to the work of the 
douaniers DQGWKHLUFROODERUDWRUVDWVXFKVWDWLRQVZDVWKHULVNRIµ)LIWK-FROXPQLVWV¶ZLWKLQWKH
customs and railways administration, sabotaging such operations through the filtering of 
classified shipment details to the Nationalists or the rightist press. In the case of leaking of 
information to the former faction, /¶$XWRQRPLVWD, whilst clearly a leftist publication prone to 
believing in the omnipresence of fifth columnists, gives an insight into perhaps how the 
Nationalists garnered in their propaganda reports such precise information on the quantity 
DQG FRQWHQWV RI µVHFUHW¶ VKLSPHQWV YLD /D 7RXU GH &DURO DQG 3XLJFHUGj 2Q WKLV LVVXH WKH
publication wrote, citing the Socialist Le Populaire ,that: 
...(V SDUOD GH O¶H[LVWqQFLD GH XQ GHSzVLW G¶DUPHV D %RXUJ-Madame.Un dels francesos que 
ajuden als espíes és un inspector de ferrocarils el cual communica als rebels totes les 
informacions relatives a les transmeses de queviures a Espanya sabotajent dits envios...83  
    
:KLOVW VFHSWLFLVP PLJKW QRUPDOO\ EH UHTXLUHG LQ UHDGLQJ WKLV QHZVSDSHU¶V UHSRUWV WKH
original source was Le Populaire, a leftist but more detached national French publication, 
thus its allegations perhaps contained elements of truth. Certainly with regards to the filtering 
of information to the Rightist press, reports were emitted by publications such as /¶(FODLU 
and /¶,QGHSHQGHQW which verged on collusion with the Nationalists, the former writing in a 
sensational article in February 1938: 
1RXVVRPPHVDYHUWLV« 
Il nous revient, de milieux bien informés, que quarante mille tonnes de matériel de guerre de 
SURYHQDQFHIUDQoDLVH«YRQWrWUHDFKHPLQpHVHQ(VSDJQHURXJHVLFSDU/D-Tour-de-Carol et 
Puigcerda«1RXV VDYRQV DXVVL TXH«)UDQFR FRQQDvW FH WUDILF HW TX¶LO HVW disposé à 
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bombarder la gare de PXLJFHUGD«GqVTXHOHFRQYRLSpQpWUHUDHQWHUULWRLUHHVSDJQRO« Nous 
VRPPHVDLQVLSUpYHQXV«84 
    
In this complicity, and as has been noted from /¶$XWRQRPLVWD, the operations of the French 
sympathisers and the shipments undoubtedly had far-right sympathisers reporting their 
movements, hindering the task of the Republic, facing enemies as well as allies on the French 
side of the border.  
 Lastly it is worth highlighting that, despite the prevalence of customs officers friendly to the 
Republic, not all officials shared the same political views towards such smuggling activities. 
Jean Serres illustrates this with an example of a Republican freighter being loaded 
clandestinely with arms on the quays of the Adour, near Bayonne, in September 1936. Whilst 
one customs officer rushed to alert André Moine and his PCF colleagues, informing them that  
they had been denounced by a factory watchman, the official also warned that  maritime 
customs officers were about to arrive in their launch. Subsequently, whilst the Communist 
militants hid amongst nearby pine trees, two were arrested by maritime customs officers, and 
sentenced to prison for arms smuggling.85 In another case in March 1937, the maritime 
customs officers forced the French trawler Sans Pareil, into Port Vendres carrying 25 
American and Canadian volunteers for the International Brigades.86 
 The political and personal risks implied in involvement in secret operations to supply the 
Republic were numerous. Officials collaborating with Spanish Republicans and government 
sympathisers in such activities faced a constant risk of exposure to the Rightist press and the 
Nationalists. Furthermore, as illustrated in the case of the customs in the Cerdagne railway 
stations and Bayonne, lower grade functionaries frequently played a hazardous double-game 
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with their colleagues and superiors, endeavouring, as in the latter example, to stay moments 
ahead of their colleagues, attempting to derail such activities.     
 $VGHPRQVWUDWHGE\WKHFDVHVWXGLHVRIWKH0RQWDXGUDQDHURGURPHµDIIDLU¶DQG-HDQ%ODQF
the South West and its government-connected sympathisers constituted an important part of 
the Republicans¶ international war HIIRUW %ODQF¶V UDQJH RI VHUYLFHV WR WKH 5HSXEOLF DQG
efforts to supply the Republicans, despite police and Rightist hostility, demonstrate how the 
commitment of a numerically small amount of supporters could change the balance of 
support for the Republic. Furthermore Blanc was not an isolated operator. His ventures relied 
conclusively on a range of connections, from several government cabinets in Paris, to the 
sympathies of a plethora of Air France and Latécoère aviation workers, pilots, Republican 
and Soviet agents, lawyers and watchmen.87 The reader may also recall that other rendezvous 
locations such as the %DUGHO¶2SpUDHYLGHQFHGWKHVRFLDOVXSSRUWLQWKHFRPPXQLW\WKDWFRXOG
foster a climate of support for the Spanish Republic, enabling local sympathisers to engage 
ZLWKWKHFRPPXQLW\DQGGHEDWHVROLGDULW\LVVXHV%ODQF¶VSLYRWDOUROHIRUWKH5HSXEOLFZRXOG
thus have been greatly reduced if he had not been able to rely on such widespread local and 
national support for his activities. Similarly, the customs officers of the border stations played 
a vital, if shadowy, role in assisting the Republic and local border communities in Catalonia. 
In receiving the collaboration of these officials the Republic was assured a crucial supply 
route after the capture of Irún. In their localised activities the douaniers provided a long-
standing sympathetic relationship with local Republicans, whilst obstructing their enemies.  
 To summarise the role of the South West and its regional functionary actors, it is certain that, 
despite the difficulties and dangers described in this chapter, such groups and individuals 
enabled the Republic to draw on a wide range of sympathies in vital administrative positions, 
allowing the Republican government to continue their war effort via the aerodromes and 
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Pyrenean railway stations of the South West, establishing important footholds of solidarity 
between the two Republics.  
 Chapter four will now show that accompanying such partisan actions in favour of the 
Spanish Republic in the border zone, elements of the local Left took it upon themselves to 
provide the most hazardous actions of partisanship and partisan solidarity for the Republic. 
By partisanship the chapter will be referring to actions such as guiding volunteers across the 
Pyrenees into Republican Spain and sailing volunteers along the Mediterranean coast 
clandestinely to Republican ports in Catalonia. These acts took the actions of the customs 
officials and aviation functionaries even further, by quite literally crossing the line into the 
Spanish Republican zone to provide support services to International Republican volunteers.  
  By partisan solidarity the chapter will be dealing with actions that were undertaken by 
elements of the regional Left to give direct assistance to the Republican army, either in the 
International Brigades or in indigenous Spanish units.  
 The final chapter aims to provide an analysis of these unambiguously partisan acts of 
solidarity, which provided the Spanish Republic with vital trans-Pyrenean support. This will 
subsequently allow the reader to understand the complexity of regional sympathies, solidarity 
and partisanship in favour of the Spanish Republic, allowing for the exposure of this seldom 
examined aspect of regional support for the Spanish Republic.  
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Map 7 Above : Pneu Michelin Services de Tourisme France : Grandes Routes (Paris, 1954) 
Below : Mauléon, Sainte Engrâce (Basses-Pyrénées) and Navarra (Spain)  
Pneu Michelin Services de Tourisme, Carte Biarritz-Luchon 85 (Paris,1963)   
1cm to 2km 
Map 7 
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Map 8 Above: Pneu Michelin Services de Tourisme, France : Grandes Routes (Paris, 1954) 
Below: Cerbère (Pyrénées-Orientales, France) and Port-Bou (Girona province, 
Catalonia, Spain) and border crossing on the Coll dels Balistres.  
<www.geoportail.fr> µ*pRSRUWDLO/HSRUWDLOGHVWHUULWRLUHVHWGHVFLWR\HQV¶ (Géoportail 2007-2010®) [accessed 
on 23 July 2010]  
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 Map 9 Above: Pneu Michelin Services de Tourisme., France : Grandes Routes (Paris, 1954) 
Below : Gavarnie (Hautes-Pyrénées)  
Pneu Michelin Services de Tourisme, Carte Biarritz-Luchon 85 (Paris,1963)  
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Chapter four: Beyond solidarity- Partisan Support Operations and Volunteers 
for the Spanish Republic 
 
In chapter three the effects of the solidarity of determined, politically-motivated and 
government-connected functionaries were examined. However, as has been shown, these 
actions remained largely restricted to the South West and in proximity to the Franco-Spanish 
border crossings. In this chapter the participation and partisan solidarity of a minority of 
south-western leftists and anti-fascists will be illuminated, unravelling the national and 
regional complexities that motivated and allowed French volunteers to be recruited from the 
South West, and travel to the Spanish Republic. Whilst much research has been done on 
recruitment of International Brigade volunteers in Paris and the northern industrial 
départements, this chapter will highlight the significance of the South West as a recruitment 
zone for anti-fascist volunteers and those who facilitated their enlistment and travel to the 
Republican zone.1 In this vein the chapter intends to demonstrate the significance of the 
engagement of a variety of groups of volunteers. This will include French antifascists, 
Spanish immigrants and second-generation Spanish immigrants, born in France, but 
LQWULQVLFDOO\ FRQQHFWHG WR WKHLU DQFHVWRUV¶ KRPHODQG OLQJXLVWLFDOO\ DQG FXOWXUDlly. With the 
latter, WKH FKDSWHU LQWHQGV WR DQDO\VH WKH VLJQLILFDQFH RI VXFK YROXQWHHUV¶ H[SHULHQFHV LQ
France, and particularly the South West to shed light on the significance of French political 
and social background on Spaniards, working and living in a developed republican liberal 
democracy.  
From the outset of the Spanish Civil War, the South West demonstrates a significantly 
different regional case study in looking at volunteering for the International Brigades and the 
Spanish Republican army. Whilst Parisian recruitment of volunteers was organised by the 
                                                          
1
 R. Skoutelsky., /¶(VSRLUJXLGDLWOHXUVSDVpp.113-122 & L.London, Le Printemps des camarades, 
(Paris,1996)  
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PCF, across the South West recruitment was largely undertaken by Spanish Republican 
committees constituted by local émigrés. Indeed Skoutelsky notes how André Moine, the 
regional head of the PCF, referred prospective volunteers who came to him to contact the 
regional Spanish committees.2 However, regional anomalies in the recruitment process also 
stem from the involvement of Spanish consulates in the region as recruitment centres, as we 
will see. Importantly, as discussed in chapter one, the South West witnessed throughout the 
1930s a forging of close relations between local people and Spanish Republican economic 
émigrés and political refugees (after 1934) and thus the Spanish Republic retained for such 
migrants and their French neighbours a close bond.  
 Previous research conducted by Skoutelsky suggests that there was a comparatively low 
number of French volunteers from the region, the latter declaring that:  
/DSUR[LPLWpJpRJUDSKLTXHDYHFO¶(VSDJQHQ¶DSSDUDvWGRQFSDVSRXUOHVFLWR\HQVIUDQoDLV
un facteur incitatif à O¶HQJDJHPHQW.3 
 
By contrast the contention here is that the cultural, political and geographic connections of 
the South West with Spain were actually vital factors in the enlistment of Spanish émigré 
volunteers and their French colleagues, across the region.4 Whilst overall French volunteers 
from the South West (Aquitaine, Midi-Pyrénées, Languedoc Roussillon) constituted 
approximately 4.8% of French volunteer contingent of the International Brigades, Skoutelsky 
has done little research into the localised enlisting of French volunteers in the context of 
international anti-fascist solidarity in the region, described above and in chapter one.5 In this 
light the chapter will analyse local case studies from across the South West demonstrating the 
                                                          
2Skoutelsky., /¶(VSRLUJXLGDLWOHXUVSDVp.115. 
3
 Ibid., p.115.  
4Ibid., p.151.  
5Ibid., p.151. 
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forging of antifascist solidarity which, whilst more evident in solidarity actions in favour of 
the Republican Home Front, also extended to volunteering for the Republic.  
 From as early as July 1936 recruitment of both French and Spanish volunteers across the 
South West deviated from the national trend of Communist-organised enlistment, and, whilst 
often retaining Communist elements, organisation relied largely on Spanish committees. Thus 
on 29 July 1936 a meeting in Tarbes, appealing for volunteers, was attended by 350 
Spaniards. Such attendance indicates that migrant workers were clearly the target audience of 
the organisers and the reunion was presided by Mssrs. Maumus, Troc and Lasalle ,French 
members of the SR. Speeches by two Spaniards, Frances and Lopez, were also accompanied 
by an oration by Lasalle.6 A subsequent call for volunteers received the response of 13 
Spaniards, 5 Saarland refugees and 2 ORFDO)UHQFKYROXQWHHUV,Q6NRXWHOVN\¶VVWXG\WKHORZ
figures for enlistment in the South West are used to downplay regional volunteers¶ 
significance.7 However, as the communities from which volunteers originated were 
significantly smaller than the northern centres of enlistment, the effect on local communities 
was perhaps far more resonant, as the figures for enlistment below will demonstrate. Whilst 
combatant numbers were numerically small, the social context and most crucially the role of 
the local community were vitally important factors in allowing for enlistment. For example, 
in Tarbes many of the latter left behind their families, and thus the social support offered to 
VXFK PHQ¶V IDPLOLHV FDQQRW EH RYHUORRNHG An officer recording a social support  reunion 
revealed that: 
µ«XQ FRPLWp G¶DFWLRQ D pWp FRQVWLWXp SRXU O¶RXYHUWXUH G¶XQH VRXVFULSWLRQ HQ IDYHXU GHV
familles des volontaires et une permanence sera établie à la bourse de travail pour recueillir 
OHVHQJDJHPHQWV«¶8  
    
                                                          
6
 Commissaire Spécial to Préfet des Hautes-Pyrénées, 29.07.36 4M 238 ADHP 
7
 Skoutelsky., /¶(VSRLUJXLGDLWOHXUVSDVp.151. 
8
 Commissaire Spécial to Préfet des Hautes-Pyrénées, 29.07.36 4M 238 ADHP 
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What is notable about this early meeting is that local political organisers stood in solidarity 
with their Spanish colleagues, and the local community, French and Spanish alike, was called 
to provide for the families of volunteers. Furthermore, the use of the Bourse du travail, 
described for its important role in the community, also indicates the dual significance of both 
Spanish aid committees and French Republican workers institutions. Whilst in the early 
months of the Spanish Civil War, regional consuls clearly obstructed recruitment by refusing 
visas and consular rooms to promote enlistment, the French local political and social 
institutions such as the SR and the Bourse du travail provided potent reminders to 
Republicans of the recognition and engagement of local people with their anti-fascist 
VWUXJJOH 7KH\ DOVR PDGH SRVVLEOH WKH FLUFXPYHQWLQJ RI WKH µRIILFLDO¶ 6SDQLVK GLSORPDWLF
channels, frequently disaffected from the Republic from July 1936. 
 In looking at the example of Tarbes, the volunteering of Spanish volunteers was not 
accompanied by widespread enlistment of French volunteers, despite local support in 
VROLGDULW\ZLWKYROXQWHHUV¶IDPLOLHV7KHVDPHFDQQRWEHVDLGRIRWKHUORFDOLWLHVLQWKH6RXWK
West. In Narbonne, for example, a town on the Mediterranean coastline, and home to a large 
Spanish migrant worker population, the préfet of the Aude département wrote in February 
1937 that 12 French citizens had joined 600 Spanish colleagues in travelling to Spain to fight 
for the Republic. However, in Carcassonne, where 36 Spaniards joined up, and in Limoux 
where 37 Republicans volunteered, no French citizens accompanied the volunteers.9 At face 
value this seems to suggest that areas with larger concentrations of Spanish migrants saw 
greater levels of French volunteering. Indeed a similar picture is seen in Oloron and Tarbes. 
In the local sous-SUpIHW¶V)HEUXDU\UHSRUWRQGHSDUWXUHVRIYROXQWHHUVWR6SDLQWKLVVWDWH
functionary reported that 22 Spanish volunteers had been accompanied by 4 French 
                                                          
9
 3UpIHWGHO¶$XGHWR0LQLVWUHGHO¶,QWpULHXU0'40 ADA 
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volunteers.10 Similarly in Tarbes 4 French workers joined 26 Spanish counterparts on 6 
August to travel to the Republic.11 As has already been seen in chapter one in Oloron, with 
François Mazou and his brother Jean, who both joined the International Brigades due to 
social and political connections with Spanish Republicans, such links, developed throughout 
the 1930s, certainly played a substantial part in the enlistment of French volunteers. 
Furthermore, in the Aude from July 1936 to January 1937 only Narbonne saw French 
enlistment in Spain. As we have already seen in Chapter two, this is not to say that numerous 
solidarity initiatives in support of volunteers, as in Tarbes, were not taking place. In assessing 
the number of departures to Spain a certain level of scepticism is certainly necessary.  
Official figures only detailed the easily-quantifiable departures of volunteers who departed 
openly via legal border crossings and railways. However, following the 18 February 1937 
Non-Intervention laws it is difficult to assess levels of enlistment amongst the various 
political groupings (Communist, Socialist, and Anarchist), since volunteering for either of the 
opposing Spanish factions was officially proscribed.12 Perhaps crucially, following the 18 
February laws, which forced potential volunteers to travel illegally to Spain, it is necessary to 
assess the importance of clandestine passeurs or mountain guides and their coastal 
equivalents, whose role in facilitating the crossing of the Pyrenean passes and Mediterranean 
coastline represented a vital stage in the trajectory of many volunteers who travelled to Spain. 
This form of assistance to the Republic has seldom received attention in recent 
historiography, highlighted by Skoutelsky as being carried out with µH[WUrPHGLIILFXOWpXQH
                                                          
10
 Sous-SUpIHWG¶2ORURQWRPréfet des Basses-Pyrénées, 3.02.37. 1M 260 ADPA The figures correspond to the 
period from the 18 July 1936 to the 31 January 1937  
11
 Commissaire Spécial to Préfet des Hautes-Pyrénées, 06.08.36, 4M 238 ADHP 
12
 Skoutelsky., L¶(VSRLUJXLGDLWOHXUVSDVp.133. Skoutelsky details how despite the risk of 1-6 months 
imprisonment and/or fines ranging from 100 to 10,000 Fr, detentions such as that of the passengers of the Sans 
Pareil (see  Footnote 85, p.86. ) were the exception rather than the rule, Non-Intervention relâchée allowed for 
the double-JDPHLQZKLFKWKHXQVSRNHQUXOHZDVµpas vu, pas pris¶$GGLWLRQDOO\IRUPHQDQGZRPHQSUHSDUHG
to travel hundreds of miles to fight fascism, the minimal risk of detention and a short spell in prison, was as 
Skoutelsky argues, a small sacrifice compared to that they intended to make in Spain.  
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YHULWDEOHpSUHXYHSK\VLTXHSpULOOHXVHVRXYHQWSUDFWLTXpODQXLW¶13 Given this assessment of 
the hazardous nature of Pyrenean crossings, the existence of networks of guides for 
international volunteers would provide a clear indicator of political partisanship for the 
Spanish Republic in the local Pyrenean communities. However, in assessing the importance 
of such guides, the complex motivations behind such support actions require more detailed 
analysis. It is important not to relegate support actions such as guiding over the Pyrenees to 
secondary importance, based on financial recompense combined with political ideology. One 
might expect the political commitment of such persons to be called into question. However, 
one must remember that the loss of employment through such activities and the risks (that 
will be analysed) meant that, as with Blanc and his collaborators, financial gain must be seen 
as a parallel factor in determining guides¶ and smugglers¶ contribution to supporting the 
Republic.14 Historically smugglers operated in the Pyrenean region essentially for financial 
profit, but it must be remembered, as Rapin underlines, that in the Pyrénées-Orientales pro-
Republicans and volunteers were µ$LGps par des militants communistes de Céret, qui forment 
des éTXLSHVGHSDVVHXUV¶15 Thus political ideology cannot be downplayed as a factor in this 
département. As political conviction accompanied by payment from the PCF was not 
incompatible, indeed, the services provided by an experienced passeur were valued parts of 
the solidarity chain and were remunerated, as with other partisan solidarity activities.16 
Furthermore, Skoutelsky has suggested that there was widespread involvement of local 
communities in the housing and guiding over the Pyrenees of International volunteers:  
OH GLVSRVLWLI GH UHFUXWHPHQW HW G¶DFKHPLQHPHQW UHSRVH VXU XQH IRXOH GH SHUVRQQHV
G¶KRUL]RQV GLYHUVGpSOR\DQW OHV WUpVRUVG¶LQJpQLRVLWpSRXU VRQERQ IRQFWLRQQHPHQW VXUWRXW
après la mise en place du blocus de la République en février 1937. De la famille qui héberge 
XQYRORQWDLUHHQDWWHQGDQWVRQSDVVDJHGH OD IURQWLqUHGXPLOLWDQW ORFDOTXL O¶Rrganise, au 
GRXDQLHU TXL GpWRXUQH OHV \HX[ DX ERQ PRPHQW FHWWH PLVH HQ SODFH SRXU O¶HQVHPEOH GHV
                                                          
13
 Ibid., p.134.  
14
 S. Barrère ., 3\UpQpHVO¶pFKDSSpHYHUVODOLEHUWp : Les Évadés de France (Pau,2005) pp.59-60.  
15
 A-J. Rapin., Tant-pis si la lutte est cruelle, p.125.  
16
 Barrère., Pyrénées, p.60. This author gives detail about the funding of passeurs by the Allies from 1940.   
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DFWLYLWpVGHVROLGDULWpDYHFO¶(VSDJQHHWGRQWWRXVOHVPDLOORQVQ¶DSSDUWLHQQHQWSDVDX3DUWL
Communiste- FRQVWLWXHHOOHDXVVLXQSUpFpGHQWKLVWRULTXH«¶17   
 
In examining 6NRXWHOVN\¶V DIILUPDWLRQV WKH FKDSWHU ZLOO QRZ explore how the mountain 
guide networks functioned and how local leftist militants supported the volunteers for the 
Republic.  
 From the spring of 1937 clandestine networks of passeurs and convoyeurs in the Pyrenean 
zones were certainly established, corresponding with borders opening onto the Republican 
zone. 18 On 26 August 1937 a border police officer wrote to his superior in Paris following an 
investigation into clandestine arms and volunteer smuggling in the Pyrenean zone. The report 
reveals the diversity and multi-IDFWHGQDWXUHRIWKH5HSXEOLF¶Vsupporters:  
«les renseignements TXL RQW pWpV UHFXHLOOLV SDU /¶LQVSHFWHXU SULQFLSDO
3257(5,(«FRQFHUQDQWXQHRUJDQLVDWLRQDQDUFKLVWHGDQVOH6XG-Ouest pour la contrebande 
des armes et des volontaires| Des lieux de rassemblement et de passage des armes et des 
volontaires auraient été créés dans diverses localités des départements de la Haute-Garonne, 
de O¶$ULqge et des Pyrénées-Orientales. Des militants Anarchistes seraient chargés de recevoir les 
DUPHVHWOHVPXQLWLRQVHWG¶HQDVVXUHUOHWUDQVSRUWHQ(VSDJQHSDUOHVFKHPLQVGHPRQWDJQH«19  
 
The report went on to document no fewer than eight points of assembly for groups crossing 
the Pyrenean frontier. These included meeting places at St. Beat, Burgalays, Mayrègne and 
Luchon in the Haute-Garonne and Castillon in the Ariège. As the closest département to 
Perpignan and Barcelona it comes as little surprise that assembly points in the Pyrénées-
Orientales were more numerously reported with rendezvous points at Prats-de-Mollo, Arles-
sur-Tech and Montalban-sur-Tapias.20 The points of entry into Spain, clearly far-removed 
from border patrols, indicate the perilous nature of such guides and volunteers crossings. In 
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 Skoutelsky., Tant pis si la lutte est cruelle,pp.59-60.  
18
 By February 1937 when the Non-Intervention ODZVFDPHLQWRµIRUFH¶ZHNQRZWKDWQXPHURXVFXVWRPV
officers turned a blind eye as seen in chapter three) the French départements with borders straddling the 
Republican zone were the Hautes-Pyrénées, the Haute-Garonne, the Ariège and the Pyrénées-Orientales. By 
March 1938 only the latter would remain open, with its vital rail connections discussed in chapter 3.   
19
 Commissaire de la Surveillance du Territoire to Contrôleur Générale, 26.08.37. 1M772 ADPO   
20
 Ibid.,  
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this respect the commissaire revealed that crossings in the Haute Garonne included the Pic de 
la Hage and the Pic de Burat. These peaks reach 2165m and 2154m respectively. In the 
Ariège the officer wrote that, following rendezvous at Castillon, guides would pass through 
the Port de Girette, a mountain pass in the Lleida (Lérida) province, culminating at a 
vertiginous 2442m. Considering that such crossings were, as Skoutelsky highlights, 
conducted under cover of nightfall, and with the additional danger of nocturnal discovery en 
route to the border by Gendarmes and Gardes Mobiles, it can be appreciated that such 
endeavours were extremely hazardous.21 Furthermore, whilst Skoutelsky correctly points out 
that politically sympathetic douaniers could be expected to détourné les yeux au bon moment, 
the conduct of their military counterparts did not look so favourably upon violators of the 
Non-Intervention laws. The commissaire finished one report for example with an officious 
forwarding of his surveillance report to: ...MM. Les Colonels commandant les 16ºet 17º 
Légion de la Gendarmerie, pour surveillance de la frontière aux points indiqués...22 Whilst it 
is certain that militarised formations such as the Gendarmerie were wary of going off-piste, 
especially at night time, we do know that the entry points to the valleys  leading to the most 
inaccessible pics were subject to surveillance from the Gardes Mobiles.23 Therefore it is 
important to give the interim conclusion that financial recompense could not have been the 
motivating factor. Passeurs were working with leftist groups such as the Anarchists, risking 
dangerous mountain tracks at night time, with accompanying volunteers, unfamiliar with the 
country and its language, and of course over mountainous terrain. Such endeavours were 
certainly motivated by financial payment for services, but also by complex traditional 
                                                          
21Ibid., Altitudes and peak names from <www.geoportail.fr> [accessed on 5 June 2010]   
22
 Commissaire de la Surveillance du Territoire to Contrôleur Générale, 26.08.37. 1M772  ADPO  
23
 Barrère., 3\UpQpHVO¶pFKDSSpHYHUVODOLEHUWp, pp .55-64. For an account of the passeurs during from 1940-44. 
See pp.68-72. for details the competencies of each of the state security forces. 
For information on the Gardes Mobiles and surveillance from 1936-39 see Map of Garde Mobile positions in 
the Hautes-Pyrénées, ADHP 4M 238. This map details how three militarised groups surveyed the frontier from 
August 1936. These included G.R.M (Groupes de Réserve Mobile)  Brigades ordinaires de la frontière and 
Brigades spécialisés de la frontière. 
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sympathies towards neighbours in the Spanish Republic and local leftist politics, both 
Communist and Socialist. Aside from the challenging topography of the Pyrenees, the 
transport of contraband arms and volunteers presented, on a purely legalistic level, a 
significant risk for such persons to take on a regular basis, especially after February 1937.24 
Clearly all smuggling presented legal complications in the event of arrest, however, it must 
be remembered that Non-Intervention laws were more stringent than peacetime laws, with an 
increased presence of state authorities, such as the militarised Garde Mobile, whereas 
previously smugglers had faced a sparse - and often sympathetic - customs attendance which 
had presented less of a risk.   As mentioned above, private partisan initiatives did not benefit 
from the assistance of local authorities and thus were certainly more hazardous than 
government connected pro-Republican actions. To provide just one example of many from 
the Ariège département  in September 1936: 
/D *HQGDUPHULH G¶Ax-les-Thermes a arrêté un autocamion portant une certaine quantité 
G¶DUPHVGHVWLQpHVDX)UHQWH3RSXODU/HVRFFXSDQWVGXYpKLFXOHDXQXméro de quatre ont 
étés gardés à YXHHWOHFKDUJHPHQWUpVHUYp«¶25 
 
Evidently motorised transportation of arms to Spain was clearly more hazardous to pro-
Republicans than mountainous crossings. However, in the aforementioned case, the attitude 
of the local authorities demonstrates the real judicial implications for those who were arrested 
for illegal pro-Republican activities. Similarly, the report above, by the commissaire de la 
Surveillance du Territoire, gives a clear example of the stringency RIWKHPLOLWDULVHGIRUFHV¶
attitudes towards proscribed activities, including volunteer smuggling, from 1937. This 
demonstrates that, whilst it will be underlined below how volunteers were initially facilitated 
in their travels to the Republic, by the complacence of the Front Populaire and local 
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 A typical sentence for arms trafficking can be seen in the case of Lucien Casier an Anarchist in Narbonne 
(Aude). The brother of the aforementioned is highlighted in a police report as having been sentenced to 3 
months in prison for this infraction of Non-Intervention laws. See 1MD 483 ADA police report 2.06.37.   
25
 Le Temps, 2/09/36  
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authorities  it is evident that from 1936-1939 there were a series of changes that took place 
with regards to enforcement of the official policy of Non-Intervention. However, we must 
also temper this knowledge with the fact that professional smugglers were unlikely to have 
been hindered in their activities as they could rely on the networks of local complicities from 
douaniers and trade union members. Furthermore it must be remembered that such 
institutions of the state as the customs department did not operate in isolation from their 
Gendarmerie and police counterparts, and customs officials and their contacts in smuggling 
would have been forearmed with gleaned information on deployments of gardes and 
Gendarmes that would undoubtedly have enabled route-planning modifications for those 
concerned.   
 The role of the guides who assisted volunteers in crossing into Spain via the Pyrenean chain 
KDV EHHQ WRXFKHG XSRQ E\ 6NRXWHOVN\ DQG H[DPLQHG LQ PRUH GHWDLO LQ 6HEDVWLDQ %DUUqUH¶V
thesis on the guides from 1940-44. Lesser known is the role of maritime smuggling of 
volunteers, briefly seen in chapter three, yet this represents an important aspect of solidarity 
with the Republic. One particular case that arises in looking at this form of solidarity occurs 
in the case of Lucien Casier, an Anarchist based in Narbonne. Whilst previous studies by 
Rapin have researched this militant in relation to his notoriety for arms smuggling to the 
Republic from July 1936, this chapter is concerned with the lesser known initiatives that 
Casier was involved in. Such partisan activities extended beyond the realms of arms 
trafficking, an activity that was, for such a closely observed political character, of limited 
efficiency to the Republican war effort.26 
 From June 1937, the actions of Casier clearly changed direction. The 18 February laws 
evidently required volunteers and smugglers to be more discreet in their solidarity actions, 
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 See Rapin., Tant pis si la lutte est cruelle,p.103 & /¶,QVSHFWHXU3ULQFLSDO de Police Mobile DOUMERC to 
Commissaire Divisionnaire Chef de la 14 ième Brigade de la Police Mobile, 26.11.36, 1MD 483 ADA 
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now proscribed, and therefore, as in the case of the Sans Pareil, actively threatened by the 
zealous enforcement of such laws by elements of the local authorities.27 On 23 June 1937, for 
example, the Minister of the Interior wrote to the préfet of the Aude in response to an 
allegation by the previously mentioned non intervention chief observer for the South West, 
Colonel Lunn.28 7KHODWWHU¶VLQYestigation in the Aude revealed: 
O¶H[LVWHQFHj/$1289(//( (sic)G¶XQFHQWUHGHYRORQWDLUHVTXLVHUDLHQWWUDQVSRUWés  en 
yachts ou en vedettes en Espagne gouvernementale à PORT BOU, LLANSA ou PALAMOS.| 
8Q QRPPp +(51$(= UpVLGHQW FKH] 0 &$6,(5 /XFLHQ«j 1DUERQQH WUDQVSRUWHUDLW OHV
volontaires de cette dernière ville à La Nouvelle en Renault 1242 RK.«29    
 
The Minister¶V UHSRUW WR WKH Sréfet gives us a clear warning as to the legal implications of 
+HUQDH]DQG&DVLHU¶VDFWLRQVWKHIRUPHUZULWLQJWKDW/XQQKDGSDVVHGKLVILQGLQJVRQWRWKH
)RUHLJQPLQLVWU\DGGLQJWKDWDQµXUJHQW¶LQYHVWLJDWLRQZRXOGEHUHTXLUHGE\WKHORFDOSROLFH
in order to help the ministry ...de répondre aux questions qui lui seraient posées par le 
Comité de Londres...30 Whilst the London-based Non-Intervention Committee was renowned 
for its inability to curtail the support of the Nazi and Fascist powers for the Nationalists, the 
SUHVHQFH RI WKH $QDUFKLVWV¶ RSHUDWLRQV LQ )Uench police reports, and their subsequent 
investigation, clearly would have presented a far greater risk to the Narbonne militants.31 
Indeed, in this vein in April 1937 the Interior Minister had written to the préfet of the Aude, 
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 6HH3UpIHWGHO¶$XGHWRSous-préfet de Narbonne, 27.03.37, 1MD 483 ADA 
28
 See Footnote 85, p.86.  
29
 Ministre de l¶,QWpULHXUWR3UpIHWGHO¶$XGH0'$'$ 
30
 Ibid.  
31
 See J. Delperrié de Bayac, Histoire du Front Populaire,(Paris, 1972) pp.276-308. It must be remembered that 
the French foreign ministry was heavily influenced by the Non-Intervention advocating Foreign Office, which 
had initially latched onto a )UHQFKVXJJHVWLRQIURPPHPEHUVRI%OXP¶VFDELQHWKRVWLOHWRLQWHUYHQWLRQLQ
Spanish affairs. Blum was also under considerable pressure on a national level from the far-right,to enforce 
Non-Intervention. However, French rightists and Spanish Nationalists also suffered from Non-Intervention 
enforcement in France. Reports from the Basses-Pyrénées reveal that denunciations of pro-Nationalist 
smuggling, through Sainte-Engrâce to Navarra, made to police by leftists in Mauléon were thoroughly 
investigated. One offLFHU¶VRIILFLDOFRUUHVSRQGDQFH, following an anonymous tip-RIIUHDGµ%LHQTXHMHQ¶DL
SDVO¶KDELWXGHGHWHQLUFRPSWHGHFHVsRUWHVGHOHWWUHVM¶HVWLPHTX¶HQUDLVRQGHVpYqQHPHQWVDFWXHOVLO\DWRXWGH
PrPHOLHXGHIDLUHSURFpGHUDXQFRQWU{OH«¶ SubseTXHQWKDQGZULWWHQQRWHVE\WKHOHWWHUV¶UHFLSLHQWUHDG : 
µTransmis au Capitaine  de la section de Mauléon pour enquête diligente par lui-PrPH«¶See Commissaire 
Spécial to Commandant de la Gendarmerie des Basses-Pyrénées, 1.09.1936 1M260. ADPA 
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highlighting the developing opposition of the government towards pro-Republican smuggling 
activities:  
-H VXLV LQIRUPp TXH GHV RUJDQLVDWLRQV GRQW OH EXW VHUDLW GH«IDFLOLWHU OH WUDQVSRUW GHV
volontaires au-delà des Pyrénées VHUDLHQW VXVFHSWLEOHV G¶H[HUFHU leur activité sur certains 
SRLQWV SHX DFFHVVLEOHV RX LVROpV GX OLWWRUDO PpGLWHUUDQpHQ«MH YRXV SULH GH UHGRXEOHU OD
vigilance de manière à UHQGUHLPSRVVLEOHWRXWWUDILFGHFHJHQUH«32     
 
Police reports, shortly preceding the ministerial intervention of 23 June 1937 into Casier and 
+HUQDH]¶VDFWLYLWLHVDW3RUW-la-Nouvelle, whilst highlighting the small scale initiative of these 
Anarchists, surprisingly confirm a sophisticated level of logistical organisation that would not 
usually be associated with such characters. The authorities wrote in June 1937 that:     
...Plusieurs expéditions sont parties au moyen de deux yacKWV«LO\HQDFLQTYHGHWWHVXQHVH
trouve dans le canal les autres sont encore sur wagon) qui possèdent deux moteurs de grande 
puissance|«(OOHV SRVVqGHQW HQ RXWUH XQ GLVSRVLWLI VSpFLDO TXL QH VH WURXYH pas sur les 
vedettes. En examinant attentivement les moteurs on peut se rendre compte de leur 
adaptation. Ces dispositifs servent au lancement des torpilles en mettant en marche le 
mécanisme de ces derniers. '¶DXWUHVDUULYpVGHFHVYHGHWWHVVRQWDQQRQFpV«33 
 
*LYHQ WKDW &DVLHU¶V DQG KLV PLOLWDQW IULHQG¶V SUHYLRXV IRUP LQFOXGHG ORZ-level arms 
smuggling, the discovery that Hernaez was engaged in operations using  motorised torpedo 
boats reveals a previously unknown level of technological support for pro-Republican 
volunteer and equipment smuggling. Nor was such a discovery by the police a one-off 
occurrence in Port-la-Nouvelle. For example, a report written on 11 June 1937 revealed: 
...suite à notre note concernant le transfert des vedettes de PORT-VENDRES à LA 
NOUVELLE (sic) au nombre de cinq nous vous informons que ses mêmes vedettes ont été 
DFKHPLQpHVVXUO¶(VSDJQHSDUOHXUVSURSUHVPR\HQV'¶DXWUHSDUWWURLVDXWUHVYHGHWWHVVRQW
DUULYpHV DX SRUW GH OD 1RXYHOOH«ELHQ HQWHQGX OH UDYLWDLOOHPHQW HQ HVVHQFH VH IDLW GDQV OH
même port de La Nouvelle.34  
                                                          
32
 MinistrHGHO¶,QWpULHXUWRPréfHWGHO¶$XGH0' ADA 
33
 Police report, 2.06.37 1MD483 ADA 
34
 Police report, 11.06.37 1MD483 ADA 
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The acquisition by the Anarchists of eight torpedo equipped launches in June 1937 brings 
into question the capacities of this organisation for supporting the Republic. Of all the pro-
Republican formations the Anarchists were least known for their logistical capabilities. The 
Communists, owing to their connections with the USSR, were more renowned for running 
maritime smuggling routes.35 The 2 June report referring to some of the launches being 
transported on wagons confirms that such equipment arrived by train, demonstrating that they 
had arrived at Port-la-Nouvelle from Spain or from French suppliers. In either case it is clear 
that the Anarchists were entrusted with operations on a level not normally associated with 
them, and from marginal arms smuggling operations in 1936, diversified into maritime 
smuggling for the Republicans, and provided an important rear-guard support base. Whilst 
from the investigation detailed above, the provenance of military equipment for the French 
Anarchists is unconfirmed, it is known that the French government during Non-Intervention 
rélâchée did supply Spanish Anarchists, so logistical support for this group certainly existed 
from the French sympathisants of the Republic.36 Furthermore, this case fits squarely into the 
schema of Anarchist activities in the Spanish Civil War outlined by David Berry, who 
emphasises that material solidarity with the Republic was the principal aim of the French 
Anarchist organisations.37 
Reports from November 1936 reveal the hostility of the Garde Mobile investigator, but more 
LPSRUWDQWO\&DVLHU¶VPRWLYDWLRQVIRUVXSSRUWLQJWKH5HSXElic:  
&DVLHU Q¶D SDV GH SURIHVVLRQ GpWHUPLQpH WUDYDLOODQW OH PRLQV SRVVLEOH«LO HVW SDUIRLV
employé comme commissionnaire à la coopérative des Fonctionnaires de la Bourse du 
7UDYDLOGH1DUERQQH«LODSSDUWLHQWDX[-HXQHV*DUGHV3DFLILVWHVGHODOLJXH,QWernationale 
GHVFRPEDWWDQWVGHODSDL[«38  
                                                          
35
 Rapin.,Tant pis si la lutte est cruelle, pp.110-114.  
36
 E.Weber.,The Hollow years, (New York, 1994) p.168. Weber argues that the French government sent materiel 
WRWKH&DWDORQLDQ$QDUFKLVWVµOHVVWRILJKWWKDQWRVXLWWKHLUIDQF\¶ 
37
 Skoutelsky., /¶(VSRLUJXLGDLWOHXUVSDVp.125.  
38
 6HH/¶,QVSHFWHXU3ULQFLSDO de Police Mobile DOUMERC to Commissaire Divisionnaire de la Police Mobile, 
26.11.36, 1MD 483 ADA 7RFRQWH[WXDOLVHWKHRIILFHU¶VUHPDUNVUHJDUGLQJ&DVLHULWLVLPSRUWDQWWRQRWHWKDWWKH
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From this case and others that will be examined below, it is clear that solidarity with 
volunteers arising in the South West was motivated by a complex series of overlapping 
factors, tinged with financial recompense certainly, but guided also by pro-Republican beliefs 
and a desire to protect the region from the devastation seen in the First World War. Whilst 
leftist propaganda used the traumatic collective memory of the previous conflict to mobilise 
public opinion against the Nationalists, it must also be remembered that south- western 
supporters of the Republic, particularly those in the border zone, were horrified by the 
1DWLRQDOLVW WKUHDW SUHVHQW RQ )UDQFH¶V 3\UHQHDQ ERUGHU )URP  DHULDO LQFXUVLRQV LQWR
)UHQFK DLUVSDFH IROORZHG E\ µDFFLGHQWDO¶ VWUDILQJ DQG ERPELQJ RI )UHnch border villages, 
provoked fury amongst the French Left and Right on numerous occasions, and raised the 
spectre of aerial bombardment in France.39  
 The risks undertaken by leftist militants who transported and guided volunteers to Spain 
were substantial. Indeed, as has already been seen in the case of the Sans Pareil such support 
operations, whilst evidently representing less physical risk than front-line combat to their 
organisers, nevertheless demonstrated a degree of sang froid in evading the coastal patrols of 
the customs, the inquisitive snooping of the police in the Mediterranean ports and other 
threats, for example rightist sabotage and Nationalist naval interception.40 The existence of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
GMR was usually involved in riot control against the Left, where members of far-left parties including 
Anarchists and Communists would have been particularly repressed.  
39
 On the 23 January 1938 fourteen Nationalist aircraft entered French airspace ,dropping eleven bombs on the 
French border village of Osseja, this incident forced the French government to increase anti-aircraft protection 
on the border. See La Vanguardia, 25.01.38.p.3. On the 6 June 1938 nine Nationalist aircraft bombed, without 
human casualties, up to 50km inside French territory, in the vicinity of Orgeix, Orlu and Ax-les-Thermes.See 
ABC Madrid , 7/06/38 p.3.   
40
 For the case of the Sans Pareil. see Footnote 85, p.86. The physical risk represented by ferrying volunteers 
and vessels to Catalonia is  also relevant in the context of 1937-39 as Nationalist submarines and aviation posed 
a frequent risk to Republican and neutral shipping from 1936-39. In March 1937 the British merchantman the 
Lansbury castle struck a Nationalist mine off Cabo Creus and sank off Port-Vendres, see La Vanguardia 
,5/03/37. The presence of Nationalist warships, notably the Canarias, patrolling with impunity off the 
Mediterranean coast, also posed a risk to Republican shipping, with the French Merchantman the Ri-Ri bound 
for Alicante from Marseille being forced by Nationalist warships to deviate to the Nationalist-held Balearic 
islands. See Agence Espagne, 28/07/37. service de 23h30 .ANC1-1-T-7476. The risk of French far-right 
sabotage of pro-Republican operations was certainly real, even in a largely leftist département such as the Aude. 
In Narbonne, for example, the local Commissaire wrote in July 1937 that a Ford V8 lorry, parked in a locked 
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Anarchist involvement in such operations confirms a significant level of commitment to the 
Republican cause, despite the very real judicial threat represented by the Non-Intervention 
laws of February 1937.  
 Having examined the support mechanisms that allowed volunteers to be conveyed to the 
Republic, it is important in the scope of this chapter to examine the motivations and 
experiences of regional volunteers who travelled to Spain from 1936-39. In analysing the 
anti-fascist trajectory of such groups the chapter will focus on the role of second-generation 
Spanish immigrants, émigrés to the South West in the 1930s and local French citizens who 
also enlisted. This approach will demonstrate that the geographical, social and political links 
between the two republics cemented this form of solidarity in the interwar period, with 
identification with democratic and republican democracies facilitating enlistment and 
commitment to the Spanish Republican cause. The social factors that motivated recruitment 
into the international brigades will also be examined in order to assess the variety of 
overlapping factors that contributed to this form of solidarity.    
From the outset of the Spanish Civil War the French government emitted various positions 
regarding the conflict with communiqués from different ministers and ministries ranging 
from openly tolerant to hostile, as below. The interior minister Roger Salengro wrote to 
departmental préfets in August 1936: 
...Le gouvernement soucieux de maintenir strictement sa position de QHXWUDOLWp«VHUHIXVH«j
admettre que sur son propre territoire, on puisse favoriser la formation et au besoin 
O¶DUPHPHQWGHFRPEDWWDQWVjGHVWLQDWLRQGHO¶(VSDJQH41       
                                                                                                                                                                                    
garage yard as part of an eight vehicle convoy destined for the Republican government in Spain, was reported 
by its owner as µYROpGDQVODQXLWGXDX-XLOOHWHWUHWURXYpVXUODTXDLGH/RUUDLQHO¶DYDQWGXYpKLFXOH
LPPHUJpGDQVOHFDQDO¶The functionary writing to his superior that the act had been carried out by µGHV
LQFRQQXVDSSDUWHQDQWDGHVJURXSHPHQWVIDVFLVWHVORFDX[¶. See Commissaire Central de Narbonne to Sous-
préfet de Narbonne 6.07.37 1MD 483 ADA 
41
 0LQLVWUHGHO¶,QWpULHXURoger Salengro to Préfets, 21.08.36  1M260 ADPA 
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The reality of departures and recruitment for the Spanish Republicans on a regional level 
was, however, regarded by many in prefectoral and police administration as a fait accompli. 
In order to understand the relative ease of such departures, before their illegality in February 
1937, the reports written by prefects across the region reveal a laissez-faire attitude that 
undoubtedly facilitated travel to Spain. For example, the préfet of the Basses-Pyrénées sent a 
telegram to the Interior ministry in July 1936: 
Suis avisé que volontaires français munis passeports réguliers se proposent aller Espagne 
combattre selon leurs oSLQLRQVVRLWDXSUqVGHVUHEHOOHVVRLWDXSUqVJRXYHUQHPHQWDX[«6DXI
DYLVFRQWUDLUH«LOQHVHUDSDVIDLWREVWDFOHOHXUGpSDUW. 42  
      
Such declarations were also accompanied by an acknowledgment that local volunteers could 
scarcely be impeded from enlisting, since instructions to the police did not allow for thorough 
inspections of volunteers departing for Spain. The commissaire spécial wrote to the Préfet of 
the Basses-3\UpQpHVUHJDUGLQJWKHODWWHU¶VHQTXLU\LQWRGHSDUWXUHVIRU6SDLQWhat: 
...Il y a...lieu de noter que les volontaires sont partis en se mélangent aux voyageurs 
RUGLQDLUHV VRXYHQW VDQV DYLVHU SHUVRQQH HQ WRXW FDV VDQV rWUH O¶REMHW G¶XQ FRQWU{OH
DGPLQLVWUDWLITXHOFRQTXHDXTXHOLOVQ¶pWDLHQWSDVDVWUHLQWV«43    
  
Lax attitudes towards allowing departures of volunteers from the South West to the Republic 
(and the Nationalist zone) clearly stemmed from a lack of political will, as checks could have 
been attempted with some difficulty had the authorities so wished. Perhaps aside from 
political will, a realisation that the impracticality of preventing individual departures 
precluded any formal judicial proceedings into volunteers travelling to Spain. Indeed, even 
shortly prior to the 18 February 1937 laws, the prefectoral authorities in the Basses-Pyrénées 
recognised that the resources at the disposal of the state in the region were insufficient to 
regulate departures from the département¶s coastal zone:  
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 Préfet des Basses-Pyrénées to Intérieur, 29.07.36 1M260 ADPA 
43
 Commissaire Spécial to Préfet des Basses-Pyrénées, 3.02.37, 1M260 ADPA 
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...Je crois devoir vous signaler combien il est difficile, dans les circonstances actuelles 
G¶H[HUFHU XQ FRQWU{OH HIILFDFH GH O¶HPEDUTXHPHQW HW GpEDUTXHPHQW GHV EDWHDX[ HVSDJQROV
TXL YLHQQHQW PRXLOOHU GDQV OH SRUW GH %D\RQQH &H SRUW QH FRPSRUWH«DXFXQ GHV
RUJDQLVDWLRQV H[LVWHQW GDQV OHV UDGHV IUpTXHQWpHV SDU OHV QDYLUHV«GHV YR\DJHXUV«SRXU
UHPpGLHU«O¶DEVHQFHG¶XQVHUYLFHVSpFLDOLVpMHIDLVDVVXUHUXQHVXUYHLOODQFH«GXSRUWHWVHV
abords par la Garde Mobile.| Enfin, quelles que soient les mesures qui puissent êtres prises, 
LOGHPHXUDWRXMRXUVWUqVGLIILFLOHG¶HPSrFKHUOHVHPEDUTXHPHQWV«FODQGHVWLQVpWDQWGRQQp
ODFRXUWHGLVWDQFHTXHVpSDUHOD)UDQFHGHO¶(VSDJQH«44 
       
From the concerns of the préfet it is obvious that the political climate of the early Front 
Populaire did not favour the restrictive measures that other nations such as Britain 
wholeheartedly supported from July 1936. Furthermore, as seen in the above declarations, 
local authorities were aware that their control over departures for Spain remained more 
theoretical than practical. Additional lack of political will to restrict volunteering ventures, in 
WKH HDUO\ VWDJHV RI %OXP¶V )URQW 3RSXODLUH DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ FDQ EH VHHQ E\ WKH HYLGHQWO\
laxiste DWWLWXGH RI 6DOHQJUR¶V VXFFHVVRU 0DU[ 'RUPR\ at the interior ministry. Indeed, the 
latter wrote in this vein in November 1936 that :  
...il ne saurait question G¶HPSrFKHUOHVGHSDUWVLQGLYLGXHls de voyageurs munis de passeports 
réguliers qui circulent dans notre pays et en sortent sans armes« 45  
 
In this light it is clear that in examining volunteering in the South West, the political climate 
must be considered as a key factor from July 1936-February 1937 in allowing such 
departures. Not only were any judicial attempts to reduce volunteering viewed as unrealistic 
by local authorities, attempts to stem the departures of volunteers were additionally perceived 
in 1936 by the government as being outside the political or public interest.46     
                                                          
44
 Préfet des Basses-Pyrénées to 0LQLVWUHGHO¶,QWpULHXU1M260 ADPA  
45
 0LQLVWUHGHO¶,QWpULHXr to Préfets, 29.11.36, 1MD478 ADA 
Marx Dormoy was also in favour of Non-Intervention relâchée which may have influenced him in not re-
enforcing policing prior to British pressure in February 1937. See J.Jackson.,The Popular Front in France: 
Defending Democracy 1934-38,(Cambridge, 1988) p.209.   
46
 See Footnote 42, p.107.  
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In addressing the question of recruitment of volunteers in the South West it is clear that the 
region had notable differences from those investigated by Skoutelsky and recalled by Lise 
London.47 Whilst the PCF was clearly decisive in establishing solidarity, as seen in chapter 
two, the central forces for recruiting in the region were the Spanish aid committees, Spanish 
Republicans in the local communities and from late 1936 select Spanish consulates. In this 
vein, formal structures of recruitment were largely eschewed by pro-Republican recruiters. In 
the Basses-Pyrénées the sous-préfet of Oloron wrote in August 1936 to his superior that : 
...aucune DFWLRQP¶DpWp signalée en vue de recrutement de volontaires français et étrangers 
SRXU O¶Espagne.48 In a similar manner the sous-préfet of Bayonne also wrote that : LOQ¶D
pas été créé une organisation quelconque de recrutement des YRORQWDLUHVSRXUO¶(VSDJQH«49 
Clearly recruitment in the Basses-Pyrénées was carried out on a small scale ,as the local 
police wrote in August that:   
OHV RUJDQLVDWLRQV G¶H[WUrPH-gauche se sont montrées assez prudentes jusqu'à présent. 
'¶DSUqVFHTXHM¶DLSXDSSUHQGUHTXHOTXHVYRORQWDLUHVVHXOHPHQWHVSDJQROVHWIUDQoDLVSHXW-
être trois ou quatreVHUDLHQWSDUWLVLQGLYLGXHOOHPHQWSRXUO¶(VSDJQH.50   
    
Whilst caution regarding police sources would suggest that officials tended to downplay the 
significance of leftist initiatives in order to present an impression of public order to their 
superiors, we know from André Moine that the PCFs, role in the South West, particularly on 
the Basque coast, was limited to an advisory role. In addition, as we saw in chapter two, 
material solidarity constituted a major aim of the PCF in the region as with the Anarchists in 
the South West, and explains why the police report above should mention the far-left¶V
µSUXGHQW¶DSSURDFKWRUHFUXLWPHQWRIYROXQWHHUV+RZHYHUWKHIDFWWKDWORFDOLVHGUHFUXLWPHQW
initiatives and departures of volunteers did occur on a small-scale across the South West, 
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 Skoutelsky., /¶(VSRLUJXLGDLWOHXUVSDVpp.113-122 & London, Le Printemps des camarades.  
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 Sous-SUpIHWG¶2ORURQWR3UpIHW des Basses-Pyrénées, 18.08.36, 1M260 ADPA 
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 Sous-préfet de Bayonne to Préfet des Basses-Pyrénées, 24.08.36, 1M260 ADPA 
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 Commissaire Spécial to Préfet des Basses- Pyrénées, 25.08.36, 1M260 ADPA 
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from even small towns, is demonstrated by the recruitment sources that will be examined 
below.51      
Police sources, whilst emphasising to prefectoral authorities the small-scale nature of 
volunteering in their local area, do recognise that such ventures took place and that local 
Republican sympathisers were frequently responsible for their enlistment. In December 1936 
the commissaire spécial reported to the sous-préfet de Bayonne that, whilst there were no 
agences spéciales pour le recrutement des volontaires, enlistment in the Republican armies 
nevertheless occured across the département as:  
....quelques jeunes gens de la région- Bayonne-Biarritz-Boucau se sont enrôlés dans les 
UDQJVJRXYHUQHPHQWDX[«52 
 
In characteristic fashion the officer assured his superior that the young volunteers all 
EHORQJHG WR &RPPXQLVW RUJDQLVDWLRQV LQIHUULQJ WKDW QR µFRQWDJLRQ¶ RI YROXQWHHULQJ KDG
spread to the wider leftist community) and highlighted that : 
...Tous ces faits sont des actes isolés GRQW OHV DXWHXUV Q¶REpLVVDQW j aucun contraint, sont 
seuls guidés par leurs inspirations politiques...53  
 
At pains to emphasise the individual nature of enlistment for the Republicans as well as the 
1DWLRQDOLVWV WKH RIILFHU¶V UHPDUNV QHHG D IXUWKHU OHYHO RI H[DPLQDWLRQ WR UHYHDO ZKR VXFK
volunteers were and what motivated them to join the Republicans.  
 Amongst the quelques jeunes gens mentioned by commissaire Sangla in his report would 
have been Alexandre Dufour, a painter, and François Duveilla an unskilled worker from 
Biarritz. In analysinJWKHVHZRUNHUV¶GHFLVLRQVWRGHSDUWIRU6SDLQWKHcommissaire wrote that 
the PCF had advised unemployed workers to enlist as:  
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 Skoutelsky., /¶(VSRLUJXLGDLWOHXUVSDVp.115. 
266 Commissaire Spécial, Sangla, to Sous-préfet de Bayonne, 10.12.36, 1M260 ADPA 
53Ibid.  
112 
 
...ils avaient intérêt, pour soutenir la cause, à engager dans les rangs de la colonne 
internationale luttant en Espagne...54  
 
Whilst one might suspect such volunteers as being motivated by financial gain this seems 
unlikely. Skoutelsky has highlighted how unemployment was often a motivating factor, not 
for the financial recompense but due to the humiliation of unemployment. This traumatic 
experience, provoked by the economic crisis of the 1930s, gave workers the opportunity to 
defend leurs convictions les armes à la main.55 Certainly in the case of Dufour, political 
convictions can be seen as the decisive factor in his departure to Spain, as he was a member 
of the Biarritz JC.56   
 Faith in the ability of the party to support the families of volunteers such as Dufour also 
seems to have played an additional factor in permitting volunteers to travel to Spain. As seen 
in Tarbes, the HVWDEOLVKPHQW RI VXSSRUW RUJDQLVDWLRQV IRU YROXQWHHUV¶ IDPLOLHV ZDV D
prominent feature of enlistment across the region.57 In the case of Dufour, the police noted 
that the aforementioned volunteer wrote to his wife, explaining the reasons for his enlistment: 
HQ O¶LQIRUPDQWTXHV¶LO UHYHQDLW LODXUDLWXQHSHQVLRQHWTXHV¶LOpWDLW WXpHOOHHWVRQ ILOV
seraient secourus...58   
The comradeship of enlistment evidently played a supporting role in such difficult decisions 
to leave behind friends and family to fight for the Republic. The commissaire wrote for 
example that Dufour had left with: ...cinq autres camarades de la région... Similar cases of 
group enlistment can be seen across the region, to give just one example, this occurrence is 
also apparent in the case of volunteers from Oloron, which will be seen below. 
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 Such engagements did not always last long, despite the initial commitment of the volunteers. 
The préfet of the Var, in Toulon, wrote to his counterpart in Pau in March 1937, for example, 
that Dufour had abandoned the front before being repatriated from Spain by the French Navy. 
The latter had arrived in Spain on the 28 November 1936 after passing through the Perpignan 
recruitment centre. Integrated into the 14th Brigade, 13th Battalion (the Henri Barbusse 
Battalion) he had been sent to the Córdoba front on 22 December 1936 and was wounded in 
the University City on the Madrid Front:  
...il a pu en échappant à la surveillance des Espagnols, se présenter au Consul de Valence, 
qui réussit à lui rapatrier.| Dufour étant totalement dépourvu des ressources a été pourvu 
G¶XQHUpTXLVLWLRQGHWUDQVSRUWJUDWXLW«OH0DUVSRXUUHMRLQGUHVRQGRPLFLOH¶59     
 
 The case of Dufour, whilst illustrating the human weakness of volunteers subjected to levels 
of violence that they were previously unaccustomed to, also demonstrates how many such 
volunteers from the region travelled to Spain, without intentions of recompense but with 
political convictions developed throughout the 1930s. At this point it is worth discussing that, 
whilst Robert Stradling has in the case of Welsh volunteers portrayed such brigaders as dupes 
DQGµYLFWLPV¶RI WKH&Rmmunist party, who once in Spain saw the error of their decision to 
enlist for the Republic, we can refute any similar suggestion in the case of the volunteers 
from the south west who are examined in this chapter.60 Indeed, as we will see, volunteers did 
not enlist in the hope of (misguided) adventure orchestrated by the PCF, but were 
conclusively motivated by the defense of a Republican and anti-fascist cause that volunteers 
saw as equally relevant to defending France from Fascism, as well as supporting a 
neighbouring people, with similar political and social ideals. 
 Having examined a case from the Basque coast, a region of significant Spanish emigration, it 
is important to stress the role of local Spanish émigrés in conjunction with their French 
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political counterparts in enlisting their French neighbours alongside local Spaniards, across 
this area and the South West as a whole. Indeed the key recruiters of both nationalities seem 
to have been Spanish Republicans and leftists. One report mentioned, for example, that:  
...les services de la police sppFLDOH G¶+HQGD\H RQW UHPDUTXp O¶DFWLYLWp G¶XQ (VSDJQRO GH
Boucau nommé ALVAREZ et des militants communistes de Ciboure RENAUD et BRAMARIE 
TXLQHPDQTXHQWDXFXQHRFFDVLRQSRXUHQJDJHUGHVMHXQHVJHQV«61 
 
In the same way, Spanish émigrés living in local communities seem to have been integrated 
into the Republican war effort accompanied by local colleagues. Geographical factors have 
also been downplayed by Skoutelsky as a motivating factor for enlistment. However, the 
proximity to Spain allowed not solely for  historic interchange of merchandise and solidarity 
but also the facilitating of access to the Republican zone.62 The communications 
infrastructure as well as knowledge of the mountains provided volunteers with multiple 
options for departure and return from the Republican zone. In the case of the Mazou brothers 
of Oloron, social connections to Spanish Republican refugees and immigrants and political 
commitment to communism and pacifism, as well as a geographic perspective of their region, 
tied to Spanish affairs and culture as much as French, clearly illustrate the integration of all of 
the above factors.63 
 In examining motivations behind enlistment in the International Brigades it is crucial to 
underline that such a range of complex, intertwined and overlapping identities and ideals, 
especially in the border context of the South West, mean that it is too simplistic to see 
enlistment and indeed solidarity with the Spanish Republic through the prism of class, 
financial recompense and political party membership. The very nature of border 
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relationships, developed in diverse ways for centuries, means that whilst such factors may be 
relevant in looking at volunteers from northern France, they cannot be used to categorise 
South Western volunteers.  These combatants were affected by complex social and political 
interaction with local Spanish Republicans that motivated them as much as their parallel 
national political adhesion to the Communist and Socialist parties.   
In this light, on the 26 January 1937 for example, police in Oloron highlighted the close 
contact between such local anti-fascists and their émigré neighbours in a report that detailed:   
...le refugié SROLWLTXH HVSDJQRO 6$1&+(= 7255(52 5LFDUGR HVW SDUWL DXMRXUG¶KXL par le 
WUDLQ«SRXUO¶(VSDJQHSDU3DX728/286(1$5%211(HW3257-BOU« Trois espagnols 
résidant habituellement à Oloron sont partis vers 14h30 en auto, jusqu'à Pau où ils devraient 
prendre le train pour PORT-%28«'DQV OD PrPH DXWR VRQW SDUWLV GHX[ IUDQoDLV
TALLEFOURTANE, Irénée,« 0$=28 -HDQ«SDUWL HQ MXLOOHW GHUQLHU FRPPH YRORQWDLUH
dans les troupes gouvernementales Espagnols, était revenu à Oloron en « permission » 
GHSXLVXQHTXLQ]DLQHGHMRXUV«64  
 
Clearly the departure for Spain of émigrés and local sympathisers demonstrates a large 
degree of cross-border collaboration in anti-fascism. Furthermore, that fact that local 
Republicans and anti-fascists should return on leave to Oloron and later depart for the front in 
Spain reinforces the importance of geography, combined with strong social and political ties 
to Spain. The report also revealed that another milicien, Francisco Cavero, had returned to the 
town via Gavarnie in the Hautes-Pyrénées, demonstrating that, whilst regional rail 
connections to the Republic were exploited by anti-fascists throughout, the Pyrenean border 
also provided in certain zones an alternative gateway to the Republican zone.65  
 In the same way that volunteers such as Tallefourtane, Dufour, Duviella and the Mazou 
brothers, all French Republican leftist sympathisers, joined the International Brigades, the 
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same can also be seen in the cases of local French-born citizens of Spanish descent. Such 
volunteers can be seen as having been strongly influenced not only by tKHLUIDPLOLHV¶,EHULDQ
origins, but also through the political experience they developed in France throughout the 
1930s. Such factors combined to demonstrate the importance of the social, cultural, political 
and geographical factors that cannot be understated in mobilising volunteers from the South 
West.  
 Meanwhile, cases of second-generation immigrants, born in France, who endeavoured to join 
the Republican struggle, give a clear indication of the strength of feeling towards the plight of 
the Republic that spanned generational differences.  
 ,Q3DXLQ-XO\IRUH[DPSOHDORFDOµ6SDQLDUG¶FDPHWRFROOHFWIURPWKH3UpIHFWXUHLQ
Pau a Spanish visa applied for previously at the local consulate, and affirmed to passport 
service officials: 
...Je soussigné Leonardo Togores Escanero, né à Lanaja, Espagne, le 24 septembre 1911, 
FLWR\HQHVSDJQRODLO¶KRQQHXUGHVROOLFLWHUOHYLVDGHPRQSDVVHSRUW«YLVDTXLHVWQpFHVVDLUH
pour retourner en Espagne.66  
      
'HVSLWH7RJRUHV(VFDQHUR¶VGHFODUDWLRQ LWDSSHDUV WKDWhis presentation as a Spanish citizen 
did not entirely convince the local authorities. The commissaire in Pau wrote that  Togores 
(VFDQHUR¶V FDVH KDG EHHQ WDNHQ XS E\ WKH 3UHIHFWXUH¶V SDVVSRUW VHUYLFH Subsequently this 
department wrote that following the visa application.67:  
...il fut demandé à 72*25(=GHMXVWLILHUGHVDQDWLRQDOLWpHVSDJQROH«$XFXQHSLqFHGHFHWWH
nature ne put noXVrWUHSUpVHQWpHPDLVOHVUpSRQVHVTXLQRXVILWO¶LQWpUHVVpQRXVSHUPLUHQWGH
FRQVWDWHUTX¶LOSDUODLWWUqVFRXUDPPHQWQRWUHODQJXHWDQGLVTX¶LOSUpWHQGDLWQ¶DYRLUKDELWpHQ
France que pendant quelques mois de sa prime jeunesse. | La suspicion découlant de cette 
FRQVXOWDWLRQGLULJHDQRWUHLQWHUURJDWRLUHHW7RJRUH]QRXVDYRXD«rWUHQpHQ)UDQFHj3DXHW
DYRLU VHUYL GDQV QRV DUPpHV j %RUGHDX[«DSUqV FRQVXOWDWLRQ DYHF 0 OH 3UpIHW OH YLVD IXW
refusé...| $XFRXUVGHRXYLVLWHVTX¶LOQRXVILWHQVXLWHOHMHXQHKRPPH«VHPRQWUDGpFLGp
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jUHMRLQGUHO¶DUPpHJRXYHUQHPHQWDOHHVSDJQROSDUWRXVOHVPR\HQVHWLOSDUXWPrPHQHSDV
DGPHWWUH  TXH O¶DEVHQFHG¶XQ WLWUHGH YR\DJH UpJXOLqUHPHQW YLVp O¶HPSrFKHUDLW GHPHWWUHj
O¶H[pFXWLRQ VRQ« UHWRXU HQ (VSDJQH| ,O QRXV GLW«DSSDUWHQLU j XQ UpJLPHQW PRWRULVp«HQ
TXDOLWp GH PpFDQLFLHQ« VXU OH IURQW GH *XDGDODMDUD«|,O UpVXOWH GHV UHQVHLJQHPHQWV«TXH
TOGORES aurait été un militant communiste, inscrit à la section de Billere.| Il résulte des 
UHFKHUFKHV«DX%XUHDX0LOLWDLUHTXH72*25EZ (et non TOGOREZ ESCANERO) Léonard 
est né à Pau le 24 Septembre 1911, de José et de ESCANERO Pabla, domicilié à Billere et 
TX¶LOjpWpGpFODUp© bon pour le service armé» (inapte à O¶LQIDQWHULHGpIDXWGHWDLOOH«SDUOH
Conseil de Révision au cours des opérations concernaQWODFODVVH«68      
 
7RJRUH]¶VLQLWLDOVXEWHUIXJHFDQEHVHHQDVQDWXUDO, given the proscribing of French citizens 
volunteering with Republican forces from February 1937, but the information given by the 
passport authorities at the prefecture underlines how significant such politically-versed and 
militarily-WUDLQHGYROXQWHHUVZHUH WR WKH5HSXEOLF ,QGHHGGHVSLWH7RJRUH]¶VUHMHFWLRQIURP
the infantry his military service during conscription would have been an important asset to 
Spanish military commanders, hard-pressed to find personnel with even rudimentary military 
training. In this vein, Lise London at the Paris branch of the PCF- OLQNHG 0DLQ G¶2HXYUH
Immigré (MOI), wrote of Spaniards who advised her superiors of the need for skilled 
volunteers that: ...Notre people est courageux, mais, dans son immense majorité, il ignore 
tout du maniement des armes... Spanish advisors also asked London if the party could 
recruit : 
...militants ouvriers ayant fait leur service militaire, pour apprendre le maniement des armes 
DX[VROGDWVLPSURYLVpVGHOD5pSXEOLTXH«69   
 
Skoutelsky concurs with London, arguing that even if such former conscripts were  : ...pas de 
quoi former une armée de élite... they did provide «pour les espagnols dépourvus 
de«IRUPDWLRQ PLOLWDLUH XQ DSSRUW LQGpQLDEOH«70 Furthermore as a mechanic, and 
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Communist militant, Togorez would have certainly provided the Republican forces with a 
valued militarily-trained and technically-experienced volunteer. 7RJRUH]¶V UHJXODUFURVVLQJV
from the Republican zone to the Basses-Pyrénées were viewed by the authorities as 
potentially demonstrating this value, the commissaire in Pau writing:  
V¶LO HVW GH QRXYHDX HQ FRQJp RQ HVW HQ droit de se demander si ces allées et venues ne 
cachent pas certaines missions confiées par le Parti Communiste«71    
 
Whilst the case of Togorez in all probability demonstrated a firm commitment to the 
Republican FDXVH UDWKHU WKDQ D µ&RPPXQLVW SDUW\ missLRQ¶ to the region, the report 
nevertheless underlines how his skills would have been extremely useful to the Republican 
army. 
 The case of Togorez also indicates the varying levels of commitment to the Republican 
cause seen amongst the regional contingent. For example, the compte rendu given by Audois 
volunteer René Masove in February 1937 revealed that this International Brigader had 
travelled to Spain on the 1 November 1936, being transferred from Barcelona to the Aragon 
Front and the Sierra de Alcubierre on the 6 November. Given permission for 6 days leave in 
)UDQFHRQWKH'HFHPEHUWKHYROXQWHHU¶VSDUHQWVIRUEDGHKLPWRUHWXUQ72 As has also 
been seen in the case of Alexandre Dufour, some volunteers were also surprised by the 
ferocity of the war and sought repatriation when the opportunity arose.73      
 ,Q7RJRUH]¶VFDVHFRPPLWPHQW WR WKH5HSXEOLFDQFDXVHGRHVQRWVHHPWRKDYH been called 
into question. $VLGHIURPWKHDGPLQLVWUDWRU¶VUHPDUNVDERXWWKHGHGLFDWLRQ of the volunteer, 
his passport examined by the authorities denoted that he had travelled frequently to and from 
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Spain during his service for the Republic with visas showing numerous authorisations for 
travel including  
 ...-pasa por Bujamelo [sic-Bujaruelo]«21 de Febrero 1937| Milicias Alto Aragonesas| 
Dirección G.ral de seguridad Port-Bou entrada 6 Marzo|«Consulado de España Bueno 
para España vía Port-Bou Marzo 1937| Commissariat Spécial 6 Mars 1937 Sortie Cerbère| 
Autorizado para salir de EsSDxD%RWDQDGH-XOLRGH«74  
      
Such regular travels across the Pyrenees reveal a high level of mobility and commitment to 
the Republican cause, reinforcing how such volunteers as the Mazous and Togorez were 
trusted by Republican authorities to return to the front line after leave to the South West, easy 
DFFHVVGXHWRWKHUHJLRQDOFRPPXQLFDWLRQVIDFLOLWDWLQJYROXQWHHU¶VPRELOLW\7KHLOOHJDOLW\RI
such actions was not always a hindrDQFH WR D YROXQWHHU¶V PRYHPHQWV 7he investigator 
Roussel wrote that, despite the prefecture having refused Togorez a visa, he had :   
...cependant...pu répasser la frontière, sans doute avec un nouveau passeport délivré par le 
&RQVXOG¶(VSDJQH«75  
 
This remark referring to consular complicity in French citizens volunteering for the Republic, 
whilst worthy of caution, can perhaps be seen as accurate, given the initiatives of the Spanish 
consulates seen elsewhere in the region, and indeed from the complicit attitude of the 
consular staff in Pau who had approved the YLVD WKDW WULJJHUHG WKH DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V
investigation.76 Whilst further consular measures will be discussed below, it is important to 
stress that as has been seen in police and prefectoral zealousness in investigating subterfuge 
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by French citizens attemptLQJWRWUDYHOWR6SDLQORFDODXWKRULWLHVGLGQRWIDFLOLWDWHYROXQWHHUV¶
ventures, beyond allowing their departures unimpeded from July 1936-February 1937. This is 
in stark contrast to the accusations made by the Spanish Nationalists during the conflict, with 
the Republican Foreign Press Intelligence Department highlighting in November 1936 
DUWLFOHVSXEOLVKHGE\WKH*HUPDQ'1%QHZVDJHQF\UHSRUWLQJ)UDQFR¶VDOOHJDWLRQWKDW...el 
Prefecto de Pau recibe órdenes de Barcelona...77 As we have seen local authorities in Pau 
maintained a stance of legality in the Togorez case that renders Nationalist interpretations of 
WKHIRUPHU¶VFRPSOLFLW\ZLWK5HSXEOLFDQDXWKRULWLHVLQDFFXUDWH 
 Where collaboration with Republican authorities occurred, allowing for cross-border co-
operation, it was undoubtedly between the Spanish Republican central government and 
loyalist consuls in the South West. Whilst departmental archives retain little trace of 
widespread usage of consulates as recruitment centres for the Republic, reports from the 
Hautes-Pyrénées demonstrate that certain consuls in the South West were involved in 
recruitment of volunteers. A case arising in December 1936 for example provides a great deal 
of information about methods of recruitment and the motivations of volunteers who enlisted 
for the Republican army in this manner. On the 15 December 1936 the Commissaire Spécial 
in Tarbes wrote to his colleague in Bagnères-de-Bigorre asking the latter to commission an 
investigation into : 
 «des jeunes gens français en résidence dans le département [qui] se disposeraient à se 
rendre en Espagne,  FRPPHFRPEDWWDQWVYRORQWDLUHV«78 
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Subsequently the officer interviewed one of the prospective volunteers ZLWK WKH ODWWHU¶V
statement providing significant information about local enlistment and personal motives for 
enlisting in the Republican army. The volunteer concerned, André Loncay, declared:   
...je suis actuellement sans travail et sans aucun ressource«DXGpEXWGXPRLV M¶DLHQWHQGX
dire par un espagnol résident à Bagnères [Ndlr Bagnères-de-Bigorre] que le consul 
G¶(VSDJQH j 7DUEHV SRXUUDLW P¶RIIULU GX WUDYDLO -H PH VXLV UHQGX j 7DUEHV HQ FRPSDJQH
G¶XQFDPDUDGH/DIDLOOH«/DIIDLOOHHWPRLDYRQVpWpVUHoXV SDUOHVHFUpWDLUHGXFRQVXO«M¶DL
pWpLQWHUURJpSDUOHVHFUpWDLUHTXLP¶DGHPDQGpPHVRSLQLRQVSROLWLTXHVV¶HVWUHQVHLJQpVXU
mon identité et ma profession et qui finalement me fait signer une déclaration par laquelle je 
P¶HQJDJHDLVjPHUHQGUHHQ(VSDJQH pour défendre le Front Populaire pendant la durée de 
ODJXHUUH«OHVHFUpWDLUHQHP¶DSDVSDUOpGHVDODLUHPDLVM¶DLHQWHQGXGLUHTXHOHVIUDQoDLV
étaient payés dix pesetas par jour | Je suis toujours disposé jSDUWLUSRXU/¶(VSDJQHLOQ¶HVW
pas de même poXUPRQFDPDUDGH/DIIDLOOHTXLDWURXYp«GXWUDYDLO«79   
           
Regarding the Republican consulate¶s importance in the South West, evidently loyal consuls 
provided a valuable link between central government and Spanish and French citizens in the 
region. The fact that recruitment was carried out in consular offices with Spanish diplomatic 
VWDII LOOXVWUDWHV KRZ WKH 5HSXEOLF¶V OR\DO UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV ZHUH DEOH WR FRQQHFW local 
sympathisers with the Republic, providing a service that had been undermined in the early 
stages of the war by the defection of the majority of diplomats in the region.80  
 The statement of Loncay, whilst evidencing the desperation that motivated some volunteers 
to join the International Brigades, also suggests that political conviction was a determining 
factor in all volunteers¶ enlistment. Indeed, the questioning by consular staff, well versed in 
political affairs, would have revealed that the prospective volunteer was unsuitable for 
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service had he demonstrated a lack of conviction in the Republican cause.81 The unspoken 
issue of remuneration and lack of questioning in this vein indicates that volunteers such as 
Loncay, and others from across the region, did not join the Republican forces primarily as an 
alternative to unemployment. Clearly political commitment was required to envisage the very 
UHDOVDFULILFHVWKDWILJKWLQJIRUWKH5HSXEOLFLQ6SDLQLPSOLHG/DVWO\/RQFD\¶VGHWHUPLQDWLRQ
to travel to Spain, despite police interference with this plan, demonstrates that despite 
pressure from the authorities volunteers were not easily dissuaded from their plans. Loncay, 
in being explained the significance of his commitment, would have been aware, as with other 
such volunteers, that volunteering for the Republic was not a decision that could be taken 
lightly.  Indeed, another volunteer from Salles-Adour near Tarbes, Roger Bernadou, 
described his experiences on return to the Hautes-Pyrénées writing that he had been:  
...versé à la 14ième Brigade Internationale.| -HQ¶DLSDUWLFLSpTXHMRXUVDX[RSpUDWLRQVGH
SUHPLqUHOLJQHVXUOHIURQWGHO¶(EUH_«EOHVVpSDUXQpFODWG¶REXVjODWrWHM¶DLpWppYDFXpj
O¶K{SLWDO GH7DUUDJRQH«82  
 
Such statements and reports recalling the capabilities of the Republican army, against its 
better-armed Nationalist enemy demonstrate that volunteers from across the region were 
aware of the risk they incurred in enlisting for the Brigades. Whilst the contribution of the 
South West to the latter may have been inferior to that of industrialised northern France, the 
presence of numerous volunteers from the region in reports on the return of brigaders to 
France in November 1938 and subsequent Prisoner of War returns demonstrate that the 
UHJLRQ¶V DQWL-fascists played a significant role alongside their international counterparts. 
Indeed, reports on the return of volunteers via Cerbère, on the 13 November 1938, following 
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the withdrawal of the International Brigades in November 1938 reveal that 70 volunteers 
from the départements of the South West were amongst 1472 French volunteers on the first 
train returning to the country. Of these, 27 originated from the départements this study has 
examined.83 A further 15 volunteers (French and Spanish émigré) from the region were 
returned in a prisoner exchange of 82 prisoners conducted on the International Bridge from 
Irún to Hendaye in February 1939.84 Such returns of international and local prisoners indicate 
that considerable sacrifices were made by volunteers, and such a commitment cannot be 
overlooked. The volunteers returned in a similar repatriation in 1937, having been captured 
on the Madrid front, revealed that whilst most declared to have been µVDWLVIDLWGHO¶DWWLWXGH
à leur égard, GHV1DWLRQDOLVWHV¶85captivity in Nationalist camps clearly came at a high price 
for the dignity of the volunteers, most of whom were Communists. The reporting officer 
recalling the volunteers¶ experiences in Irún prior to their return wrote that: 
...les photographes Italiens ne cessèrent WRXWH OD MRXUQpH GH OHV SKRWRJUDSKLHU«VH YLUHQW
UHPHWWUH FKDFXQ  IUDQFV IUDQoDLV GHV DXWRULWpV« ,WDOLHQQHV /H FRPPDQGDQW PLOLWDLUH
G¶,U~Q OHXUDGUHVVD VRXOLJQDQW OHV VHQWLPHQWVG¶KXPDQLWpPRQWUpVSDU O¶(VSDJQHj O¶pJDrd 
des prisonniers et demanda à ceux-ci de crier « YLYH O¶(VSDJQH ª 6DQV RSSRVHU«les   
SULVRQQLHUVVHFRQWHQWqUHQWGHIDLUHXQYDJXHFKXFKRWHPHQW«86    
 
Whilst the façade of indulgence presented to the press by the Italians might indicate that the 
Nationalists¶ WUHDWPHQWRI)UHQFKYROXQWHHUVZDVµKXPDQH¶WKHVXEMHFWLQJRIWKHGHIHDWHGWR
the humiliation of Fascist photographers and the demands of the Nationalist military governor 
of Irún was clearly designed for propaganda usage in the Fascist dictatorships and the 
1DWLRQDOLVW ]RQH ,Q DGGLWLRQ WKH JRYHUQRU RI ,U~Q DVNHG WKDW WKH SULVRQHUV FKHHU µVive 
/¶(VSDJQH¶ demonstrating the vindictive attitude of the Nationalists, whose outward 
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sentiments of mercy were frequently offset with elements of humiliation and revenge. This 
FDQEHVHHQLQRQHSULVRQHU¶VUHVSRQVHWRWKHJRYHUQRUUHJDUGLQJWKH1DWLRQDOLVWV¶ treatment 
of the captives, the former answering: ...Nous pensions être fusillés; puisque vous nous 
laissez libres merci! 87 Not content with allowing the Italians an ample photography session 
with the prisoners, the latter were trailed by Carlist requetés over the International Bridge. 
The commissaire in Hendaye observed that: 
 ...deux militaires Carlistes...empiétèrent de quelques mètres sur la partie française du pont 
et tentèrent de placer leurs appareils de prises de vue cinématographiques afin de prendre la 
colonne derrière, mais mon service se mit en devoir de les refouler LPPpGLDWHPHQW«88 
     
Clearly whilst the local police retained little sympathy for the Communists, there was even 
less affinity between the local authorities and their new Nationalist neighbours. 
 The experiences detailed above demonstrate that through contact with Republicans and 
Republican institutions in the region a small number of volunteers from the South West 
contributed with their Spanish neighbours to the Republican cause in Spain. Whilst many 
more sympathisers and supporters provided logistical and political support across the region, 
the notable partisan solidarity of hundreds of passeurs, coastal smugglers, and customs 
RIILFHUVGHPRQVWUDWHVWKDWZKLOVWWKHUHJLRQ¶VFRQWULEXWLRQRIYROXQWHers was numerically less 
than other more industrial regions of France it was no less significant. The solidarity and 
active partisanship of local people from the banks of the Bidassoa to the Mediterranean coast, 
seen through the multiple case studies outlined in this chapter, reveals the ingenuity and 
GHGLFDWLRQRIWKH5HSXEOLF¶VVRXWK-western allies, facing the hostility of local authorities and 
far-right opponents. Despite the judicial risks presented by proscribed activities in favour of 
the Republic, local supporters took regular risks with their lives and freedom, as well as their 
livelihoods, in providing support services to the Republic. On a local level their role was 
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significant, and in the absence of open government support for the Republic such activities 
demonstrate that regionally sympathisers did not resign themselves to accepting a Nationalist 
victory, but sought daring and often innovative ways of circumventing restrictions that they 
clearly saw as unjust. This chapter has aimed to underline how solidarity with the Republic 
often went far beyond the political manifestations of support in the comfort of the 
community, and for those who were prepared to go beyond words and translate their political 
beliefs into actions, such initiatives clearly made a difference, providing local partisan 
solidarity to an embattled Republic short on allies.  
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Conclusion 
As chapter four has demonstrated the trajectory of sympathies and solidarity in the South 
West of France extended from political displays of solidarity to support initiatives launched 
by small numbers of individuals and the enlistment of small groups of leftists in the 
International Brigades and Spanish Republican armed forces. That French leftist elements, 
Spanish émigré workers and second generation Spanish immigrants joined Republican forces 
in Spain, having co-existed in parallel republican and left-wing social and political climates 
in local communities across the region, has been demonstrated in the previous chapters to 
have been no coincidence. 
In chapter one the framework of solidarity with the Spanish Republic in the 1930s was 
demonstrated exemplifying how political, social and cultural connections between the border 
zone and the wider south western region were deeply developed throughout the early 
twentieth century and significantly from April 1931, following the proclamation of the 
Second Spanish Republic. The rise of leftist Popular Front governments and politics in 
France and Spain from 1934 further cemented the parallel political currents that significantly 
impacted upon regional political and social relationships.   
 Chapter one also examined how diverging political and social currents existed in many 
communities where pro-Republican actions took place, to recapitulate just a few examples, 
we can see cases of opposing politics examined in Saint-Jean-de-Luz, Bayonne, Biarritz and 
Perpignan. Such elements, chiefly associated with the Spanish Nationalist refugee right, 
evidence how local pro-Spanish Republican sympathisers had visible opponents, not only on 
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the far-flung frontlines of the Spanish peninsular conflict, but also, in many cases, in their 
own communities. 
 
 Such ideological and irreconcilable political stances demonstrate how pro-Republicanism 
and leftist politics were mobilised into action by opponents whose activities represented a 
threat to solidarity to the political, social and cultural values forged in the 1930s throughout 
the region. 
 Additionally, chapter one highlighted how the cultural and linguistic ties forged for centuries 
between peoples on both sides of the frontier, and especially in the Catalan and Basque 
regions, both allowed for and demonstrated a resurgence of a common regional and 
transnational identity, the Spanish Civil War demonstrating the profound nature of this 
traditional relationship. Moreover it is clear that local republicans and leftists supported the 
Spanish Republic often because the far-right threat was perceived as transcending the 
frontier, which throughout the period was clearly a theoretical rather than practical border in 
many respects. Indeed, it has been shown in all chapters that repercussions of events in Spain 
often reverberated far beyond the nominal Pyrenean border. Abduction, sabotage, defection, 
aerial bombardment, Nationalist espionage and military intelligence operations, all 
ingredients of the peninsular conflict, have been shown to have regularly crossed the border 
into local communities across the region. To recall but a few examples, in chapters two, three 
and four we have seen abduction and threats to rightists and Nationalists in Foix and 
Perpignan, sabotage in Bayonne and Narbonne and espionage operations in Biarritz and La 
Tour de Carol.   
 Chapter two has demonstrated how the development of a political consciousness of the 
Republican cause can be seen across the region from July 1936 as local pro-Republican 
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committees, including those in the smallest communes such as Lavelanet and Port-Vendres, 
were connected to the wider context of the Republican war effort, either through local 
initiative (Saint-Gaudens, Oloron, Bayonne) or loyalist diplomats (Pau, Tarbes, Sète). Local 
sympathisers developed solidarity as regional, national and trans-Pyrenean political and 
diplomatic personalities brought home the reality and implications of the Spanish Civil War, 
giving oratory performances of evident vigour from Carcassonne to Narbonne, Mont-Louis to 
Perpignan. Bringing home of the reality of the conflict to thousands of local leftists, 
previously sympathetic but not actively involved in solidarity initiatives,  was crucial in 
PRELOLVLQJWKHµKHDUWVDQGPLQGV¶RIORFDOSHRSOHDOORZLQJWKHPWREHFRPHLQYROYHGLQSUR-
Republican activities as Spanish events were felt to have a direct relevance for their lives and 
futures. Furthermore, as chapter two has highlighted, if local people in the border region 
readily came to the assistance of their border neighbours it was because there was a 
recognition of a shared political, social, cultural and economic tradition of interchange 
between such close communities. Local people recognised how much destinies on both sides 
of the border and the future nature of social relations between communities would be affected 
and shared in the event of a Nationalist victory. Many communities thus sought to maintain a 
balance of neighbourly and politically-motivated solidarity in order to preserve the 
harmonious balance of local relations.  
 Chapter three, having established in chapter two how civilian humanitarian efforts were 
multiplied by pro-Republicans from 1937, examined the unofficial Front Populaire 
government policy of Non-Intervention rélâchée, and subsequently revealed further layers of 
complexity in the south-western region. Parisian-centric historiography by Skoutelsky, 
Howson and Rapin may have provided a foundation for this investigation, but the regional 
and local detail has undoubtedly provided the richest levels of information which build on 
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previous UHVHDUFKLQWRWKH)URQW3RSXODLUHFDELQHW¶VVWDQFHVRQ1RQ-Intervention and support 
for the Republic. 
 The research in chapter three has also allowed for a reassessment of sympathies towards the 
Republic in the South West and the level of local engagement in covert operations. As has 
been seen, the focus of historiography on the initial phase of the Spanish Civil War from 
July-August 1936, has obscured a significantly more complex situation from 1937, in which 
local aviation industry operatives such as Jean Blanc developed and diversified their 
clandestine operations from more remote aerodromes, providing the Spanish Republic with 
guaranteed safe-zones for its aircraft purchased in northern Europe to refuel and be 
transferred. Meanwhile, as we have seen, illegal logistical operations conducted by aviation 
functionaries succeeded as complicity within the local community allowed for their activities 
to flourish. A climate of social and political sympathies within the largely pro-Republican 
workers¶ milieu of Toulouse allowed for popular leftist meeting-places to develop support for 
the Republic in the region. 
Pro-5HSXEOLFDQIXQFWLRQDULHVPDGHJRRGXVHRIFRQQHFWLRQVWRWKH)URQW3RSXODLUH¶VPXUNLHU
corridors of power, which enabled for operations to be carried out, in the knowledge that 
legal complications could be largely avoided due to timely and low-profile interventions from 
above. Our brief analysis of the Pyrénées-Orientales customs officers in chapter three has 
also underlined how networks of support stretched from municipal councils, constituted by 
retired and active colleagues, to local PCF and SFIO cells in local villages and towns. This 
network of connections stretching from Paris to Bourg Madame enabled their solidarity to 
span the local, regional and national pro-Republican front as they could draw upon all levels 
of assistance, from their central government superiors to their local political and professional 
colleagues. No less evident is the fact that such functionaries had an understanding of local 
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administration that enabled them to circumvent hostile administrators and facilitate the 
endeavours of civilian supporters of the Republic.  
There is certainly room to challenge assertions by Howson, therefore, that customs officers 
were officious enforcers of Non-Intervention. The present study has also illuminated the 
customs¶ regional role, alluded to by Skoutelsky, but confined in his study to government 
echelons.  
Finally, in chapter four, the provision of support services to future International Brigade 
volunteers travelling to Spain and the enlistment of such regional combatants has been 
examined. We have seen in numerous case studies, in the French Basque country, Oloron and 
Tarbes, how politicised pro-Republican elements in the region chose to enlist in the 
International Brigades and fight for the Spanish Republic. Such decisions were the result of 
deeply-entrenched connections to the political, social and cultural context, in the border 
region of the South West especially, where links to Spanish Republicans, both economic 
émigrés and political refugees, were part of the local fabric of daily life. Those closest to such 
multinational millieux had strong sympathies for a Spanish government and Republic that 
was in many respects as important to the local community as the French Republic and the 
)URQW3RSXODLUH7KHVWUHQJWKRI WKH µORFDO IDEULF¶RIPDQ\FRPPXQLWLHV LQ WKH6RXWK:HVW
can also be seen in the diverse support actions and volunteer smuggling that took place before 
and after the February 1937 laws. As has been seen in chapter four in the Ariège, Haute-
Garonne and Pyrénées-Orientales networks of passeurs provided crucial connections between 
the two Republics, maintaining the flow of regional, national and international volunteers into 
Spain, despite the Non-Intervention agreement. That such persons were prepared to risk 
detention for their activities, as well as attacks from the far-right and local Nationalist 
µUHIXJHHV¶GHPRQVWUDWHV a social and political commitment that was present in Communist, 
Socialist and Anarchist circles.  
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In this light, it has been necessary throughout the present work to underline the importance of 
the complexity of motivations for sympathy, solidarity and partisanship with the Spanish 
Republic. Whilst this research has shown the involvement of Communists and Socialists 
motivated by Republicanism and anti-fascism, we have also seen Anarchists motivated by 
pacifism, extreme-rightists motivated by humanitarian ideals, Rightists by territorial integrity 
and Catholics motivated by shared religious beliefs.  
Meanwhile we have seen that it is impossible to attempt to reconstruct a profile of the 
µaverage¶ supporter of the Spanish Republic in the South West. Motivations behind 
sympathies and solidarity for the Spanish Republic were of course multi-faceted, but included 
antifascism, class solidarity, Communism, Anarchism, Socialism, Pacifism, democratic and 
human rights beliefs, regionalism and regional identity amongst many important mobilising 
factors. 
Clearly, then, the Spanish Civil War had a wide-ranging effect upon the South West; creating 
networks of solidarity which forged Popular Front ideals on both sides of the border, creating 
a genuine solidarity movement which remained durable throughout the conflict. Whilst the 
solidarity of other regions of the French Third Republic during the conflict ebbed as the 
conflict continued into 1937, communities and political sympathisers, such as those examined 
throughout the thesis, remained firmly behind the Spanish Second Republic. The awareness 
of a shared destiny, and for many communities the first-hand experiences of far-right 
involvement in favour of the Nationalists, as well as hostile acts by Nationalist agents on 
French soil in the South West, ensured that a heightened awareness of the conflict remained 
far beyond 1936.  
Throughout, we have seen how supporters from diverse political, professional and social 
horizons provided solidarity that pre-dated the support that Spain¶V H[RGXV RI UHIXJHHV
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received in 1939 from various organisations. Moreover it is clear that South Western 
functionaries sympathetic to the Republic were not merely actors standing in the wings of the 
Non-Intervention rélâchée drama, but vital parts in a politically volatile game. That their 
contribution has been revealed enables us to understand another layer of complexity in the 
attitudes of Front Populaire supporters to the Spanish Republic and Frente Popular. Above all 
the present work has offered a fuller picture of sympathies and solidarity for the Second 
Spanish Republic in the South West and importantly in the border region. Local communities 
were not inert onlookers surveying the destruction and suffering of their southern neighbours, 
but were indeed crucial components of international solidarity, able to mobilise local 
political, social and cultural bonds with the peninsula and project solidarity initiatives far 
beyond the Pyrenean peaks.  
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